This reverts commit fa243293343eb964bfee5b91cc52b91f16232ab6.
The commit may be signed by my key, but I haven’t checked it. Also, I haven’t checked the new contrib/verify-commits/trusted-git-root
.
This reverts commit fa243293343eb964bfee5b91cc52b91f16232ab6.
The commit may be signed by my key, but I haven’t checked it. Also, I haven’t checked the new contrib/verify-commits/trusted-git-root
.
This reverts commit fa243293343eb964bfee5b91cc52b91f16232ab6.
The following sections might be updated with supplementary metadata relevant to reviewers and maintainers.
See the guideline for information on the review process.
If your review is incorrectly listed, please react with 👎 to this comment and the bot will ignore it on the next update.
Commit signature for fab17f08e24f0db687dc25c5e10eb62293070048 looks good. I ran a rebased version of #27058 against the old trusted git root, and it doesn’t complain about the commit that contains the new one, so I guess that’s good.
Calling the commit Revert
both confusing and omits the rather critical bit about updating the trusted root.
The following generates a (rather huge) list of revsig commits which can be used in lieu of the root update (see #27058)
0git log --format="%H %GK" --merges $(cat contrib/verify-commits/trusted-git-root)..master | grep -E "CE2B75697E69A548" | cut -c -40
Strong preference to merge #27058 first.
ACK fab17f08e24f0db687dc25c5e10eb62293070048
The key removed matches the fingerprint of the key that I have for Marco Falke and is the same that has been used to sign commits.
With the key removed and the new trusted git root, all commits still verify.
ACK fab17f08e2
Matches the fingerprint I have for Marco Falke and what has been used to sign commits. 437dfe1c26e752c280014a30f809e62c684ad99e was the last merge signed with this key, and verify-commits.py passes with this trusted root and the key removed.