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[2607:f8b0:4864:20::112b]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 586e51a60fabf-423ddd3f04csi27834fac.7.2026.04.09.13.54.03 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 09 Apr 2026 13:54:03 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of laolu32@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::112b as permitted sender) client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::112b; Received: by mail-yw1-x112b.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-79ea87af213so21725467b3.0 for ; Thu, 09 Apr 2026 13:54:03 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1775768043; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; b=OuGzz/K9wbyKOiQi//MXei9smfRqd+VM1PXy/5/mquceGwCgUzTW/UZpT4ZD2R8Qk7 43zaVY1Xqr3i49N1aBSrzO72SV0WV7sljw7c+ZRBXQt+j0ZV+rUMQ6dNTcD2XEyUw7c2 0irQdU/MPvCO/BobApkqWrnPMhKxqhhb2TsQmo7IsTG1UqKCaogrbCjH32pFjJ7OuuMh Lx2J+0se+CsUK08PNjziS08bD19+zFtV7Rk66XqU7M1thqmQ0iHc8B/3SuHtyBGQwK42 kgXpylZnDWGR/zWAHkOBDdqYMevcBWcz8BXCj/t2J9C7qnS3k4jR+GojWz4vie7PPajO S9yw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20240605; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:dkim-signature; bh=pDsW36RFm+0RlYEej0tnMuO0UlrcH+S1yWyVOLPNkQI=; fh=AraWG4EtKgnVZC3vx0kKXPCQKgjblcoyQOn27ZV865o=; b=PG9omlzSEg7ptq+uiVSMcij++JRQGK4aqygQ3QfJe3HR2iyiyva92ovLdo4H54trTW Yzv9wNYTQR3CYOEQw62Y/5lwU/+zEj3BdawOLXg9733hvXRj+xu9fn3AhhDEKQ6Hn3UU coLl6acxk98jaZTlUfw3s1qxTgRrNK60OYyHJ4AkqAYVB2nP/o20ulgvBlj8EAQqMVsT nblRk9sxT+XPznDdQAv/PTIpEXRRNvhFuHLgD/iG02VgAekHkr6DL793KxNcdRZkFStK odcVrP9VOpA0t926zD/yhjbT+a3FREFli2r2HcQVzinF03tGjuUw71g9Wjrn6c2iUt21 rQ4Q==; dara=google.com ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; arc=none X-Gm-Gg: AeBDietx9wmdRDWR2IyyQ6wplbYSreDCNuKBCnhFCdghxJrrPalHr90H11MPOLXSSlJ /g3+84vgJYoSTLDXZfKFsttujZ+ceyhqfZovf/aGOQIpEvSKBmaeRDUfJ+X8ok4vh6UKZem2+l7 3SjJ17Kr0G1HWow+qoJMKajQaBMbWE7n0h+v041CrZhkmWB21ym7VRjiZWJhMumvwNzpCVZ3bln uKooTCGVJmhtyQYhebfee2yuUocYLg3TVSI3um2R3gcjrT8Y/rERyZvDgTgu5ExSy2bSeqV27cv XTh06NZKetflOxKcYHSkqHl1Hhk1iXKwPUWo9BNc X-Received: by 2002:a05:690e:484a:b0:650:73ad:25bf with SMTP id 956f58d0204a3-65198f6edc6mr210060d50.1.1775768042754; Thu, 09 Apr 2026 13:54:02 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 13:53:50 -0700 X-Gm-Features: AQROBzBAc4uhcdyplhbWRF4k3gNb7ePzB8cOh87EfjQmz3biWQ9fVfaSdaaQh3A Message-ID: Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Post-Quantum BIP-86 Recovery via zk-STARK Proof of BIP-32 Seed Knowledge To: conduition Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000006457c6064f0d3717" X-Original-Sender: laolu32@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20251104 header.b="mm/wDhnh"; arc=pass (i=1); spf=pass (google.com: domain of laolu32@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::112b as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=laolu32@gmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com; dara=pass header.i=@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) --0000000000006457c6064f0d3717 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Conduition, > You need only prove this much more general statement (2): "I know a BIP32 > xpriv which derives this xpub via one or more hardened steps". > I'm amending my prior suggestion slightly: The circuit (guest program) > could take in an xpriv (e.g. at m/86'/0') and output a child xpriv > (e.g. at m/86'/0'/0') to the journal (instead of outputting a child > xpub). That's an excellent insight! As mentioned in my recent reply, with risc0's "succinct" receipt type, I wa= s able to get the proof size down to 220 KB, at the cost of 3.5x longer total proving time. Your proposal definitely reduces the complexity of the core statement to be proved, which would speed up the proving time for the normal default/composite receipt type. I'll try to hack this up, and then run a head to head comparison to see thi= s simpler statement actually results in a smaller proof then the final succinct receipt of either of the proof variants. Based on my current intuition w.r.t the lower level details, I think the final succinct proof size would be on the same order of magnitude re size. However, this can still be a win as then this would provide potential futur= e users with a less resource intensive proof, which can then be aggregated/rolled up into a final succinct proof in a batched manner. This line of optimization is also more interesting if one were to look at hand rolling a custom AIR to avoid the overhead that the RISC-V emulation adds to the rirsc0 proof chain, given that it entirely skips doing any EC operations at all for the final statement. ---- Re the commit/reveal approach, to be honest I'm not fully caught up on that proposal. That original thread got pretty long, so I dropped of after a point =F0=9F=98=85. I'll revisit that specific branch of the thread so I ca= n digest it and develop a proper opinion, then get back to you re comparisons! -- Laolu On Wed, Apr 8, 2026 at 1:23=E2=80=AFPM conduition wr= ote: > Oh, I've been a fool, a foolish fool. > > We don't even need to do point multiplication in the circuit at all. > > I'm amending my prior suggestion slightly: The circuit (guest program) > could take in an xpriv (e.g. at m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B) and output a *child xp= riv *(e.g. > at m/86'/0'/0'=E2=80=8B) to the journal (instead of outputting a child *x= pub*). > > This is safe because remember, EC spending has been disabled in this > context, and to a quantum attacker, an xpub is computationally equivalent > to its xpriv. So why bother hiding it? The child xpriv doesn't give an > observer anything they can't already do with the equivalent xpub. > > The guest program then is basically the BIP32 CKDpriv algorithm, > restricted to a single hardened derivation step. The verifier gets the > child xpriv, but can't use it to forge new proofs. Honest verifiers use t= he > xpriv to derive the child address(es) as suggested in my last message, to > authenticate spending. > > Designing the guest program like this will massively reduce your circuit > complexity, because EC point multiplication is *wayyyyy* harder for the > RISC0 compiler to arithmetize than a simple hash function. In my prior > work with RISC0 , I made a > guest program which ran a SHA256 hash and an EC point multiplication. I > found that pruning EC point arithmetic from my guest program improved > prover runtime by a factor of over 100x. > > If I am not fever-dreaming and this is indeed possible, then the new > circuit's complexity will be dominated not by point multiplication, but b= y > the HMAC-SHA512 call. Our new task is then to figure out how much we can > internally optimize the HMAC-SHA512 call for STARK proving. Here's a few > ideas. > > If you bust open HMAC-SHA512, it looks like this: > > HMAC_SHA512 =3D SHA512((K=E2=8A=950x5c) || SHA512((K=E2=8A=950x36) || msg= ))=E2=80=8B > > ...where in the context of BIP32 hardened CKD, the HMAC key K=E2=80=8B is= the > chaincode (padded with zeros to 128 bytes) and msg =3D (0x00 || sk || i) = is > the parent secret key and child index. > > Since len(K) =3D 128=E2=80=8B is the SHA512=E2=80=8B block size, we need = a total of 4 > SHA512 compression calls: > > 1. to compress (K=E2=8A=950x36)=E2=80=8B > 2. to compress the msg=E2=80=8B (and SHA512 padding/length) > 3. to compress (K=E2=8A=950x5c), and > 4. a final compression call to tie it all together. > > > The output of that last compression call is partitioned into the child > chaincode, and a key delta which is added to the parent secret key (modul= o > the curve order), producing the child EC secret key. This last step is > arithmetically simple; the SHA512 calls are where most of the arithmetic > complexity lies. > > The question then becomes, which of these compression calls can be done > outside the circuit, and which are truly essential for security? > > Note how the parent secret key is the most important piece for soundness. > The circuit