From: Murch <murch@murch.one>
To: STEVEN SLATER <thugm501@gmail.com>
Cc: bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] [BIP Draft] Dust UTXO Disposal Protocol
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2026 13:45:47 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <283ccf28-c0ca-4ba5-9c5b-c4215a2fa0cf@murch.one> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAP+9vXOVhnCC5fPjK1q9d_gL0+oHs1-Gk3p04=w90W6dW1PbcQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Steven,
Thanks for the quick reply, looking forward to reading the updated document!
I just realized that I forgot another point in my prior email. While
there are some other node implementations that still implement BIP 125:
Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling, Bitcoin Core 28.0 and later will
accept replacements even if the original transaction did not signal
replaceability¹, so you could consider dropping the replaceability
signal requirement. While the dust disposal transactions will be quite
distinguishable either way and it’s unlikely to be a big deal if they
were to continue signaling in the future, it may be more forward-looking
not to signal.
¹ E.g., see the linked news items regarding `mempoolfullrbf` on
https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/replace-by-fee/ for details
Cheers,
Murch
On 2026-04-06 11:11, STEVEN SLATER wrote:
> Response to Feedback on Transaction Aggregation Proposal
>
> Hi Murch,
>
> Thank you for taking the time to review my proposal and for raising
> these thoughtful points.
>
> On the question of requiring an ash-output: I did consider the idea of
> mandating it universally. The main trade-off is between simplicity in
> aggregation and the overhead cost. A fixed 3‑byte addition per
> transaction is relatively small, but when scaled across high‑volume
> usage it does introduce measurable bloat. My current rationale was to
> avoid imposing that cost on transactions that are unlikely to benefit
> from aggregation. That said, I agree that in scenarios where feerates
> fluctuate significantly and dust transactions linger in the mempool, a
> standardized ash-output could make collapsing transactions more
> predictable and efficient. I’ll expand the rationale to weigh the
> benefits of guaranteed collapsibility against the marginal overhead, and
> outline conditions where the overhead is justified.
>
> Regarding incompatible outputs: you’re right that independent
> submissions with conflicting outputs cannot be aggregated. My intent was
> to highlight that aggregation works best when inputs are aligned, and
> that ash-output could serve as a safeguard to preserve compatibility.
> I’ll clarify this point further in the next revision.
>
> Thank you also for the correction on feerate policy backports to Bitcoin
> Core 29.1 and 28.3. I’ll update the proposal to reflect that users on
> those branches will indeed propagate sub‑sat transactions.
>
> I appreciate your constructive feedbackit helps sharpen the rationale
> and ensures the proposal is practical for broader adoption. I’ll
> incorporate these clarifications before submission.
>
> Best regards,
> Steven
>
> On Mon, 6 Apr 2026, 5:26 pm Murch, <murch@murch.one> wrote:
>
> Hi bubb1es,
>
> I just skimmed your proposal and was considering the impact of the two
> possible output variants. As you mention in the description of the test
> cases, adding more inputs to a transaction would retain the output of
> the first transaction that appeared on the network. However, if two
> users independently submit transactions with incompatible outputs,
> third
> parties would not be able to aggregate those transactions into a single
> transaction.
>
> I was wondering whether you considered generally requiring the
> ash-output to ensure that transactions can always be collapsed. This
> may
> especially be attractive if feerates will be more dynamic in the future
> and dust disposal transactions linger in the mempool for a while.
>
> It probably comes down to how heavily this scheme will be used
> whether a
> general 3-byte overhead is justifiable to simplify aggregation. Either
> way, perhaps you could expound a bit on that trade-off in your
> rationale.
>
> Also, minor correction: the feerate policy change was backported to
> Bitcoin Core 29.1 and Bitcoin Core 28.3, so users running the latest
> releases of those major branches would also propagate sub-sat
> transactions.
>
> Otherwise, this proposal looks reasonable to me. Looking forward to
> your
> submission.
>
> Cheers,
> Murch
>
> On 2026-03-30 11:34, 'bubb1es' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi, based on a topic I started on Delving <https://
> delvingbitcoin.org/t/ <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/>
> > disposing-of-dust-attack-utxos/2215> I'd like to gather feedback
> from
> > this community for a BIP to standardize disposing of dust UTXOs by
> > spending their values to the fee of single OP_RETURN output
> transactions.
> >
> > Thanks in advance for taking your time to consider this proposal.
> >
> > ```
> > BIP: ?
