From: Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail.com>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Weak Quantum Bounty Ceremony
Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 01:22:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFC_Vt7DLZEytF72Q0EVPeg6iED3qztMXs7aX6zBNBQ5+-ceXA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJowKgJVwmm=h6AsO4zeGTmfdK-RUQiDsMJkMRd6WZSo5FjeZg@mail.gmail.com>
Hey Erik,
The scheme is interesting! I want to add my two cents.
Those not motivated by funds could publish a zero knowledge proof
instead of moving the funds. This means real funds are not even needed
in this case. Or the whole scheme can be deployed to testnet or signet
not to waste (or burn?) real coins.
Also I would like to propose some properties which the publishing
scheme should have to maximize the effect:
- anonymous for the publisher
- plausible deniable for the publisher
- uncensorable
For the plausible deniability thing, imagine a researcher who has
access to a particular signature made by quantum computer and can
prove it, but then it will be clear who leaked it, because the
signature has a unique nonce. This is where ZK can help. But how to do
ZK onchain to get censorship resistance? Maybe some BitVM construction
may help.
Using mainnet provides better censorship resistance than testnet or
signet - that is actually a good reason to use mainnet unless we come
up with a better approach.
Best,
Boris
On Sat, May 30, 2026 at 12:58 PM Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:
>
> I have been thinking about a way to create publicly verifiable Bitcoin outputs whose recovery is intentionally tied to breaking a weaker cryptographic system.
>
> The goal is to create a "quantum bounty." The output would be spendable by a valid secp256k1 private key, but the key would be generated in a public ceremony and intentionally limited to 160 bits of entropy. Recovery would additionally be facilitated by publishing an encryption of the same secret under a weaker elliptic curve system.
>
> The basic idea is that a group of independent participants runs a distributed key generation ceremony. Each participant contributes a secret share. The shares are combined into a single 160-bit scalar x. At no point is x reconstructed on any machine or revealed to any participant.
>
> From the same distributed shares, participants jointly derive:
>
> 1. A Bitcoin public key P = xG on secp256k1.
> 2. An encryption of x under a separate 160-bit elliptic curve system.
>
> The transcript contains all commitments, public contributions, ciphertext contributions, and equality-of-discrete-log proofs needed to verify that both constructions are derived from the same hidden scalar.
>
> The construction does not require SNARKs or any trusted setup. It appears sufficient to use Pedersen-style commitments, ElGamal-style encryption, and Chaum-Pedersen proofs showing consistency between participant contributions across the two groups.
>
> After the transcript is finalized, participants destroy their secret shares and temporary randomness. Assuming at least one participant behaves honestly and destroys their material, the scalar x is no longer known to anyone.
>
> The final artifact consists of:
>
> * A Bitcoin public key P.
> * A weak-curve ciphertext C.
> * A complete public transcript proving that P and C were derived from the same hidden scalar.
>
> Bitcoin can then be sent to the address corresponding to P.
>
> Anyone who can recover x from the weak cryptosystem can spend the output. The effective security of the bounty is therefore determined by the weaker curve rather than by the full secp256k1 discrete logarithm problem.
>
> The intended purpose is to create a publicly auditable cryptographic canary target.
>
> One question I have not fully resolved is whether there are cleaner constructions for the recoverable encryption component than ElGamal-style encryption, while still preserving simple transcript verification and avoiding general-purpose zero-knowledge systems.
>
> --
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> To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAJowKgJVwmm%3Dh6AsO4zeGTmfdK-RUQiDsMJkMRd6WZSo5FjeZg%40mail.gmail.com.
--
Best regards,
Boris Nagaev
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-31 7:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-30 17:01 [bitcoindev] Weak Quantum Bounty Ceremony Erik Aronesty
2026-05-30 19:11 ` Nikita Karetnikov
2026-05-30 19:28 ` Erik Aronesty
2026-05-31 5:03 ` Garlo Nicon
2026-05-31 6:22 ` Nagaev Boris [this message]
2026-06-05 23:46 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
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