needs to prove the parent secret key existed in the hash > function preimage, and is correctly related to the child secret key via > modular addition. So compression call (2) seems unavoidable. The others a= re > less rigid. > > I'd argue that if we really dig into the hard relation we're trying to > prove here, we can reduce it to this statement: > > Given a child xpriv with secret key k=E2=80=8B, chaincode c=E2=80=8B and = index i=E2=80=8B, I know > a preimage x*=E2=80=8B and secret key *sk=E2=80=8B such that: > > I <- SHA512( || SHA512( || 0x00 || sk || i)=E2=80= =8B) > c =3D=3D I[:32]=E2=80=8B > k =3D=3D int(I[32:]) + sk % n=E2=80=8B > > Seeing as the =E2=80=8B slots are arbitrary, and we know in BI= P32 they > are always exactly one-block long, it seems easy to throw out the > compression calls (1) and (3). The host can precompute the relevant SHA51= 2 > midstates outside the circuit, and pass the midstates into the guest > program as secret inputs. The tradeoff is that this permits malicious > provers the flexibility of choosing their starting midstates (though hash > input length can be fixed at 192 bytes). I'm not entirely sure if this > meaningfully weakens the verifier's soundness. Ethan Heilman might have > opinions on this, he knows a lot more about attacking hash functions than= I > do. Intuitively, I doubt sampling random SHA512 midstates is that much > better than sampling a random HMAC key (chaincode) K=E2=80=8B and computi= ng the > resulting midstates. > > This reduces our circuit to, i think, the minimum acceptable security > floor for provers: two SHA512 compression calls, which commit to a parent > secret key. > > > regards, > conduition > On Wednesday, April 8th, 2026 at 12:09 PM, 'conduition' via Bitcoin > Development Mailing List wrote: > > Hi Laolu, > > Great work getting this working in the real world. I've heard many people > on delving and the mailing list conjecture based on this idea, but you're > the first person i've seen who's willing to put their money where their > mouth is, and actually build a prototype. Bravo! > > It seems to me the circuit (guest program) could be simplified. Notice ho= w > the guest code computes the entire HD wallet key path > , > including hardened *and *non-hardened derivation steps, and also computes > the taproot output key with key-tweaking. I'd argue these steps are > extraneous to the core hard relation you want the STARK to prove, and cou= ld > be safely removed to reduce proof size and improve performance. > > In reality, you needn't go so far as to prove (1) *"I know a BIP39 seed > which derives this taproot output key"*. You need only prove this much > more general statement (2): *"I know a BIP32 xpriv which derives this > xpub via one or more hardened steps"*. The latter statement (2) still > cannot be forged by a quantum adversary even if they know your > account-level xpub, but it entails far less computation to prove and > verify. The rest of the original statement (1) can be done externally > outside the circuit. > > Example. If i have a wallet with a taproot address at m/86'/0'/0'/1/2=E2= =80=8B, I > could prove I know the xpriv at m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B which derives the xpub = at > m/86'/0'/0'=E2=80=8B. Then I provide the remaining key path elements /1/2= =E2=80=8B in the > witness. Note, i *do not* mean we *derive* the xpriv at m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B= inside > the guest program. I mean the prover derives m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B first (in = the > host), and *then writes that xpriv into the guest program's inputs*. The > guest program derives and outputs the xpub at m/86'/0'/0'=E2=80=8B. The v= erifier > may check the STARK output (xpub) is correctly computed, then use the giv= en > key-path to manually derive the taproot address from the xpub themselves, > outside the circuit, and validate *that address* against the UTXO i'm > spending. The verifier thus has confirmed the prover knew an xpriv which > (through a hardened derivation step) derives the correct taproot output k= ey. > > This change significantly reduces the size of the circuit. From a glance, > I see the original guest program performs 6 HMAC-SHA512 calls (1 for the > master key, 5 for the BIP32 derivation steps), two SHA256 compression cal= ls > (for the taptweak hash), and two point multiplications. With this > simplified variant, we are invoking only a single HMAC-SHA512 call and a > single point multiplication. I can't say for sure, but I expect this will > improve your proof size and runtime significantly. > > This change also makes the circuit more generally applicable to other > rescue contexts. For instance, it could be applied to BIP340 xonly keys > inside a taproot script tree, or in a P2(W)SH address to an ECDSA public > key, or to P2(W)PKH addresses. > > Concerned about publishing xpubs? Remember that we are assuming regular E= C > spending is locked in this context, so it is safe-ish to share account > xpubs with quantum attackers. At best the xpub can be used for surveillan= ce > but not forgery. If one would prefer not to share the account-level xpub > on-chain for privacy reasons, the proof could be extended to also derive > the unhardened child xpub at /1/2=E2=80=8B inside the guest program (but = we still > do not need to do the taproot key tweaking in the guest program). > > We should also talk scaling efficiency. Given the cost of STARKs, this > style of proof should be able to authorize spends for more than one UTXO. > Say you have a wallet with 10 different UTXOs held by distinct addresses = in > the same BIP44 account. One single STARK proof could authorize spending a= ll > 10 of them, by simply committing all 10 input signature hashes into the > journal, and labeling the inputs with the corresponding 10 BIP32 key > paths somehow. The verifier would need to check the proof only once and > not 10 times. The 10 UTXO spends could be validated using the common xpub > from the STARK proof's journal. > > For a slightly related work proving a similar relation for hashed > addresses, using different STARK technology stacks, see this delving post > . > > However, all this said, my personal preference for long-term > procrastinator rescue is still for commit/reveal strategies which prove > essentially the same statement about BIP32 in a two-step procedure. They > get the job done with much lighter cryptographic machinery and much small= er > witnesses: a few hundred bytes over two transactions, compared to a few > million bytes in one transaction with STARKs. Boris Nagaev and I > discussed this on the list a while back > . That said, > commit/reveal requires more careful design and seems to demand the use of > external quantum-safe coins to make the commitment in the first place, so > perhaps the cost would be worth it to some people? IDK. What do you think > of commit/reveal compared to STARKs for this purpose? > > regards, > conduition > > On Wednesday, April 8th, 2026 at 12:18 AM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun < > laolu32@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi y'all, > > I found some spare time this last weekend to dust off a little side proje= ct > I started last August: extend TinyGo [1] to be able to produce RISC-V ELF > binaries capable of being run as a guest on the risc0 platform to generat= e > zk-STARK proofs of arbitrary programs. Initially, I didn't really have a > clear end target application, it was mainly a technical challenge to forc= e > me to learn a bit more about the RISC-V platform, and also the host/guest > architecture of risc0. Fast forward ~9 months later, and an initial kille= r > use case popped into my mind: a zk-STARK proof that a Taproot output publ= ic > key was generated using BIP-32, via a given BIP-86 derivation path. > > More formally: > ```math > \mathcal{R} =3D \left\lbrace\; > (\overbrace{K,\, C}^{\textsf{public}} ;\; \underbrace{s,\, > \mathbf{p}}_{\textsf{witness}}) > \;\middle|\; > \begin{aligned} > K &=3D \textsf{BIP86Taproot}\bigl(\textsf{BIP32Derive}(s,\, > \mathbf{p})\bigr) \\ > C &=3D \textsf{SHA256}\bigl(\texttt{"bip32-pq-zkp:path:v1"} \;\|\; > \mathbf{p}\bigr) > \end{aligned} > \;\right\rbrace > ``` > > where $K$ is the Taproot output key, $C$ is the path commitment, $s$ is t= he > BIP-32 seed, and $\mathbf{p}$ is the derivation path. > > > I was able to get everything working e2e over the weekend, after making > some tweaks to my initial architectural game plan! > > The TL;DR is that: > > * Given that the Taproot commitment scheme is post-quantum secure [3], in > the future we can deploy a soft fork to _disable_ the keyspend path, > and force all Taproot spends to instead flow through the script path > (not my idea, commonly discussed amongst developers, not sure who > proposed it first). At that point, Taproot starts to resemble BIP-360. > > * That works for script path spends, but then leaves all the BIP-86 > wallets in a bad position, as they generated outputs that provably > don't commit to a script path at all. > > * A 2023 paper (Protecting Quantum Procrastinators with Signature > Lifting: A Case Study in Cryptocurrencies [4]) proposed a solution to thi= s, > namely _seed lifting_ (use BIP-32 as the one-way function to the > Picnic PQ Signature scheme) to provide a post-quantum proof of secret > information a quantum attacker wouldn't be able to easily obtain. > > * The downside of that is that it reveals the secret BIP 32 seed, > exposing other non migrated UTXOs of a user. > > * With this project I've cobbled together a series of projects to be able > to generate a zk-STARK proof that a Taproot output public key was > generated via BIP-32 invocation of a BIP-86 derivation path. > > * In the future a variant of this scheme can be used to enable wallets > that generated the private keys via BIP-86, to have a post quantum safe > exit path in case they don't bother moving their coins in time to the > yet-to-be-decided post quantum signature scheme. > > To achieve this end, I needed to create/fork a series of repos: > > * tinygo-zkvm: https://github.com/Roasbeef/tinygo-zkvm > * A fork of TinyGo that supports the flavor of RISC-V (rv32im) that > risc0 requires to generate/execute a guest program to later be proved > by the host. > > * risc0: https://github.com/Roasbeef/risc0 > * Mostly a bug fix to their c-guest example, along with some > additional documentation on how to get things running. The repo is > unmodified other than that. Recent updates to the repo made the > entire process much easier (Go guest+host), more on that later. > > * go-zkvm: https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm > * Go utilities to take a RISC-V ELf binary produced by tinygo-zkvm, and > package it in the expected R0BF format, which combines the user > generated RISC-V ELF (the thing that is executed to generate the > proof) along with the v1compat ELF kernel, which is risc0's execution > environment. > > * This also includes a Go host package, which loads the guest program, > executes it, and generates a trace to later be proved. This is > achieved via a C FFI compat layer between Go and the original Rust > host/proving/verification code. > > * bip-32-pq-zkp: https://github.com/Roasbeef/bip32-pq-zkp > * The project that packages everything together, this contains the: > * Guest Go program that defines the secret witness and > claim/constraints of the proof. > > * The C FFI wrapper around the OG Rust host, which is used to load > the guest program, execute it, generate a trace, then finally > generate a proof. > > Details of the final proof as generated on my Mac Book (Apple Silicon M4 > Max, 128 GB of RAM): > * Takes ~55 seconds or so to generate+proof, including execution. This > uses Metal for GPU acceleration on the platform. > * Uses ~12 GB of ram. > * Final proof size is ~1.7 MB. > * Verification takes ~1.8 seconds, and uses ~32 MB of memory. > > On several layers, this demo is far from optimized (more on that later), > this is meant to serve as a PoC to demonstrate that with the latest > software+hardware, a proof of this complexity is well within reach. > > For those curious re the e2e details I've generated this tutorial that > explains the entire system top to bottom: > https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm/blob/main/docs/tutorial.md. > > If you got to this point in this mail, and don't care about the lower lev= el > details, thanks for reading up until now, and feel free to return back to > the _The Net of a Million Lies_, or as better known in our Universe: > Monitoring the Situation and/or slopfotainment! =F0=9F=AB=A1 > > ## Motivation + Background > > As commonly known, in the case of an adversary that possesses a quantum > computer capable of breaking classical asymmetric cryptography, any coins > stored in UTXOs with a known public key are vulnerable. This is the case > for any P2PK outputs from waaaay back, and also any other outputs that ha= ve > revealed their public key. Pubkey reveal might happen due to address re-u= se > (spending from the same script twice), or Taproot outputs, which publish > the public key plainly in the pkScript. > > As detailed in [3], for Taproot outputs, a widely circulated plan is > roughly to: disable the _keyspend_ path (requires a simple signature), > enforcing a new rule that all Taproot spends must then flow through the > script path. Spending via the script path requires an opening of the > Taproot commitment (C =3D I + H(I || H(M))), which was shown to be bindin= g > even > under classic assumptions, as H(M) (tapscript merkle root) is still a > collision-resistant function. > > That means any UTXO that _does_ commit to a script path has a future esca= pe > hatch _if_ such a softfork would need to be deployed in the future. > However, what about all the other wallets that use BIP 86, and don't comm= it > to a script path at all? Under a strict version of this existing > proposal, those wallets would basically be locked forever. > > The goal of this work is to demonstrate a practical solution (discussed > against devs, but never implemented AFAICT): generate a zk proof that an > output was generated using BIP-86. For the zk-Proof, we select zk-STARKs, > as they're plausibly post quantum since they rely only on symmetric > cryptography: layers of merkle trees over an execution trace, along with > some novel sampling/error-correction algorithms. > > At this point, you may be asking: "if the quantum adversary can derive th= e > private key to a random taproot public key, then how exactly does this > help?". The answer lies in the structure of BIP-32! BIP-32 takes an initi= al > 128-512-bit seed (with BIP-39, either 12 or 24 words), then runs it throu= gh > HMAC-SHA512 keyed by "Bitcoin seed" to produce the master extended privat= e > key. An adversary who wants to forge this proof needs to find a _collidin= g_ > seed: a different seed s' such that HMAC-SHA512("Bitcoin seed", s') > produces > the same master key. The BHT algorithm (Brassard-Hoyer-Tapp [6]) is the > best known quantum collision finder, and it runs in time proportional to > the > cube root of the output space: 2^(n/3). For HMAC-SHA512's 512-bit output, > that's ~2^171 quantum operations, well above even NIST's highest > post-quantum security category. Therefore, if you generated a wallet usin= g > BIP-32, you possess _another_ secret that a quantum adversary can't > efficiently reconstruct! > > This demo focuses on the Taproot case, but the rough approach also applie= s > to any other output generated via BIP-32. BIP 32 was originally published > in > 2012, over 14 years ago. So safe to say that _most_ wallets were generate= d > under this scheme. However, Bitcoin Core only officially adopted BIP-32 i= n > 2016/2018, moving away from their existing key pool structure. I can't sa= y > how much BTC is held today in outputs generated with Bitcoin Core's > original > key pool, but if you have coins generated via that mechanism, you