Hi Edil,

Appreciate taking the time to review the BIP.

> But I'm not so sure about how that improves the main purpose of the network.
Quite the contrary, seems to open more DoS and fingerprinting vectors.

For DoS, the concern is whether a small message can cause disproportionate
processing, disk usage, or outgoing traffic. Merely sending invalid data is
not a new DoS vector; peers already have many ways to do that. It's not
possible to prevent all of them.

Currently, I don’t see any resource-exhaustion or bandwidth amplification vector
introduced by this proposal. Processing is bounded by the branch-length,
recency and retained-tip limits. Nodes are not required to download stale block
data. Nodes that choose to collect it use the normal block-download mechanisms
and resource limits. Implementations may also apply stricter limits, rate-limit
abusive peers, or disable the feature.
Also on mainnet, producing stale headers requires real proof of work comparable
to the active chain.
 
On fingerprinting - supporting staletip does add another observable characteristic.
This is a trade-off the node makes when enabling the feature and is common to
optional P2P features generally. Nodes for which this trade-off is unacceptable
can disable staletip relay.

> About the design, it's not clear to me how that could work in face of more
than one competing chain.

Each staletip message describes one linear branch. Assuming A1-A2-A3-A4 is the
active chain, the two competing branches would be announced separately:

staletip(fork_point=A2, headers=[B3, B4])
staletip(fork_point=A3, headers=[C4])

The protocol announces competing branches in separate messages.
I’ve clarified this in the BIP draft. Thanks for pointing it out :)

Thanks again for reviewing. Hope this addresses your concerns.
Feel free to reach out or leave additional comments.

Cheers,
Ram

On Tuesday, August 11, 2026 at 7:04:41 AM UTC-7 Edil Guimarães de Medeiros wrote:
There's an ongoing effort to document mainnet stale blocks: https://github.com/bitcoin-data/stale-blocks
As one can imagine, since there is currently no way to recover them from the network itself, this
requires constantly monitoring several long running nodes in the hope to get them. From a monitoring
and research perspective, this proposal could be useful.

But I'm not so sure about how that improves the main purpose of the network. Quite the contrary, seems
to open more DoS and fingerprinting vectors.

About the design, it's not clear to me how that could work in face of more than one competing chain. For
instance, suppose I have:

            /- C4
A1 - A2 - A3 - A4
       \- B3 - B4

It's not clear to me how the proposal deals with communicating this, which is quite common in signet and 
the testnets, since each message is designed to relay a single competing branch (e.g. B3-B4 above).

Left more detailed and editorial comments in the bip repository PR.

Cheers.
Edil

Em qua., 29 de jul. de 2026 às 14:28, Ram <pseudo...@gmail.com> escreveu:
Hello list,

This proposal introduces `staletip`, an opt-in P2P message for relaying recent
stale tips between peers. Building on AJ Towns' initial work, w0xlt and I have
developed the proposal further and built a proof-of-concept implementation.

Draft BIP:
https://github.com/pseudoramdom/bips/blob/staletip-bip-draft/bip-staletip.md

Proof-of-concept:
https://github.com/w0xlt/bitcoin/tree/staletip-v4

Today, once a block loses a race and goes stale, it stops propagating – compact
block relay and FIBRE aggressively relay the winning chain, while stale
branches fall away. That's great for fast propagation, but it makes the stale
rate difficult to observe. Even dedicated monitors [0] have only partial views:
a stale block seen by one monitor may never reach another.

The stale rate is a useful network-health signal because it is closely related
to block propagation delay. The longer it takes miners to learn about a newly
found block, the greater the chance that another valid block will be found at
the same height, creating a race in which one of the blocks becomes stale [1].
An elevated stale rate could also expose validation or relay bottlenecks.
For example, the May 2023 "inv-to-send" bug degraded block propagation and
coincided with a roughly 10x increase in the observed stale rate [2].

A stale block does not by itself identify its cause, but changes in the
rate or shape of stale branches can provide a reason to investigate:

  - a network partition – when a partition heals, blocks mined on the
    losing side become stale, potentially producing several related stale
    blocks at once.
  - adversarial mining strategies such as selfish mining [3] – these
    can cause honest miners' blocks to become stale.

The proposal fills this observability gap with an opt-in P2P message called
`staletip`, allowing nodes to proactively announce recent stale tips to peers.

An added benefit is potentially faster reorg handling: if a node already knows
the relevant headers, and perhaps has the block data, it has less work to do if
that branch later becomes active.

At protocol level, nodes advertise support using BIP 434 `feature` message [4],
and `staletip` messages are only sent to peers that advertised support. Each
announcement contains the fork point, a sequence of compressed headers, and a
flag indicating whether the sender can serve the stale tip block.

The proposed default relay policy:
  - relays only tips within 1000 blocks (about seven days) of the active tip,
    keeping announcements recent and stale-tip spam costly on mainnet.
  - limits branches to 20 compressed headers, covering short-term reorgs
    without tracking persistent chain splits and keeps each announcement under
    1 kB.
  - keeps at most 10 recent tips in the relay cache, so announcing the full
    cache to a new peer remains under 10 kB, excluding any blocks requested.

The BIP text has more background and the full message format. Comments are
welcome.

Cheers,
Ram (pseudoramdom)

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