From: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
To: Ethan Heilman <eth3rs@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonas Nick <jonasd.nick@gmail.com>, bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Algorithm Agility for Bitcoin to maintain security in the face of quantum and classic breaks in the signature algorithms
Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2026 16:19:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJowKgL5okUA=DHSyUJfzdb6p_z5a6H_hN6NuhZo6R9ZYbJFUQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEM=y+WdPbjVH24Bhb9pJGFoHe0k7=JRwG9VU49+7ZeCip0Csg@mail.gmail.com>
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>
>
>
> You'd still need BIP 360 P2MR (or P2TRD) since OP_TXHASH needs tapscript,
> and the only available tapscript supporting output type, P2TR, isn't
> quantum safe.
>
false, covenant based multistep secret-reveal spending paths don't rely on
signatures at all
>
> I'm going to assume:
> - you mean to use this commit-reveal for migrating between signature
> algorithms, not for everyday use,
>
it can be used if "q day" happens. otherwise ignored.
> - TXHASH is being used because you are waiting for the commitment to be
> confirmed on-chain rather than lifeboat's out-of-band commitment system
>
it's used so you can commit to a spending constraint without committing to
the final "as yet to be determined" quantum-safe destination:
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/a-quantum-resistance-script-only-using-op-ctv-op-txhash-and-no-new-signatures/2168
> Once you post your commit-txn, but before it confirms, other parties can
> post competing commit-txns that double spend your output. If one of
> malicious transactions confirm, you must now wait for a timelock to expire
> and then try to post your transaction.
>
agreed. they have to spend resources to attack your private key and the
only thing they can do is "grief" using a timing attack with the results,
rather than steal outright. a massive incentive difference.
> They can block you again. Each time they burn some of you coins in fees.
> Miners get the fees, so they might be incentivized to do this. Thus, we
> must trust miners not to do this. Lifeboat doesn't have this issue since it
> uses out-of-band commitments, but out-of-band commitments have their own
> issues.
>
each time you use the reset-path, they have to re-attack a new key. very
expensive just to grief a small amount of fees spread across all miners.
sounds like science-fiction levels of compute.
plus.... TX_HASH is simple and generally useful and there is no guarantee
that q-day will even come
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-11 1:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-09 14:20 Ethan Heilman
2026-02-10 8:53 ` Jonas Nick
2026-02-10 16:44 ` Ethan Heilman
[not found] ` <CAJowKg+WJLAJoMhyhVfkC9OSdks5jBieDWty9ce-Qju-84URFA@mail.gmail.com>
2026-02-10 23:13 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-11 0:19 ` Erik Aronesty [this message]
2026-02-11 2:40 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-11 7:25 ` Erik Aronesty
2026-02-11 16:37 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-17 4:13 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-17 7:39 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-19 14:35 ` Garlo Nicon
2026-02-20 1:41 ` Alex
2026-02-20 18:48 ` Erik Aronesty
2026-02-23 14:00 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-23 19:08 ` Erik Aronesty
2026-02-23 21:42 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-24 0:12 ` Alex
2026-02-25 10:43 ` Javier Mateos
2026-02-26 13:24 ` 'Mikhail Kudinov' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-26 15:51 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-27 15:18 ` 'Mikhail Kudinov' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-27 19:31 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-03-01 12:24 ` 'Mikhail Kudinov' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-03-01 21:28 ` Alex
2026-02-11 18:53 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-11 22:57 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-12 14:55 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 15:35 ` Alex
2026-02-12 19:20 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 18:08 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-12 19:13 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 20:35 ` Ethan Heilman
2026-02-12 20:43 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 15:13 ` Alex
2026-02-12 19:16 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 15:36 ` waxwing/ AdamISZ
2026-02-12 19:35 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-12 19:43 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-14 12:39 ` waxwing/ AdamISZ
2026-02-15 12:12 ` Matt Corallo
2026-02-10 21:51 ` 'Brandon Black' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List
2026-02-10 22:19 ` Ethan Heilman
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