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On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 6:41=E2=80=AFPM Ethan Heilman wr= ote: > >> You'd still need BIP 360 P2MR (or P2TRD) since OP_TXHASH needs > tapscript > > false, covenant based multistep secret-reveal spending paths don't rel= y > on signatures at all > > P2TR has a public key baked into it via the key spend path. This key path > spend bypasses any covenant or script constraints. The attacker does not > need to see a value spend to break the key path spend. This means a quant= um > attacker can break the nums point in key spend path of the initial output > and the AnchorPublishTx output and then just taking all the coins [0]. > > > agreed. they have to spend resources to attack your private key and th= e > only thing they can do is "grief" using a timing attack with the results, > rather than steal outright. a massive incentive difference. > > Ok, so a core assumption you are making here is that a CRQC isn't powerfu= l > enough for recovering signing keys to be effectively free. This is likely > to be true at the early stages of CRQC, but this assumption may not hold > forever. If ECC is mathematically broken via a classical attack this > assumption might not hold at all. I'm attempting to address both quantum > and classical breaks. > > > TX_HASH is simple and generally useful and there is no guarantee that > q-day will even come > > TX_HASH is great! > > [0]: As originally noted here: > https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-ct= v-op-txhash-and-no-new-signatures/2168/4 > > On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 7:19=E2=80=AFPM Erik Aronesty wrot= e: > >> >>> >>> You'd still need BIP 360 P2MR (or P2TRD) since OP_TXHASH needs >>> tapscript, and the only available tapscript supporting output type, P2T= R, >>> isn't quantum safe. >>> >> >> false, covenant based multistep secret-reveal spending paths don't rely >> on signatures at all >> >> >>> >>> I'm going to assume: >>> - you mean to use this commit-reveal for migrating between signature >>> algorithms, not for everyday use, >>> >> >> it can be used if "q day" happens. otherwise ignored. >> >> >>> - TXHASH is being used because you are waiting for the commitment to be >>> confirmed on-chain rather than lifeboat's out-of-band commitment system >>> >> >> it's used so you can commit to a spending constraint without committing >> to the final "as yet to be determined" quantum-safe destination: >> https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-c= tv-op-txhash-and-no-new-signatures/2168 >> >> >> >>> Once you post your commit-txn, but before it confirms, other parties ca= n >>> post competing commit-txns that double spend your output. If one of >>> malicious transactions confirm, you must now wait for a timelock to exp= ire >>> and then try to post your transaction. >>> >> >> agreed. they have to spend resources to attack your private key and the >> only thing they can do is "grief" using a timing attack with the results= , >> rather than steal outright. a massive incentive difference. >> >> >>> They can block you again. Each time they burn some of you coins in fees= . >>> Miners get the fees, so they might be incentivized to do this. Thus, we >>> must trust miners not to do this. Lifeboat doesn't have this issue sinc= e it >>> uses out-of-band commitments, but out-of-band commitments have their ow= n >>> issues. >>> >> >> each time you use the reset-path, they have to re-attack a new key. ver= y >> expensive just to grief a small amount of fees spread across all miners. >> sounds like science-fiction levels of compute. >> >> >> plus.... TX_HASH is simple and generally useful and there is no guarante= e >> that q-day will even come >> > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= CAJowKg%2BruUmiwxJLppALCuGSRO0v%2BJg0m2TeMrmzgKQYj-pQBg%40mail.gmail.com. --00000000000026493f064a8748a4 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
i see so a minimal change to taproot=C2=A0would be a new v= ersion: =E2=80=9Cscript spend only=E2=80=9D or similar.

On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 6:41=E2=80=AFPM Ethan Heilman <eth3rs@gmail.com> wrote:
>>=C2=A0 You'd still need=C2=A0 BIP 360 P2MR (or P2TRD) since OP_TXHASH needs ta= pscript
>=C2=A0 false, covenant based multistep secret-reveal spending paths don't rely= on signatures at all

P2TR has a public key baked into it via the ke= y spend path. This key path spend bypasses any covenant or script constrain= ts. The attacker does not need to see a value spend to break the key path s= pend. This means a quantum attacker can break the nums point in key spend p= ath of the initial output and the=C2=A0AnchorPublishTx output and then just= taking all the coins [0].

>=C2=A0 agreed. they have to spend resources to attack your private key and the onl= y thing they can do is=C2=A0"grief" using a timing attack with th= e results, rather than steal outright.=C2=A0 a=C2=A0massive=C2=A0incentive difference.= =C2=A0=C2=A0

Ok, so a core assumption you are making here is that a = CRQC isn't powerful enough for recovering signing keys to be effectivel= y free. This is likely to be true at the early stages of CRQC, but this ass= umption may not hold forever. If ECC is mathematically broken via a classic= al attack this assumption might not hold at all. I'm attempting to addr= ess both quantum and classical breaks.

>=C2=A0 TX_HASH is simple and generally useful and there is no guarantee that q-day= will even come

TX_HASH is great!

[0]: As originally noted he= re: ht= tps://delvingbitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-ctv-op= -txhash-and-no-new-signatures/2168/4

On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 7:19=E2=80= =AFPM Erik Aronesty <e= rik@q32.com> wrote:


You'd still need= =C2=A0 BIP 360 P2MR (or P2TRD) since OP_TXHASH needs tapscript, and the only avail= able tapscript supporting output type, P2TR, isn't quantum safe.

false, covenant based multistep secret-= reveal spending paths don't rely on signatures at all
=C2=A0

I'= m going to assume:
- you mean to use this commit-reveal for migrating b= etween signature algorithms, not for everyday use,

it can be used if "q day" happens.=C2=A0 otherw= ise ignored.
=C2=A0
- TXHASH is being used because you are waiting for the = commitment to be confirmed on-chain rather than lifeboat's out-of-band = commitment system

it's used s= o you can commit to a spending constraint without committing to the final &= quot;as yet to be determined" quantum-safe destination:=C2=A0 https://delving= bitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-ctv-op-txhash-and-n= o-new-signatures/2168
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
Once you post your c= ommit-txn, but before it confirms, other parties can post competing commit-= txns that double spend your output. If one of malicious transactions confir= m, you must now wait for a timelock to expire and then try to post your tra= nsaction.

agreed. they have to spend reso= urces to attack your private key and the only thing they can do is=C2=A0&qu= ot;grief" using a timing attack with the results, rather than steal ou= tright.=C2=A0 a=C2=A0massive=C2=A0incentive difference.=C2=A0=C2=A0
=C2=A0
They c= an block you again. Each time they burn some of you coins in fees. Miners g= et the fees, so they might be incentivized to do this. Thus, we must trust = miners not to do this. Lifeboat doesn't have this issue since it uses o= ut-of-band commitments, but out-of-band commitments have their own issues.<= br>

each time you use the reset-path, they= have to re-attack a new key.=C2=A0 very expensive just to grief a small am= ount of fees spread across all miners.=C2=A0 =C2=A0sounds like science-fict= ion levels of compute.=C2=A0=C2=A0
=C2=A0

plus.... TX_HASH= is simple and generally useful and there is no guarantee that q-day will e= ven come

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