may wan= t > to consider migrating them to a BIP-32 wallet. > > ## TinyGo + RISC-V + risc0 > > Now for some of the lower level details. risc0 is a STARK based proving > system that takes a RISC-V ELF binary generated by a guest program (any > program generating using their flavor of rv32im can be proved), executes > that in a host environment, generates a trace, then produces a STARK proo= f > from that. > > Today you can take some subset of Rust, compile it to an ELF using their > toolchain, then execute it, generate a trace, to finally prove+verify it > using their system. > > This demo took a bit of a round about journey to achieve this, as after > all, the journey is most of the fun, ain't it! > > For the past 10 years or so, my Bitcoin stack of choice (lnd/btcsuite) us= es > a series of Go libraries, so I wanted to be able to re-use them, first fo= r > this demo, then also in the future for other projects. > > TinyGo is a special Go compiler based on LLVM, that targets mostly embedd= ed > environments. You can use it to generate go programs that can run on > micro controllers, or on web assembly (producing a smaller binary than if > you used the normal stdlib path). > > TinyGo supports RISC-V, but _not_ the 32-bit variant of RISC-V that risc0 > relies on. So the first step here was to create a new target definition f= or > TinyGo: riscv32-unknown-none, which uses base integer + multiply/divide > instructions with no compressed instructions, which uses 4 KB stacks for > each task. From there, I created a new linker script > (`targets/riscv32im-risc0-zkvm-elf.ld`) which created a memory layer > identical to what risc0 expects. The final component was a new runtime > (`src/runtime/runtime_zkvm.go`), which implemented a few platform specifi= c > syscalls for risc0 (putchar(), exit(), ticks(), and growHeap()). > > When I tried to get this working last year, I had to also implement a > number > of kernel syscalls (called ecalls in the platform [7]) to handle: > read+write > to stdin/stdout, halting, and the journaling mechanism (the transcript of > execution committed to), which basically implement the kernel that the > guest > executes in. Fast forward to 2026, and after pulling the latest version o= f > the repo, I realized that they now make a libzkvm_platform.a, which > packages > up the kernel nicely to be linked against. So I threw out my custom kerne= l > code, and slotted that in instead. > > The final component is a C FFI layer that enables me to use _both_ a Go > guest (the program to be proved) and a Go host (the thing that executes t= he > program and generates the final proof). > > ## BIP-32+Taproot zk-STARK Proof > > With basic proofs working (like the classic: I know the factorization of = a > number `n`), I was unblocked to generate the actual proof. The claim/proo= f > is represented with the following JSON artifact: > ``` > { > "schema_version": 1, > "image_id": > "8a6a2c27dd54d8fa0f99a332b57cb105f88472d977c84bfac077cbe70907a690", > "claim_version": 1, > "claim_flags": 1, > "require_bip86": true, > "taproot_output_key": > "00324bf6fa47a8d70cb5519957dd54a02b385c0ead8e4f92f9f07f992b288ee6", > "path_commitment": > "4c7de33d397de2c231e7c2a7f53e5b581ee3c20073ea79ee4afaab56de11f74b", > "journal_hex": > "010000000100000000324bf6fa47a8d70cb5519957dd54a02b385c0ead8e4f92f9f07f99= 2b288ee64c7de33d397de2c231e7c2a7f53e5b581ee3c20073ea79ee4afaab56de11f74b", > "journal_size_bytes": 72, > "proof_seal_bytes": 1797880, > "receipt_encoding": "borsh" > } > ```` > > The `image_id` is basically a hash of the ELF, so you know what the prove= r > executed. There are then a few flags that control the claim version and > whether BIP-86 derivation is a part of the proof. BIP-86 was only adopted > post-Taproot, so if you have an existing BIP-44 path, you can instead opt > to > claim that instead. The Taproot key we're generating the proof against is > also part of the _public data_, as it sits plainly on the chain for all t= o > see. We then also include a `path_commitment`, which is a commitment to t= he > exact BIP 86 path that the prover used. Finally, we also commit to the > journal hex, which is basically a commitment to the public claim. > > Assuming you've built the project, then you can generate the proof (even > passing in an arbitrary BIP-32 seed and derivation path with) > ``` > make prove GO_GOROOT=3D/path/to/go1.24.4 > ``` > > Then verify it with: > ``` > make verify GO_GOROOT=3D/path/to/go1.24.4 > ``` > > The default prove target writes: > * ./artifacts/bip32-test-vector.receipt > * ./artifacts/bip32-test-vector.claim.json > > The receipt is the STARK proof artifact. claim.json is the stable, > human-readable description of the public statement being proved. > > ## Application to a Future Keyspend Disabling Soft fork > > As mentioned above, assuming the community is forced to deploy a keyspend > disabling soft fork in the future, we can also deploy some variant of > this proof to enable both BIP-86 wallets, and also any BIP-32 wallet, to > sweep their funds into a new PQ output. > > In 2026, we've shown that this is achievable using 2 year old consumer > hardware. I don't doubt that the upcoming advancements (eg: photonics, ne= w > flavor of high bandwidth memory, etc) in hardware (driven by the fierce A= I > race) will make such a proof even more feasible. > > One thing to note is that this proof has a few layers of indirection, > mainly the RISC-V layer that adds overhead which increase the total amoun= t > of steps, and therefore the size of the proof. A production grade > deployment would likely instead hand roll a custom STARK proof for this > exact statement, to achieve a faster and smaller proof). > > # Future Work > > In terms of future work, there're a number of interesting following up > projects that can be pursued from here. > > One basic one is that the current proof doesn't actually commit to a > spending txid and/or sighash. That can be trivially incorporated into the > proof. Going a step further, the execution of the guest program can even > _generate_ a valid schnorr signature to permit spending. > > Looking to the memory+computational requirements necessary to generate th= e > proof, I've left two low hanging fruits: > > 1. First, we can speed up the Elliptic Curve operations the proof require= s > (scalar base mult, then addition, or more performantly Double Scalar > Multiplication via the Strauss-Shamir trick). For this we can use the > syscalls/precompile in the risc0 env for big integer arithmetic: > sys_bigint and sys_bigint2. With this, the guest calls into the kernel > to use an optimized/accelerated circuit for the modular arithmetic, > reducing cycles, steps, and thus proof size. > > 2. Second right now, the entire claim is a single proof. Instead, we can > first break that up using their recursive proof/composition syscalls: > sys_verify_integrity+sys_verify_integrity2. We can then assembled a > series of these proofs into a _single_ statement, which can save block > space by aggregating N proofs into a single proof. > > -- Laolu > > [1]: https://tinygo.org/ > > [2]: https://risczero.com/ > > [3]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1307 > > [4]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/362 > > [5]: https://microsoft.github.io/Picnic/ > > [6]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BHT_algorithm > > [7]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm/blob/main/docs/ecall-reference.m= d > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAO3Pvs_PciUi%2BzBrCps3acO14= sgeHVUANx9w6TVwUf_AYcd_qQ%40mail.gmail.com > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/ciibnh-b0x-rLwA8pY5NURBfPvG5= 8gLcS7yPLIIkFV5IzA1k-PTsPZqYU8uUyQRxLCnEFhGcrRCTM39N2AYEy0Db2H_UwIse3Hg9XEX= NEYg%3D%40proton.me > . > > > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= CAO3Pvs8GXaYEpOhug%3DsOO_1%2BSpWPpOvV03Y7ay64bd_S9Mn9jw%40mail.gmail.com. --0000000000006457c6064f0d3717 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Conduition,