> > Layer: Applications
> > Title: Dust UTXO Disposal Protocol
> > Authors: bubb1es <bubb1es71@proton.me <mailto:bubb1es71@proton.me>>
> > harris <imtux2@proton.me <mailto:imtux2@proton.me>>
> > Status: Draft
> > Type: Specification
> > Assigned: ?
> > License: CC0-1.0
> > Discussion: 2026-01-25: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/disposing-
> of-dust- <https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/disposing-of-dust->
> > attack-utxos/2215
> > Version: 0.1.0
> > ```
> >
> > ## Abstract
> >
> > This BIP specifies a standardized protocol for safely disposing
> of dust
> > UTXOs by spending them to an OP_RETURN output with the entire value
> > going to transaction fees. The protocol enables wallet software to
> > remove unwanted small-value UTXOs, particularly those received in
> dust
> > attacks, without creating new address linkages or degrading user
> > privacy. The specification includes transaction format requirements,
> > signature conventions enabling third-party batching, and validation
> > rules for compliant implementations.
> >
> > ## Motivation
> >
> > ### The Dust Attack Problem
> >
> > Dust attacks are a well-documented privacy threat where attackers
> send
> > small amounts of bitcoin to numerous addresses. When wallet software
> > later consolidates these dust UTXOs with non-dust UTXOs, the
> attacker
> > can analyze the blockchain to link previously unassociated
> addresses,
> > potentially deanonymizing users.
> >
> > The common solution to this issue is to "lock" dust UTXOs and never
> > spend them, but this creates its own problems:
> >
> > 1. **UTXO Set Bloat**: Unspent dust permanently occupies space in
> the
> > UTXO set that all full nodes must maintain.
> > 2. **Wallet Clutter**: Accumulated dust degrades wallet usability
> and
> > complicates coin selection.
> > 3. **Accidental Consolidation**: Users may inadvertently spend dust
> > during legitimate transactions, achieving the attacker's goal.
> > 4. **Lock Fragility**: Wallet software that "locks" dust UTXOs to
> > prevent spending provides only temporary protection; wallet
> migrations,
> > restores from seed phrases, software bugs, or inheritance
> scenarios can
> > inadvertently unlock dust, exposing users to the original attack.
> >
> > ### Why OP_RETURN Disposal
> >
> > Spending dust to an OP_RETURN output with the entire value going
> to fees
> > provides several benefits:
> >
> > 1. **No New UTXOs**: OP_RETURN outputs are provably unspendable
> and not
> > stored in the UTXO set.
> > 2. **No Address Linking**: Without a change output, there is no new
> > address to link.
> > 3. **Permanent Removal**: The dust UTXOs are removed from the user's
> > wallet entirely.
> > 4. **Miner Compensation**: OP_RETURN outputs are small, providing
> higher
> > transaction fee rates.
> > 5. **No Cost to Victims**: Dust attack UTXO values are used to
> pay for
> > their own disposal.
> >
> > ### Why Standardization
> >
> > A standardized protocol enables:
> >
> > 1. **Wallet Anonymity**: Transactions with a standard format
> cannot be
> > used to fingerprint the wallet software a user is running.
> > 2. **Third-Party Batching**: Multiple dust disposals can be combined
> > into single transactions, reducing overall block space consumption.
> > 3. **Best Practice Codification**: Ensures implementations follow
> > privacy-preserving best practices.
> > 4. **Easy Identification**: Chain analysis tools can use disposal
> > transactions to help trace the sources of dust attacks.
> >
> > ## Specification
> >
> > ### Transaction Format
> >
> > A compliant dust disposal transaction MUST satisfy all the following
> > requirements:
> >
> > #### Overall
> >
> > 1. The transaction MUST signal RBF replaceability (nSequence <
> 0xFFFFFFFE).
> > 2. The ntimelock MUST be set to block height 0.
> > 3. The fee rate MUST be at least 0.1 sat/vB.
> >
> > #### Outputs
> >
> > 1. The transaction MUST have exactly one output.
> > 2. The single output MUST be an OP_RETURN.
> > 3. The OP_RETURN data MUST be either:
> > - Empty: `0x6a 0x00` (OP_RETURN OP_0), or
> > - The ASCII string "ash": `0x6a 0x03 0x61 0x73 0x68` (OP_RETURN
> > OP_PUSHBYTES_3 "ash").
> >
> > The "ash" marker MUST be used when padding is needed to meet the
> 65 vB
> > minimum standard transaction size with a single witness input.
