Seeking feedback on a simple secret-reveal scheme for a quantum-secure vault.   There may be some missing details, but in general, this shows that covenant-protected vaults, with appropriate depth-locks are quantum-resistant.   The whole idea involves a two-phase reveal: you must clear one tx to pin the destination and then you can inspect what's been mined, and then, based on that inspection, submit an escape or a final reveal.   It uses linear-state as a more flawless quantum security and doesn't require new signature schemes or cryptography-libraries. 

Assumptions:

• OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY (OP_CTV) is available per BIP119. 

• OP_TXHASH / OP_CHECKTXHASHVERIFY is available per the current draft proposal, allowing scripts to hash and verify selected fields of the spending transaction

• Relative timelocks exist (BIP68 / BIP112).

• SHA256 preimage resistance holds, even if ECDSA/Schnorr signatures become forgeable.

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Threat model:

An attacker may:

• Forge signatures.
• Intercept, delay, reorder, or fee-bump transactions.
• Front-run in the mempool.
• Exploit shallow reorgs.

An attacker may not:

• Break SHA256 preimage resistance.
• Violate miner-enforced OP_CTV semantics.
• Violate miner-enforced  OP_TXHASH semantics.
• Violate relative timelock rules.
• Rewrite deep chain history.

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High-level idea:

This construction creates a multi-phase envelope that separates:

• who can trigger execution from
• where value is allowed to go.

Even if signatures are forgeable, funds can only move into a protected Anchor envelope, and from there only along template-bound paths.

• Phase 0 funnels all value into a predetermined Anchor envelope (that commits to a secret-reveal scheme, but no destination, using TXHASH)
• Phase 1 instantiates that envelope on-chain (attacker could do this... but why?)
• Phase 2 either:
  • reveals a one-time secret to complete a template-bound spend (because spender sees their good TX was mined), or
  • uses an escape hatch without revealing the secret (because spender sees a bad TX was mined)

Phase 0 locking policy:

The Phase 0 UTXO enforces the following:

1. Anchor pinning: Any spend MUST create exactly one value-bearing output whose scriptPubKey equals P_anchor.

2. No value leakage: No other value-bearing outputs are permitted. Transaction fees are paid by reducing the Anchor output amount.

3. Fee bound: The Phase 0 script MUST enforce a bound on fee extraction, e.g.:

These conditions are enforced using OP_TXHASH, selecting and verifying:

• the number of outputs,
• the scriptPubKey of the Anchor output,
• and sufficient value information to enforce the fee bound.

Phase 1: AnchorPublishTx

Properties:

• Spends the Phase 0 UTXO.
• Creates exactly one output: the Anchor UTXO, locked to P_anchor.

The Anchor envelope is now instantiated on-chain. An attacker may have triggered this spend... that's ok.

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Anchor UTXO locking script shape

A Taproot script tree with two spending paths.

Path 1: Reveal spend (normal)

Conditions:

1. Relative depth gate The Anchor UTXO must have aged by at least k blocks (CSV).

2. Reveal check SHA256(x) == C.

3. Template enforcement The spending transaction MUST match template T via OP_CTV.

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Path 2: Escape hatch

Conditions:

1. Template enforcement The spending transaction MUST match template E via OP_CTV.

2. No secret revealed The value x is not disclosed on this path.

The escape path may be immediately available or time-delayed

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Phase 2: SpendAnchorTx

• Reveal path witness: x plus any required non-cryptographic data.
• Escape path witness: no x.

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Security properties

• Quantum signature safety Forged signatures do not enable theft. All value is confined to the Anchor envelope before any secret is revealed.

• No redirect-after-reveal Once x is revealed, OP_CTV pins the outputs.

• Observation is sufficient If an attacker publishes Phase 0 or Phase 1 spends, the Anchor script still contains a usable escape hatch.

• Reorg resistance The relative timelock k mitigates shallow reorg games

• Graceful degradation A quantum attacker can force execution or cause delay or fee grief , but cannot steal value.

Some more information and discussion is on delving bitcoin:

https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-ctv-op-txhash-and-no-new-signatures/2168/5