> You need only prove this m= uch more general statement (2): "I know a BIP32
> xpriv which de= rives this xpub via one or more hardened steps".

> I'm a= mending my prior suggestion slightly: The circuit (guest program)
> c= ould take in an xpriv (e.g. at m/86'/0') and output a child xpriv> (e.g. at m/86'/0'/0') to the journal (instead of outputt= ing a child
> xpub).

That's an excellent insight!
As mentioned in my recent reply, with risc0's "succinct" rec= eipt type, I was
able to get the proof size down to 220 KB, at the cost = of 3.5x longer total
proving time.

Your proposal definitely reduc= es the complexity of the core statement to be
proved, which would speed = up the proving time for the normal
default/composite receipt type.
<= br>I'll try to hack this up, and then run a head to head comparison to = see this
simpler statement actually results in a smaller proof then the = final
succinct receipt of either of the proof variants. Based on my curr= ent
intuition w.r.t the lower level details, I think the final succinct = proof
size would be on the same order of magnitude re size.

Howev= er, this can still be a win as then this would provide potential future
= users with a less resource intensive proof, which can then be
aggregated= /rolled up into a final succinct proof in a batched manner.

This lin= e of optimization is also more interesting if one were to look at
hand r= olling a custom AIR to avoid the overhead that the RISC-V emulation
adds= to the rirsc0 proof chain, given that it entirely skips doing any EC
op= erations at all for the final statement.

----

Re the commit/r= eveal approach, to be honest I'm not fully caught up on that
proposa= l. That original thread got pretty long, so I dropped of after a
point = =F0=9F=98=85. I'll revisit that specific branch of the thread so I can = digest it
and develop a proper opinion, then get back to you re comparis= ons!

-- Laolu


On Wed, Apr 8, 2026= at 1:23=E2=80=AFPM conduition <= conduition@proton.me> wrote:
Oh, I've been a fool, a foolish fool.

We don't even need to do point multiplicat= ion in the circuit at all.

I'm amending my prior suggestion slightly: The circuit (guest= program) could take in an xpriv (e.g. at m/86'/0'=E2= =80=8B) and output a child xpriv (e.g. at=C2=A0m/86'/0'= ;/0'=E2=80=8B) to the journal (instead of outputting a child = xpub).=C2=A0

= This is safe because remember, EC spending has been disabled in this contex= t, and to a quantum attacker, an xpub is computationally equivalent to its = xpriv. So why bother hiding it? The child xpriv doesn't give an observe= r anything they can't already do with the equivalent xpub.=C2=A0
<= div style=3D"font-family:Arial,sans-serif;font-size:14px">
The guest program then = is basically the BIP32 CKDpriv algorithm, restricted to a single hardened d= erivation step. The verifier gets the child xpriv, but can't use it to = forge new proofs. Honest verifiers use the xpriv to derive the child addres= s(es) as suggested in my last message, to authenticate spending.

Designing the guest progra= m like this will massively reduce your circuit complexity, because EC point= multiplication is wayyyyy harder for the RISC0 compiler to arithmet= ize than a simple hash function. In my prio= r work with RISC0, I made a guest program which ran a SHA256 hash and a= n EC point multiplication. I found that pruning EC point arithmetic from my= guest program improved prover runtime by a factor of over 100x.

If I am not fever-dreaming= and this is indeed possible, then the new circuit's complexity will be= dominated not by point multiplication, but by the HMAC-SHA512 call. Our ne= w task is then to figure out how much we can internally optimize the HMAC-S= HA512 call for STARK proving. Here's a few ideas.

If you bust open HMAC-SHA512, it looks= like this:

HMAC_SHA512 =3D SHA512((K=E2=8A=950x5c) || SHA512((K=E2= =8A=950x36) || msg))=E2=80=8B=C2=A0

...where in the context of BIP32 hardened = CKD, the HMAC key=C2=A0K=E2=80=8B is the chaincode (padded wit= h zeros to 128 bytes) and msg =3D (0x00 || sk || i)=C2=A0is th= e parent secret key and child index.=C2=A0

Since len(K) =3D 128=E2=80=8B is the= SHA512=E2=80=8B block size, we need a total of 4 SHA512 compression calls:= =C2=A0
  1. to compress (K=E2=8A=950x36)=E2=80=8B
  2. to compress the = msg=E2=80=8B (and SHA512 padding/length)
  3. to compress=C2=A0(K<= /span>=E2=8A=950x5c), and=C2=A0
  4. a final compression call to tie = it all together.=C2=A0

The output of that last compression call is partitioned into t= he child chaincode, and a key delta which is added to the parent secret key <= span style=3D"display:inline;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">(modulo the= curve order), producing the child EC secret key. This last step is ari= thmetically simple; the SHA512 calls are where most of the arithmetic compl= exity lies.

The question then becomes, which of these compression calls can be do= ne outside the circuit, and which are truly essential for security?=C2=A0

Note how the paren= t secret key is the most important=C2=A0piece for soundness. The circuit ne= eds to prove the parent secret key existed in the hash function preimage, a= nd is correctly related to the child secret key via modular addition. So co= mpression call (2) seems unavoidable. The others are less rigid.

