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[79.135.106.104]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 4fb4d7f45d1cf-6b889c20942si40462a12.7.2026.11.18.15.45.11 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:45:11 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of conduition@proton.me designates 79.135.106.104 as permitted sender) client-ip=79.135.106.104; Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:45:03 +0000 To: Cory Fields From: "'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions Message-ID: <3Si-X9YGMmYLUCsKqrf8g84uAsg2xdkZMDpHXcLgqC1_KTnCw1J8kylgHw8PyGNjMkT4tpxSfKwnVNxX8QbnzuSzFDkdGGe96a7q_GTLnWg=@proton.me> In-Reply-To: <6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n@googlegroups.com> References: <40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n@googlegroups.com> <6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n@googlegroups.com> Feedback-ID: 72003692:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 4457906860e76d6b1b1e2c80055b909764f9fa1e MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512; boundary="------0c1e2521231725744958c70f492eac08241c55f48af3860de356c6e589521ff0"; charset=utf-8 X-Original-Sender: conduition@proton.me X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@proton.me header.s=agbeygxwgvf7he3wgphzgzr2ue.protonmail2 header.b=siygtpES; spf=pass (google.com: domain of conduition@proton.me designates 79.135.106.104 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=conduition@proton.me; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=proton.me X-Original-From: conduition Reply-To: conduition Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --------0c1e2521231725744958c70f492eac08241c55f48af3860de356c6e589521ff0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary=---------------------3be05e0f6797905863195b8bd73a0a55 -----------------------3be05e0f6797905863195b8bd73a0a55 Content-Type: multipart/alternative;boundary=---------------------2c16581ad85f16a03ea6d9ae0eb50144 -----------------------2c16581ad85f16a03ea6d9ae0eb50144 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" It's a neat idea conceptually (your superposition joke elicited a hearty ch= uckle!), but I fear your stated goal of "make it impossible to reason about= how many coins are quantum-safe" is contrary to one of the most important = metrics we need: a gauge for the progress of PQ migration. Without that we = are effectively guessing about the ratio of classical/PQ coins when making = future soft fork decisions, which seems like shaky ground. Further, i'm not sure that your goal would even be accomplished... As you n= ote here: > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associate= d private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a = quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landm= ines. A quantum attacker could simply neglect to attack outputs created after the= "landmine" soft fork was activated, and be certain that they'll never step= on one. If any new output could be a landmine, the attacker would just foc= us on old outputs, e.g. satoshi era coins, and still have plenty of profit. > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, b= ut in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40bt= c, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40= btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In orde= r to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constraine= d. > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the v= ulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc= of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending cond= itions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. >=20 > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an au= ction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction per= iod, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to t= ake 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost,= the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction contin= ues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. This is confusing. How does the network distinguish an attacker from the real honest user? If = the honest user is trying to rescue their coins, why do they have to endure= this rigmarole in order to do it, rather than using a rescue protocol like= commit/reveal? Why does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He h= asn't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would = spend a given UTXO.=C2=A0 Why would landmine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, given that i= t was created beyond a landmine soft fork was deployed? Why does Carol's 30 BTC bid win over Bob's 40 BTC bid? I'm not sure i see t= he logic here. Could you clarify what you mean by "staking"? AFAICT nobody has any coins t= imelocked or staked in any enforceable way (except apparently for the legac= y UTXO?) Secondary concern: The collateralization requirement makes it possible to c= reate outputs you cannot spend without access to more bitcoins for collater= al. Tractable but very awkward UX. regards, conduition On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 10:26 AM, Cory Fields wrote: > Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look. >=20 > Yes, the landmine would be purposeful bait. >=20 > The reason it's interesting is because it makes it impossible to reason a= bout how many coins are quantum-safe at any given time. This would have the= effect of rendering any "freeze the coins that can't be safely spent" argu= ment moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerability of _any_ unspent output, = Satoshi's included, could not be known until attempting to steal it. UTXO s= uperposition would be an ironic defense against a quantum attacker :) >=20 > I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving coins seems backwards at first gl= ance, but another way of looking at it is that the coins are "moved" as soo= n as the landmine is planted, in that they're protected and safely spendabl= e at that point. It's just that their safety is not observable to anyone el= se. Depending on how forking and migration go, that could be a feature or a= n anti-feature. >=20 > I presented these ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no = other proposals for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to al= low but disincentivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain tr= ansactions should we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but wi= th these thought experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead = ask "can we co-exist with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitc= oin's ethos?". Obviously I can't answer that question myself, but when atte= mpt to reason through it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with = involved financial punishments for theft and rewards for defending the chai= n against attacks. Landmines achieve both of those. >=20 > It seems to me that if recovery schemes are on the table, it's worth cons= idering whether we could take them a step further and use them as an actual= offense/defense rather than just an escape hatch. The same collateral rule= s employed by landmines could be added to any recovery scheme in order to c= hange the incentives. >=20 > I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm d= efinitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just shari= ng the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :)On Tuesday, Novem= ber 17, 2026 at 11:00:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-5 conduition wrote: >=20 > > Hi Cory, > >=20 > >=20 > > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also= embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. > >=20 > >=20 > > If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prio= r to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quan= tum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable inten= tionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong th= ing to incentivize. > >=20 > > regards, > > conduition > >=20 > >=20 > >=20 > >=20 > > On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields wrote: > >=20 > > > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migr= ation to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of= how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possibl= e, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post= is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > >=20 > > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > > > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > > > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like T= ripwire and/or manually) > > > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in= order to be spent (more on this later) > > > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet = certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > >=20 > > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant con= structions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by= soft-fork rules. > > >=20 > > > ## Quantum Landmines > > >=20 > > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been disc= ussed here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > >=20 > > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a = quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe ou= tput (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any l= egacy output type would work. > > >=20 > > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also= embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine = this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it al= so contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed= by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never reveal= ed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > >=20 > > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the ne= w rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a tran= saction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe outpu= t. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > > > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of = the private key is sufficient to spend > > > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the= one signed for in the above proof > > > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be = spent as usual. > > >=20 > > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, exce= pt that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after findi= ng her private key. > > >=20 > > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-sa= fe 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs,= and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described abo= ve. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the at= tacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. = However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-li= mbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input an= d revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taki= ng the attacker's collateral. > > >=20 > > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked jus= t like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > >=20 > > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivize= s Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerab= le coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as = they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that o= n qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft= . > > >=20 > > > ## Staked Auction > > >=20 > > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the assoc= iated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thu= s a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by l= andmines. > > >=20 > > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme= to empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quant= um attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > >=20 > > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways = to spend a legacy output: > > > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qda= y knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > > > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeo= ut, a bid is sufficient to spend > > > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it= can be spent as usual. > > >=20 > > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associ= ated landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the futur= e. > > >=20 > > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret lea= f, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of = 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid o= f 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In = order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constr= ained. > > >=20 > > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with t= he vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 5= 0btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending = conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > >=20 > > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now a= n auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction= period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it = to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are l= ost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction co= ntinues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > >=20 > > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her = staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but = nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coin= s as profit. > > >=20 > > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future qua= ntum attacker can bid on before qday. > > >=20 > > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins b= ack so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused c= ollateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or thrown= into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked= time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > >=20 > > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a stake= d lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by = the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacke= r's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only eve= r makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're inc= entivized to make a very conservative bid. > > >=20 > > > ## Sats Auction > > >=20 > > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggeste= d that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. S= ee the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how = it could be used here. > > >=20 > > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/time= out mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > >=20 > > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine ti= meout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest= bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there = are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent th= emselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. A= s a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnera= ble 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even at= tach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vu= lnerable output. > > >=20 > > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the l= ogical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is n= o pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly indis= tinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial reco= very if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > >=20 > > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > > > - Collateral ratio > > > - Min/Max bids and intervals > > > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > >=20 > > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > >=20 > > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there ar= e lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable co= in auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the= best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most desir= able outcome would be. > > >=20 > > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal= in the first place? > > > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers s= ometimes winning to encourage the process? > > > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, a= n auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspen= t output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > >=20 > > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may eve= n change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is incr= easingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > >=20 > > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction > >=20 > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Gr= oups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, sen= d an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > > > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitco= indev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com. >=20 > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups= "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an= email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoinde= v/6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n%40googlegroups.com. --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 3Si-X9YGMmYLUCsKqrf8g84uAsg2xdkZMDpHXcLgqC1_KTnCw1J8kylgHw8PyGNjMkT4tpxSfKw= nVNxX8QbnzuSzFDkdGGe96a7q_GTLnWg%3D%40proton.me. -----------------------2c16581ad85f16a03ea6d9ae0eb50144 Content-Type: multipart/related;boundary=---------------------48f0c3c34477e5b966d47508b0f02998 -----------------------48f0c3c34477e5b966d47508b0f02998 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
It's a neat= idea conceptually (your superposition joke elicited a hearty chuckle!), bu= t I fear your stated goal of "make it impossible to reason about how many c= oins are quantum-safe" is contrary to one of the most important metrics we = need: a gauge for the progress of PQ migration. Without that we are effecti= vely guessing about the ratio of classical/PQ coins when making future soft= fork decisions, which seems like shaky ground.