> > Implementations MUST prefer empty OP_RETURN data when the
> transaction
> > already meets minimum size requirements.
> >
> > #### Inputs
> >
> > 1. All inputs MUST use the signature hash type `SIGHASH_ALL |
> > SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY` (0x81).
> > 2. For Taproot (P2TR) inputs using key-path spending,
> implementations
> > MUST explicitly append the signature hash type byte `SIGHASH_ALL |
> > SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY` (0x81) to enable ANYONECANPAY semantics, as
> the
> > default sighash for Taproot (SIGHASH_DEFAULT, which omits the
> byte) does
> > not include ANYONECANPAY.
> > 3. All inputs must be confirmed in the blockchain at least one
> block deep.
> >
> > #### Fees
> >
> > 1. The entire input value MUST go to fees (output value is zero for
> > OP_RETURN).
> > 2. The transaction fee rate MUST be at least 0.1 sat/vB to meet
> minimum
> > relay requirements (Bitcoin Core 30.0+).
> > 3. The transaction fee rate MAY be higher based on the available
> dust
> > UTXO amounts and transaction size.
> >
> > ### Transaction Size
> >
> > 1. The transaction base size MUST be at least 65 bytes to meet
> Bitcoin
> > Core's minimum relay size standardness rule.
> > 2. If the transaction would otherwise be smaller than 65 bytes, the
> > OP_RETURN value "ash" as ASCII (UTF-8) bytes (0x61, 0x73, 0x68)
> MUST be
> > used to pad the transaction's size to 65 bytes.
> >
> > ### Address Consolidation Rules
> >
> > Implementations consolidating dust UTXOs for a single user (i.e.,
> not
> > third-party batching services):
> >
> > - MUST NOT spend dust UTXOs that were sent to different addresses
> in the
> > same transaction.
> > - MUST NOT broadcast dust disposal transactions at the same time for
> > dust sent to different addresses.
> > - SHOULD spend dust UTXOs for dust sent to the same address in one
> > transaction.
> >
> > ### Batching Dust Disposal Transactions via RBF
> >
> > Multiple unconfirmed dust disposal transactions created by unrelated
> > entities MAY be batched into a single replacement transaction using
> > Replace-By-Fee (RBF). This is enabled by the inputs
> SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY
> > signature type.
> >
> > In addition to standard RBF rules, batch dust disposal
> transactions must
> > follow all transaction construction requirements for non-batched
> dust
> > disposal transactions.
> >
> > #### Third-Party Batching
> >
> > A third-party batching service for dust disposal transactions could
> > compromise their users' privacy by collecting user-related
> network and
> > timing metadata. The best practice for these services is:
> >
> > 1. The service MUST NOT collect pre-signed inputs directly from
> wallet
> > users.
> > 2. The service SHOULD collect pre-signed inputs from the public
> bitcoin
> > network mempool.
> > 3. The service MAY add their own UTXO inputs to improve the batch
> > transaction's fee rate as long as all the requirements of this
> > specification are still followed.
> >
> > This mempool-based approach preserves user privacy while enabling
> > efficient batching:
> >
> > 1. Users broadcast their individual dust disposal transactions to
> the
> > network.
> > 2. Batching services monitor the mempool for compliant dust disposal
> > transactions.
> > 3. Services can combine unconfirmed transactions via RBF without
> knowing
> > user identities.
> >
> > ### Dust Threshold
> >
> > Implementations SHOULD allow users to configure their own dust
> threshold
> > based on:
> >
> > 1. The current and anticipated fee rates.
> > 2. The dust input script type, different types have different
> spending
> > costs.
> > 3. The varying amounts that may be used by dust attack initiators.
> >
> > A UTXO is generally considered dust if its value is less than the
> cost
> > to spend it at a reasonable fee rate, but any small UTXO value
> could be
> > used in a dust attack.
> >
> > ### Security Considerations
> >
> > #### Transaction Signing
> >
> > 1. **Key Security**: Signing dust disposal transactions requires
> signing
> > with the user's wallet private keys. This could be a risk for cold
> > storage wallets where the key or keys needed to sign are not easily
> > accessible.
> > 2. **Transaction Correctness**: Transaction signers must carefully
> > review and verify that only dust UTXOs are spent and no other
> inputs are
> > signed.