I'd argue that if we r= eally dig into the hard relation we're trying to prove here, we can red= uce it to this statement:

Given a child xpriv with secret ke= y k=E2=80=8B= , chaincode c=E2=80=8B and index i=E2=80=8B,=C2=A0I know a preimage x=E2=80=8B and secret key sk=E2=80=8B=C2=A0such that:
<= code>I <- SHA512(<something> || SHA512(<something> || 0x00 |= | sk || i)=E2=80=8B)
c =3D=3D I[:32]=E2=80=8B
k =3D=3D int(I[32:]) + sk= % n=E2=80=8B

Seeing as the <something>=E2=80=8B slots are arb= itrary, and we know in BIP32 they are always exactly one-block long,=C2=A0i= t seems easy to throw out the compression calls (1) and (3). The host can p= recompute the relevant SHA512 midstates outside the circuit, and pass the m= idstates into the guest program as secret inputs.=C2=A0The tradeoff is that this=C2= =A0permits malicious provers the flexibility of choosing their starting mid= states (though hash input length can be fixed at 192 bytes). I'm not en= tirely sure if this meaningfully weakens the verifier's soundness. Etha= n Heilman might have opinions on this, he knows a lot more about attacking = hash functions than I do. Intuitively, I doubt sampling random SHA512 midst= ates is that much better than sampling a random HMAC key (chaincode)=C2=A0<= code>K=E2=80=8B and computing the resulting midstates.=

This reduces our circuit to, i think, the minimum acceptable securi= ty floor for provers: two SHA512 compression calls, which commit to a paren= t secret key.

=

regards,
conduition
On Wednesday, April 8th, 2026 at 12:09 PM, 'conduition' via= Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Hi=C2=A0Laolu,

Great work getting this wo= rking in the real world. I've heard many people on delving and the mail= ing list conjecture based on this idea, but you're the first person i&#= 39;ve seen who's willing to put their money where their mouth is, and a= ctually build a prototype. Bravo!

It seems to me t= he circuit (guest program) could be simplified. Notice how=C2=A0the guest code computes the entire HD wa= llet key path, including hardened=C2=A0and=C2=A0<= /span>non-hardened derivation steps, and also computes the taproot outp= ut key with key-tweaking. I'd argue these steps are extraneous to the c= ore hard relation you want the STARK to prove, and could be safely removed = to reduce proof size and improve performance.

In r= eality, you needn't go so far as to prove (1)=C2=A0"I know a BI= P39 seed which derives this taproot output key". You need only pro= ve this much more general statement (2):=C2=A0"I know a BIP32 xpriv= which derives this xpub via one or more hardened steps". The latt= er statement (2) still cannot be forged by a quantum adversary even if they= know your account-level xpub, but it entails far less computation to prove= and verify. The rest of the original statement (1) can be done externally = outside the circuit.

Example. If i have a wallet w= ith a taproot address at=C2=A0m/86'/0'/0'/1/= 2=E2=80=8B, I could prove I know the xpriv at=C2=A0m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B which derives the xpub at=C2=A0m/86'/0'/0'=E2=80=8B. Then I provide the remai= ning key path elements /1/2=E2=80=8B in the witness. Note, i= =C2=A0do not=C2=A0mean we=C2=A0derive=C2=A0the x= priv at=C2=A0m/86'/0'=E2=80=8B inside the= guest program. I mean the prover derives=C2=A0m/86'= /0'=E2=80=8B first (in the host), and=C2=A0then = writes that xpriv into the guest program's inputs.=C2=A0The guest p= rogram derives and outputs the xpub at=C2=A0m/86'/0&= #39;/0'=E2=80=8B.=C2=A0The verifier may check the STARK output (= xpub) is correctly computed, then use the given key-path to manually derive= the taproot address from the xpub themselves, outside the circuit, and val= idate=C2=A0that address=C2=A0against the UTXO i'm s= pending. The verifier thus has confirmed the prover knew an xpriv which (th= rough a hardened derivation step) derives the correct taproot output key.

This change significantly reduces the size of the c= ircuit. From a glance, I see the original guest program performs 6 HMAC-SHA= 512 calls (1 for the master key, 5 for the BIP32 derivation steps), two SHA= 256 compression calls (for the taptweak hash), and two point multiplication= s. With this simplified variant, we are invoking only a single HMAC-SHA512 = call and a single point multiplication. I can't say for sure, but I exp= ect this will improve your proof size and runtime significantly.
=
This change also makes the circuit more generally applicable= to other rescue contexts. For instance, it could be applied to BIP340 xonl= y keys inside a taproot script tree, or in a P2(W)SH address to an ECDSA pu= blic key, or to P2(W)PKH addresses.

Concerned about publishing xpubs? = Remember that we are assuming regular EC spending is locked in this context= , so it is safe-ish to share account xpubs with quantum attackers. At best = the xpub can be used for surveillance but not forgery. If one would = prefer not to share the account-level xpub on-chain for privacy reasons, th= e proof could be extended to also derive the unhardened child xpub at=C2=A0= /1/2=E2=80=8B inside = the guest program (but we still do not need to do the taproot key tweaking = in the guest program).

We should also t= alk scaling efficiency. Given the cost of STARKs, this style of proof shoul= d be able to authorize spends for more than one UTXO. Say you have a wallet= with 10 different UTXOs held by distinct addresses in the same BIP44 accou= nt. One single STARK proof could authorize spending all 10 of them, by simp= ly committing all 10 input signature hashes into the journal, and labeling = the inputs= with=C2=A0the=C2=A0corresponding 10 BIP32 key paths somehow. The verifier= would need to check the proof only once and not 10 times. The 10 UTXO spen= ds could be validated using the common xpub from the STARK proof's jour= nal.

For a slightly related work proving a similar= relation for hashed addresses, using different STARK technology stacks,=C2= =A0see this delving post.
However, all this said, my personal preference for long-term p= rocrastinator rescue is still for commit/reveal strategies which prove esse= ntially the same statement about BIP32 in a two-step procedure. They get th= e job done with much lighter cryptographic machinery and much smaller witne= sses: a few hundred bytes over two transactions, compared to a few million = bytes in one transaction with STARKs.=C2=A0Boris Nagaev and I discussed this on the list a while back. That said,= commit/reveal requires more careful design and seems to demand the use of = external quantum-safe coins to make the commitment in the first place, so p= erhaps the cost would be worth it to some people? IDK. What do you think of= commit/reveal compared to STARKs for this purpose?
=
regards,
conduition

On Wednesday, April 8th, 2026 at 12:18 AM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun <<= a href=3D"mailto:laolu32@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">laolu32@gmail.com= > wrote:
Hi y'all= ,

I found some spare time this last weekend to dust off a little sid= e project
I started last August: extend TinyGo [1] to be able to produce= RISC-V ELF
binaries capable of being run as a guest on the risc0 platfo= rm to generate
zk-STARK proofs of arbitrary programs. Initially, I didn&= #39;t really have a
clear end target application, it was mainly a techni= cal challenge to force
me to learn a bit more about the RISC-V platform,= and also the host/guest
architecture of risc0. Fast forward ~9 months l= ater, and an initial killer
use case popped into my mind: a zk-STARK pro= of that a Taproot output public
key was generated using BIP-32, via a gi= ven BIP-86 derivation path.