Further, i'm not sure that your go= al would even be accomplished... As you note here:

The obvious problem= with relying on landmines alone is that the associated private keys for ma= ny vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum attacker coul= d reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines.


This is confusing.

How does the network distinguish an attacker from the = real honest user? If the honest user is trying to rescue their coins, why d= o they have to endure this rigmarole in order to do it, rather than using a= rescue protocol like commit/reveal?

Wh= y does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He has= n't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would sp= end a given UTXO. 
Why would landm= ine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, given that it was created b= eyond a landmine soft fork was deployed?


<= /div>
Could you clarify what= you mean by "staking"? AFAICT nobody has any coins timelocked or staked in= any enforceable way (except apparently for the legacy UTXO?)

Secondary concern: The collateralization requirement= makes it possible to create outputs you cannot spend without access to mor= e bitcoins for collateral. Tractable but very awkward UX.

regards,
conduition


On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 10:26 AM, Cory Fields <foss@c= oryfields.com> wrote:
Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look.

Yes, the landmi= ne would be purposeful bait.

The reason it's interesting is because = it makes it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe at a= ny given time. This would have the effect of rendering any "freeze the coin= s that can't be safely spent" argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulne= rability of _any_ unspent output, Satoshi's included, could not be known un= til attempting to steal it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense a= gainst a quantum attacker :)

I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving= coins seems backwards at first glance, but another way of looking at it is= that the coins are "moved" as soon as the landmine is planted, in that the= y're protected and safely spendable at that point. It's just that their saf= ety is not observable to anyone else. Depending on how forking and migratio= n go, that could be a feature or an anti-feature.

I presented these = ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no other proposals for = turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to allow but disincentivi= ze it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain transactions should we= incentivize" is of course very closely related, but with these thought exp= eriments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead ask "can we co-exist= with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". Obvio= usly I can't answer that question myself, but when attempt to reason throug= h it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with involved financial p= unishments for theft and rewards for defending the chain against attacks. L= andmines achieve both of those.

It seems to me that if recovery sche= mes are on the table, it's worth considering whether we could take them a s= tep further and use them as an actual offense/defense rather than just an e= scape hatch. The same collateral rules employed by landmines could be added= to any recovery scheme in order to change the incentives.

I haven't= thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm definitely n= ot advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just sharing the idea= that it *could* be done with wider audience :)
<= div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 11:0= 0:09=E2=80=AFAM UTC-5 conduition wrote:
Hi Cory,

= Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also= embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge.

