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Thu, 27 Aug 2026 08:37:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:1928:b0:4b1:b9f1:e893 with SMTP id 5614622812f47-4b3666ac725mr16115844b6e.3.1787845071436; Thu, 27 Aug 2026 08:37:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 2002:a05:690c:442a:b0:848:c909:19b5 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-85752b6bfadms7b3; Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:43:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:e1c7:20b0:81d:a225:ecc0 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-857410575cemr46809817b3.27.1787830998998; Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:43:18 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:43:18 -0700 (PDT) From: Jack Liao To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: <4bbb1017-8080-4916-8f85-082d2ebf5eacn@googlegroups.com> Subject: =?UTF-8?Q?=5Bbitcoindev=5D_=5Bbitcoin=2Ddev=5D_Draft_BIP_for_discussion=3A?= =?UTF-8?Q?_Time=2DShifted_Proof_of_Work_=28TSPOW=29_=E2=80=94_an_informational_con?= =?UTF-8?Q?sensus=2Ddesign_proposal?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_331022_357808046.1787830998708" X-Original-Sender: xiangliao@gmail.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) ------=_Part_331022_357808046.1787830998708 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_331023_497566479.1787830998708" ------=_Part_331023_497566479.1787830998708 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi all, I am sharing a draft BIP for feedback before submitting it to the bips repository. It is classified as Informational: it documents a=20 consensus-design pattern and its security analysis. It does NOT recommend activating a hard= =20 fork on the Bitcoin main chain. WHAT THE PROPOSAL IS Time-Shifted Proof of Work (TSPOW) separates the three roles Bitcoin binds= =20 into a single event =E2=80=94 finding a hash below target, earning the block rew= ard, and authoring the block =E2=80=94 into two stages: 1) Stage 1 (warrant issuance): miners produce a valid initial-hash warrant= =20 H_n (H(header, nonce) < D1), which carries the right to the new-coin reward. Rewards are deferred and warrants expire. 2) Stage 2 (selection): once k warrants accumulate (an adaptive Gamma=20 batch), the protocol elects a block producer from the candidate pool via argmin H(h, R, PrevBlockHash), where R is an external-beacon output=20 (with the previous block hash as the chain-derived fallback seed). Two claimed properties, both backed by the whitepaper and by cross-checked simulation (Rust / C++ / Python; see the repository): - Block-time stability: the block interval becomes a Gamma(k, lambda) sum instead of a single exponential arrival, dividing block-time variance by= =20 1/k. - Withholding economics: warrant expiry plus deferred reward make privately mining / withholding a warrant strictly suboptimal (expected payoff=20 strictly decreasing in delay). WHAT THE PROPOSAL HONESTLY DOES NOT CHANGE - A >50% adversary still dominates warrant generation and thus pool composition; 51%-attack security is unchanged natively. - Without the external beacon, the long-run double-spend probability remain= s (q/p)^z, identical to traditional PoW. KNOWN COSTS / RISKS (TO BE TRANSPARENT) - External beacon =3D a new trust assumption. The election only fully=20 eliminates private mining when an honest beacon is present; a compromised or censore= d beacon degenerates to the weaker chain-derived seed. - Hard fork. Adopting TSPOW changes the block header, replaces direct block authorship with pool-based selection, and reallocates rewards. This is by construction a severe backward-incompatible change =E2=80=94 another reas= on this=20 is an informational document, not an activation proposal. - Pool-flooding within a window is mitigated (chained FIFO, per-owner caps)= =20 but not eliminated; residual risk should be stress-tested. MATERIALS - BIP draft: bip-corepool-timeshiftpow (source in the repository below) - Reference implementations, verification scripts, and numerical checks: https://github.com/corepool/timeshiftpow - Whitepapers (CN + EN) and formal security analysis in the same repository= . I would welcome scrutiny of the Gamma block-time argument, the withholding-economics model, and the beacon trust model in particular, both= =20 on this list and in the BIP's security-considerations section. Comments-Summary: No comments yet. Thanks, corepool --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 4bbb1017-8080-4916-8f85-082d2ebf5eacn%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_331023_497566479.1787830998708 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi all,

I am sharing a draft BIP for feedback before submitting = it to the bips
repository. It is classified as Informational: it docum= ents a consensus-design
pattern and its security analysis. It does NOT= recommend activating a hard fork
on the Bitcoin main chain.

WHAT THE PROPOSAL IS

Time-Shifted Proof of Work (TSPOW) separa= tes the three roles Bitcoin binds into
a single event =E2=80=94 findin= g a hash below target, earning the block reward, and
authoring the blo= ck =E2=80=94 into two stages:

1) Stage 1 (warrant issuance): min= ers produce a valid initial-hash warrant H_n
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(H(header, n= once) < D1), which carries the right to the new-coin reward.
=C2=A0= =C2=A0Rewards are deferred and warrants expire.

2) Stage 2 (sel= ection): once k warrants accumulate (an adaptive Gamma batch),
=C2=A0 = =C2=A0the protocol elects a block producer from the candidate pool via
=C2=A0 =C2=A0argmin H(h, R, PrevBlockHash), where R is an external-beacon = output (with the
=C2=A0 =C2=A0previous block hash as the chain-derived= fallback seed).

Two claimed properties, both backed by the whit= epaper and by cross-checked
simulation (Rust / C++ / Python; see the r= epository):

- Block-time stability: the block interval becomes a= Gamma(k, lambda) sum
=C2=A0 instead of a single exponential arrival, = dividing block-time variance by 1/k.
- Withholding economics: warrant = expiry plus deferred reward make privately
=C2=A0 mining / withholding= a warrant strictly suboptimal (expected payoff strictly
=C2=A0 decrea= sing in delay).

WHAT THE PROPOSAL HONESTLY DOES NOT CHANGE
=
- A >50% adversary still dominates warrant generation and thus poo= l
=C2=A0 composition; 51%-attack security is unchanged natively.
= - Without the external beacon, the long-run double-spend probability remain= s
=C2=A0 (q/p)^z, identical to traditional PoW.

KNOWN COSTS= / RISKS (TO BE TRANSPARENT)

- External beacon =3D a new trust a= ssumption. The election only fully eliminates
=C2=A0 private mining wh= en an honest beacon is present; a compromised or censored
=C2=A0 beaco= n degenerates to the weaker chain-derived seed.
- Hard fork. Adopting = TSPOW changes the block header, replaces direct block
=C2=A0 authorshi= p with pool-based selection, and reallocates rewards. This is by
=C2= =A0 construction a severe backward-incompatible change =E2=80=94 another re= ason this is an
=C2=A0 informational document, not an activation propo= sal.
- Pool-flooding within a window is mitigated (chained FIFO, per-o= wner caps) but
=C2=A0 not eliminated; residual risk should be stress-t= ested.

MATERIALS

- BIP draft: bip-corepool-timeshiftp= ow (source in the repository below)
- Reference implementations, verif= ication scripts, and numerical checks:
=C2=A0 https://github.com/corep= ool/timeshiftpow
- Whitepapers (CN + EN) and formal security analysis = in the same repository.

I would welcome scrutiny of the Gamma bl= ock-time argument, the
withholding-economics model, and the beacon tru= st model in particular, both on
this list and in the BIP's security-co= nsiderations section.

Comments-Summary: No comments yet.
Thanks,
corepool

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