More formally:
```math
\mathcal{R}= =3D \left\lbrace\;
(\overbrace{K,\, C}^{\textsf{public}} ;\; \underbrac= e{s,\, \mathbf{p}}_{\textsf{witness}})
\;\middle|\;
\begin{aligned} K &=3D \textsf{BIP86Taproot}\bigl(\textsf{BIP32Derive}(s,\, \mathbf= {p})\bigr) \\
C &=3D \textsf{SHA256}\bigl(\texttt{"bip32-pq-z= kp:path:v1"} \;\|\; \mathbf{p}\bigr)
\end{aligned}
\;\right\rbra= ce
```

where $K$ is the Taproot output key, $C$ is the path commi= tment, $s$ is the
BIP-32 seed, and $\mathbf{p}$ is the derivation path.<= br>

I was able to get everything working e2e over the weekend, after= making
some tweaks to my initial architectural game plan!

The TL= ;DR is that:

* Given that the Taproot commitment scheme is post-qu= antum secure [3], in
the future we can deploy a soft fork to _disabl= e_ the keyspend path,
and force all Taproot spends to instead flow t= hrough the script path
(not my idea, commonly discussed amongst deve= lopers, not sure who
proposed it first). At that point, Taproot star= ts to resemble BIP-360.

* That works for script path spends, but t= hen leaves all the BIP-86
wallets in a bad position, as they generat= ed outputs that provably
don't commit to a script path at all.
* A 2023 paper (Protecting Quantum Procrastinators with Signature Lifting: A Case Study in Cryptocurrencies [4]) proposed a solution to= this,
namely _seed lifting_ (use BIP-32 as the one-way function to = the
Picnic PQ Signature scheme) to provide a post-quantum proof of s= ecret
information a quantum attacker wouldn't be able to easily = obtain.

* The downside of that is that it reveals the secret BIP 3= 2 seed,
exposing other non migrated UTXOs of a user.

* With= this project I've cobbled together a series of projects to be able
= to generate a zk-STARK proof that a Taproot output public key was
= generated via BIP-32 invocation of a BIP-86 derivation path.

* I= n the future a variant of this scheme can be used to enable wallets
= that generated the private keys via BIP-86, to have a post quantum safe
= exit path in case they don't bother moving their coins in time to t= he
yet-to-be-decided post quantum signature scheme.

To achiev= e this end, I needed to create/fork a series of repos:

* tinygo-zk= vm: https://github.com/Roasbeef/tinygo-zkvm=
* A fork of TinyGo that supports the flavor of RISC-V (rv32im) = that
risc0 requires to generate/execute a guest program to later b= e proved
by the host.

* risc0: = https://github.com/Roasbeef/risc0
* Mostly a bug fix to their c-= guest example, along with some
additional documentation on how to = get things running. The repo is
unmodified other than that. Recent= updates to the repo made the
entire process much easier (Go guest= +host), more on that later.

* go-zkvm: https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm
* Go utilities to take a RI= SC-V ELf binary produced by tinygo-zkvm, and
package it in the exp= ected R0BF format, which combines the user
generated RISC-V ELF (t= he thing that is executed to generate the
proof) along with the v1= compat ELF kernel, which is risc0's execution
environment.
=
* This also includes a Go host package, which loads the guest progr= am,
executes it, and generates a trace to later be proved. This is=
achieved via a C FFI compat layer between Go and the original Rus= t
host/proving/verification code.

* bip-32-pq-zkp: https://github.com/Roasbeef/bip32-pq-zkp
= * The project that packages everything together, this contains the:
= * Guest Go program that defines the secret witness and
cla= im/constraints of the proof.

* The C FFI wrapper around the OG= Rust host, which is used to load
the guest program, execute it,= generate a trace, then finally
generate a proof.

Details= of the final proof as generated on my Mac Book (Apple Silicon M4
Max, 1= 28 GB of RAM):
* Takes ~55 seconds or so to generate+proof, including = execution. This
uses Metal for GPU acceleration on the platform.
= * Uses ~12 GB of ram.
* Final proof size is ~1.7 MB.
* Verifica= tion takes ~1.8 seconds, and uses ~32 MB of memory.

On several layer= s, this demo is far from optimized (more on that later),
this is meant t= o serve as a PoC to demonstrate that with the latest
software+hardware, = a proof of this complexity is well within reach.

For those curious r= e the e2e details I've generated this tutorial that
explains the ent= ire system top to bottom:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm/blob/main/docs/tutorial.md= .

If you got to this point in this mail, and don't care about th= e lower level
details, thanks for reading up until now, and feel free to= return back to
the _The Net of a Million Lies_, or as better known in o= ur Universe:
Monitoring the Situation and/or slopfotainment! =F0=9F=AB= =A1

## Motivation + Background

As commonly known, in the case= of an adversary that possesses a quantum
computer capable of breaking c= lassical asymmetric cryptography, any coins
stored in UTXOs with a known= public key are vulnerable. This is the case
for any P2PK outputs from w= aaaay back, and also any other outputs that have
revealed their public k= ey. Pubkey reveal might happen due to address re-use
(spending from the = same script twice), or Taproot outputs, which publish
the public key pla= inly in the pkScript.

As detailed in [3], for Taproot outputs, a wid= ely circulated plan is
roughly to: disable the _keyspend_ path (requires= a simple signature),
enforcing a new rule that all Taproot spends must = then flow through the
script path. Spending via the script path requires= an opening of the
Taproot commitment (C =3D I + H(I || H(M))), which wa= s shown to be binding even
under classic assumptions, as H(M) (tapscript= merkle root) is still a
collision-resistant function.

That means= any UTXO that _does_ commit to a script path has a future escape
hatch = _if_ such a softfork would need to be deployed in the future.
However, w= hat about all the other wallets that use BIP 86, and don't commit
to= a script path at all? Under a strict version of this existing
proposal,= those wallets would basically be locked forever.

The goal of this w= ork is to demonstrate a practical solution (discussed
against devs, but = never implemented AFAICT): generate a zk proof that an
output was genera= ted using BIP-86. For the zk-Proof, we select zk-STARKs,
as they're = plausibly post quantum since they rely only on symmetric
cryptography: l= ayers of merkle trees over an execution trace, along with
some novel sam= pling/error-correction algorithms.

At this point, you may be asking:= "if the quantum adversary can derive the
private key to a random t= aproot public key, then how exactly does this
help?". The answer li= es in the structure of BIP-32! BIP-32 takes an initial
128-512-bit seed = (with BIP-39, either 12 or 24 words), then runs it through
HMAC-SHA512 k= eyed by "Bitcoin seed" to produce the master extended private
= key. An adversary who wants to forge this proof needs to find a _colliding_=
seed: a different seed s' such that HMAC-SHA512("Bitcoin seed&= quot;, s') produces
the same master key. The BHT algorithm (Brassard= -Hoyer-Tapp [6]) is the
best known quantum collision finder, and it runs= in time proportional to the
cube root of the output space: 2^(n/3). For= HMAC-SHA512's 512-bit output,
that's ~2^171 quantum operations,= well above even NIST's highest
post-quantum security category. Ther= efore, if you generated a wallet using
BIP-32, you possess _another_ sec= ret that a quantum adversary can't
efficiently reconstruct!