> >
> > #### Privacy Preservation
> >
> > 1. **Network surveillance**: Internet service providers and other
> > internet monitors may be able to determine the nodes that initially
> > broadcast a dust disposal transaction. If available the
> > `sendrawtransaction -privatebroadcast` RPC feature should be used
> > (available in [Bitcoin Core 31.0](https://github.com/bitcoin-
> core/ <https://github.com/bitcoin-core/>
> > bitcoin-devwiki/wiki/31.0-Release-Notes-Draft#p2p-and-network-
> changes)).
> > 2. **Timing Analysis**: Users should be aware that the timing of
> dust
> > disposal transactions is publicly observable. Dust disposal
> transactions
> > should not be broadcast at the same time or on a predictable
> schedule.
> > 3. **Amount Analysis**: The specific dust amounts selected for dust
> > disposal if outside the norm may be used to fingerprint the wallet
> > creating the disposal transactions.
> >
> > ## Rationale
> >
> > ### Why Empty or "ash" OP_RETURN Data?
> >
> > 1. **Minimal Size**: Empty data (2 bytes: OP_RETURN OP_0)
> minimizes the
> > transaction size.
> > 2. **Standardization**: Consistent transaction construction
> eliminates
> > wallet fingerprinting.
> > 3. **Padding Option**: The "ash" string (5 bytes: OP_RETURN
> > OP_PUSHBYTES_3 "ash") provides a standardized way to meet the
> minimum
> > transaction size; e.g., for a single P2TR dust input.
> > 4. **Semantic Meaning**: The word "ash" metaphorically represents
> the
> > result of "burning" the dust.
> >
> > ### Why Per-Address Transactions?
> >
> > Consolidating dust from multiple addresses for the same wallet
> creates
> > the same privacy harm that dust attacks attempt to achieve. By
> requiring
> > wallet software to create separate transactions per address (by
> > default), the protocol ensures dust disposal doesn't harm privacy.
> >
> > ### Why 65 Byte Minimum?
> >
> > Bitcoin Core enforces a minimum transaction base size of 65 bytes
> as a
> > policy rule to prevent certain attack vectors. Compliant
> transactions
> > must meet this threshold to be relayed by standard nodes.
> >
> > ### Why 0.1 sat/vB Minimum Fee Rate?
> >
> > [Bitcoin Core 30.0](https://bitcoincore.org/en/releases/30.0/
> <https://bitcoincore.org/en/releases/30.0/>) reduced
> > the minimum relay fee rate to 0.1 sat/vB (1 sat/kvB). This allows
> dust
> > UTXOs to be disposed of economically even when their value is very
> > small. Implementations targeting earlier node versions may need
> higher
> > minimum fee rates.
> >
> > ### Why SIGHASH_ALL|ANYONECANPAY?
> >
> > The ANYONECANPAY flag allows additional inputs to be added to the
> dust
> > disposal transaction after signing. This provides several benefits:
> >
> > 1. **Batching**: Unrelated dust disposal transactions can be
> found in
> > the mempool and batched together via RBF.
> > 2. **User privacy**: Transactions shared via the public mempool
> do not
> > reveal user identity metadata.
> > 3. **Fee Bumping**: Additional inputs can be added by unrelated
> third
> > parties to increase the fee rate.
> >
> > ### Why nLockTime block height 0
> >
> > 1. **User privacy**: Using the same nLockTime for all dust disposal
> > transactions obscures when it was created.
> > 2. **Fee sniping**: The value of disposal transactions should be
> small
> > enough that fee sniping is not a concern.
> >
> > ## Backwards Compatibility
> >
> > This BIP introduces no changes to the Bitcoin consensus rules or
> peer-
> > to-peer protocol. All transactions conforming to this
> specification are
> > valid under existing consensus rules and can be relayed by nodes
> supporting:
> >
> > - OP_RETURN outputs (Bitcoin Core 0.9.0+)
> > - SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY (original Bitcoin feature)
> > - 0.1 sat/vB minimum relay fee (Bitcoin Core 30.0+)
> > - Private transaction broadcast (Bitcoin Core 31.0+)
> >
> > Nodes running Bitcoin Core versions prior to 30.0 do not relay
> > transactions with fee rates below 1 sat/vB which could slow the
> relaying
> > of disposal transactions with lower fee rates.