If alice was online and aw= are enough to take such proactive action prior to Q-day, why wouldn't she s= imply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're= saying she is leaving coins vulnerable intentionally to bait a future quan= tum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong thing to incentivize.

regards,
conduition



On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields <fo...@coryfields.com> wrote:
I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantu= m migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechan= ics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be p= ossible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of thi= s post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments.

For th= e below, I'm assuming a future where:
- We have a new quantum-safe outpu= t type pre-qday
- Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Som= ething like Tripwire and/or manually)
- Post qday, all legacy output spe= nds must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on this later)<= br>- Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet cer= tain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths)

Note that the= last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructions, but in = this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-fork rules.
## Quantum Landmines

This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar t= o those which have been discussed here, but with the addition of a payout i= n the case of proven theft.

Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a l= egacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of b= tc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy= output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work.

Pre-qday,= when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded withi= n it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this is a tapro= ot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also contains a l= eaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by her legacy = p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed unless/until= it is used as a proof.

Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk= coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fully collateraliz= ed. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and = a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following implicit spending = conditions:
- If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday know= ledge of the private key is sufficient to spend
- If a proof is provided= , the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above p= roof
- If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can b= e spent as usual.

To see why this is useful, let's now consider the = same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2= pk coin after finding her private key.

The attacker creates a transa= ction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coin (for collateral) as we= ll as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a 2btc output with the same re= quired spending conditions described above. Because they have no pre-qday p= roof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attacker would have to wait the 30 da= ys before they can re-spend the output. However, Alice notices the transact= ion in the meantime and spends the in-limbo output to her committed-to key = by including her landmine as an input and revealing the proof. In doing so,= she moves her own coins while also taking the attacker's collateral.
Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just li= ke any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine.

Thi= s scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Alice t= o bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable coins = later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they may = be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qday, i= t's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft.

= ## Staked Auction

The obvious problem with relying on landmines alon= e is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are belie= ved to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they a= re not guarded by landmines.

But what if we could devise a similar c= ollateral/commit/reveal scheme to empower users who stake their coins pre-q= day in order to thwart a quantum attacker post-qday and take their collater= al?

Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 = ways to spend a legacy output:
- If re-spent before the initial landmine= timeout, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to= spend
- If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction t= imeout, a bid is sufficient to spend
- If re-spent after the auction tim= e-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual.

Bob suspec= ts that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated landmine an= d thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future.

Pre-qd= ay, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in th= is case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a= new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in t= he event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to kee= p bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained.
Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the v= ulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc= of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending cond= itions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc.

Because n= o landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begin= s and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob re= veals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc o= f the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attack= er loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nob= ody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit.

Carol sees Bob's win= ning bid and repeats the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her= secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the= auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as profit.

The st= aking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacke= r can bid on before qday.

There are many ways this could be designe= d. Bob could get his coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashe= d for a losing bid. Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, o= r given to miners, or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements= could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into considerat= ion. Etc.

Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine= or a staked lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully= stolen by the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's = the attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attack= er only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus = they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid.

## Sats Auctio= n

When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she sugge= sted that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well= . See the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly h= ow it could be used here.

In this case, there's no need for pre-qday= staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction.
Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine ti= meout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest= bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there = are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent th= emselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. A= s a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnera= ble 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even at= tach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vu= lnerable output.

This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia artic= le mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, = because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owne= r (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chan= ce at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves.
Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here:
- Colla= teral ratio
- Min/Max bids and intervals
- Where do the loser's coins= go?

## Desired Auction Outcome

Having thought about these fo= r a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting ways to dissu= ade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incentives and gam= e theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would be because it's = not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome would be.

- Att= empt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in the fir= st place?
- Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum atta= ckers sometimes winning to encourage the process?
- Attempt to redistrib= ute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an auction could be designed = to work more like a lottery, where every unspent output is a lottery ticket= or authorization to bid.

To complicate things even further, the mos= t desirable outcome may even change as time goes on after qday, as the vuln= erable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to = the original owner.

[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction

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