> >
> > ## Reference Implementation
> >
> > A reference implementation is available at: https://github.com/
> <https://github.com/>
> > bubb1es71/ddust
> >
> > The implementation provides:
> > - Command-line tool for creating dust disposal transactions
> > - Automatic dust detection based on configurable thresholds
> > - Transaction batching via RBF
> > - Support for P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, and P2TR input descriptors
> > - Integration with Bitcoin Core (version 30.0+) via RPC for
> syncing and
> > broadcasting transactions
> >
> > ## Test Cases
> >
> > The test cases below can be used to verify a wallet disposes of dust
> > UTXOs according to the specification in this BIP.
> >
> > ### List dust
> >
> > 1. Create payment addresses for multiple address types, send dust
> and
> > non-dust amounts to these addresses, verify that listing dust only
> > returns UTXOs at or below the configured dust threshold (e.g.
> 1000 sats).
> > 2. Create confirmed and unconfirmed dust UTXOs in the test wallet,
> > verify listing dust only returns the confirmed dust UTXOs.
> >
> > ### Spending dust
> >
> > All valid dust disposal transactions should be verified to be
> accepted
> > into the bitcoind (Bitcoin Core 30.0+) mempool.
> >
> > 1. Spending a single witness (Bech32m/P2TR) dust UTXO must produce a
> > dust disposal transaction with a single "ash" OP_RETURN output.
> > 2. Spending multiple dust UTXOs always produces a single empty
> OP_RETURN
> > output regardless of script type.
> > 3. Spending a single 2-of-2 P2SH multisig dust UTXO produces a
> single
> > empty OP_RETURN output.
> > 4. All dust UTXOs sent to the same address are disposed of in the
> same
> > transaction.
> > 5. Dust disposal transactions only include confirmed dust UTXOs.
> >
> > #### Example dust disposal transaction sizes
> >
> > | | P2PKH | P2SH (2-3) | P2WPKH | P2WSH (2-3) | P2TR |
> >
> |-------------------|-------|------------|--------|-------------|-------|
> > | Overhead (b) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
> > | Input (b) | 148 | 295 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
> > | OP_RETURN (b) | 11 | 11 | 14 | 14 | 14 |
> > | Base size (b) | 169 | 316 | 65 | 65 | 65 |
> > | Witness data (b) | 0 | 0 | 108 | 255 | 67 |
> > | Size (b) | 169 | 316 | 173 | 320 | 132 |
> > | Weight (wu) | 676 | 1264 | 370 | 517 | 329 |
> > | Virtual Size (vb) | 169 | 316 | 92.5 | 129.25 | 82.25 |
> >
> > #### Example dust disposal transaction fee rates (sats/vb)
> >
> > | Input Amount | P2PKH | P2SH (2-3) | P2WPKH | P2WSH (2-3) | P2TR |
> >
> |--------------|---------|------------|--------|-------------|-------|
> > | 294 | 1.74 | 0.93 | 3.18 | 2.27 | 3.57 |
> > | 300 | 1.78 | 0.95 | 3.24 | 2.32 | 3.65 |
> > | 325 | 1.92 | 1.03 | 3.51 | 2.51 | 3.95 |
> > | 330 | 1.95 | 1.04 | 3.57 | 2.55 | 4.01 |
> >
> > ### Batching dust disposal txs via RBF
> >
> > 1. Adding a Bech32m dust input to an unconfirmed disposal
> transaction
> > with a legacy dust input keeps the original single empty
> OP_RETURN output.
> > 2. Adding a Bech32m dust input to an unconfirmed disposal
> transaction
> > with a Bech32m dust input keeps the original single "ash"
> OP_RETURN output.
> > 3. Adding a new dust input to an unconfirmed disposal transaction
> > results in a new batch disposal transaction with a fee rate
> sufficient
> > for RBF.
> > 4. A new dust input that contributes an insufficient fee rate for
> RBF
> > with an existing unconfirmed disposal transaction is not batched
> with it.
> >
> > ## Related work
> >
> > * "dust-b-gone": https://github.com/petertodd/dust-b-gone
> <https://github.com/petertodd/dust-b-gone>
> > * "dusts": https://github.com/bubb1es71/dusts <https://
> github.com/bubb1es71/dusts>
> >
> > ## Changelog
> >
> > * **0.1.0** (2026-03-22):
> > * Initial draft of the BIP.
> >
> > ## Copyright
> >
> >
> > This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0
> Universal
> > license.
> >
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-06 21:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-30 18:34 'bubb1es' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-04-06 16:18 ` Murch
2026-04-06 18:11 ` STEVEN SLATER
2026-04-06 20:45 ` Murch [this message]
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