T= his demo focuses on the Taproot case, but the rough approach also appliesto any other output generated via BIP-32. BIP 32 was originally published= in
2012, over 14 years ago. So safe to say that _most_ wallets were gen= erated
under this scheme. However, Bitcoin Core only officially adopted = BIP-32 in
2016/2018, moving away from their existing key pool structure.= I can't say
how much BTC is held today in outputs generated with Bi= tcoin Core's original
key pool, but if you have coins generated via = that mechanism, you may want
to consider migrating them to a BIP-32 wall= et.

## TinyGo + RISC-V + risc0

Now for some of the lower leve= l details. risc0 is a STARK based proving
system that takes a RISC-V ELF= binary generated by a guest program (any
program generating using their= flavor of rv32im can be proved), executes
that in a host environment, g= enerates a trace, then produces a STARK proof
from that.

Today yo= u can take some subset of Rust, compile it to an ELF using their
toolcha= in, then execute it, generate a trace, to finally prove+verify it
using = their system.

This demo took a bit of a round about journey to achie= ve this, as after
all, the journey is most of the fun, ain't it!
=
For the past 10 years or so, my Bitcoin stack of choice (lnd/btcsuite) = uses
a series of Go libraries, so I wanted to be able to re-use them, fi= rst for
this demo, then also in the future for other projects.

Ti= nyGo is a special Go compiler based on LLVM, that targets mostly embeddedenvironments. You can use it to generate go programs that can run on
m= icro controllers, or on web assembly (producing a smaller binary than ifyou used the normal stdlib path).

TinyGo supports RISC-V, but _not_= the 32-bit variant of RISC-V that risc0
relies on. So the first step he= re was to create a new target definition for
TinyGo: riscv32-unknown-non= e, which uses base integer + multiply/divide
instructions with no compre= ssed instructions, which uses 4 KB stacks for
each task. From there, I c= reated a new linker script
(`targets/riscv32im-risc0-zkvm-elf.ld`) which= created a memory layer
identical to what risc0 expects. The final compo= nent was a new runtime
(`src/runtime/runtime_zkvm.go`), which implemente= d a few platform specific
syscalls for risc0 (putchar(), exit(), ticks()= , and growHeap()).

When I tried to get this working last year, I had= to also implement a number
of kernel syscalls (called ecalls in the pla= tform [7]) to handle: read+write
to stdin/stdout, halting, and the journ= aling mechanism (the transcript of
execution committed to), which basica= lly implement the kernel that the guest
executes in. Fast forward to 202= 6, and after pulling the latest version of
the repo, I realized that the= y now make a libzkvm_platform.a, which packages
up the kernel nicely to = be linked against. So I threw out my custom kernel
code, and slotted tha= t in instead.

The final component is a C FFI layer that enables me t= o use _both_ a Go
guest (the program to be proved) and a Go host (the th= ing that executes the
program and generates the final proof).

## = BIP-32+Taproot zk-STARK Proof

With basic proofs working (like the cl= assic: I know the factorization of a
number `n`), I was unblocked to gen= erate the actual proof. The claim/proof
is represented with the followin= g JSON artifact:
```
{
"schema_version": 1,
"= ;image_id": "8a6a2c27dd54d8fa0f99a332b57cb105f88472d977c84bfac077= cbe70907a690",
"claim_version": 1,
"claim_fla= gs": 1,
"require_bip86": true,
"taproot_outpu= t_key": "00324bf6fa47a8d70cb5519957dd54a02b385c0ead8e4f92f9f07f99= 2b288ee6",
"path_commitment": "4c7de33d397de2c231e= 7c2a7f53e5b581ee3c20073ea79ee4afaab56de11f74b",
"journal_hex= ": "010000000100000000324bf6fa47a8d70cb5519957dd54a02b385c0ead8e4= f92f9f07f992b288ee64c7de33d397de2c231e7c2a7f53e5b581ee3c20073ea79ee4afaab56= de11f74b",
"journal_size_bytes": 72,
"proof_s= eal_bytes": 1797880,
"receipt_encoding": "borsh&qu= ot;
}
````

The `image_id` is basically a hash of the ELF, so y= ou know what the prover
executed. There are then a few flags that contro= l the claim version and
whether BIP-86 derivation is a part of the proof= . BIP-86 was only adopted
post-Taproot, so if you have an existing BIP-4= 4 path, you can instead opt to
claim that instead. The Taproot key we= 9;re generating the proof against is
also part of the _public data_, as = it sits plainly on the chain for all to
see. We then also include a `pat= h_commitment`, which is a commitment to the
exact BIP 86 path that the p= rover used. Finally, we also commit to the
journal hex, which is basical= ly a commitment to the public claim.

Assuming you've built the p= roject, then you can generate the proof (even
passing in an arbitrary BI= P-32 seed and derivation path with)
```
make prove GO_GOROOT=3D/path/= to/go1.24.4
```

Then verify it with:
```
make verify GO_GOR= OOT=3D/path/to/go1.24.4
```

The default prove target writes:
= * ./artifacts/bip32-test-vector.receipt
* ./artifacts/bip32-test-vect= or.claim.json

The receipt is the STARK proof artifact. claim.json is= the stable,
human-readable description of the public statement being pr= oved.

## Application to a Future Keyspend Disabling Soft fork
As mentioned above, assuming the community is forced to deploy a keyspend<= br>disabling soft fork in the future, we can also deploy some variant ofthis proof to enable both BIP-86 wallets, and also any BIP-32 wallet, tosweep their funds into a new PQ output.

In 2026, we've shown t= hat this is achievable using 2 year old consumer
hardware. I don't d= oubt that the upcoming advancements (eg: photonics, new
flavor of high b= andwidth memory, etc) in hardware (driven by the fierce AI
race) will ma= ke such a proof even more feasible.

One thing to note is that this p= roof has a few layers of indirection,
mainly the RISC-V layer that adds = overhead which increase the total amount
of steps, and therefore the siz= e of the proof. A production grade
deployment would likely instead hand = roll a custom STARK proof for this
exact statement, to achieve a faster = and smaller proof).

# Future Work

In terms of future work, th= ere're a number of interesting following up
projects that can be pur= sued from here.

One basic one is that the current proof doesn't = actually commit to a
spending txid and/or sighash. That can be trivially= incorporated into the
proof. Going a step further, the execution of the= guest program can even
_generate_ a valid schnorr signature to permit s= pending.

Looking to the memory+computational requirements necessary = to generate the
proof, I've left two low hanging fruits:

1. = First, we can speed up the Elliptic Curve operations the proof requires
= (scalar base mult, then addition, or more performantly Double Scalar Multiplication via the Strauss-Shamir trick). For this we can use the<= br> syscalls/precompile in the risc0 env for big integer arithmetic:
= sys_bigint and sys_bigint2. With this, the guest calls into the kernel<= br> to use an optimized/accelerated circuit for the modular arithmetic,<= br> reducing cycles, steps, and thus proof size.

2. Second right= now, the entire claim is a single proof. Instead, we can
first brea= k that up using their recursive proof/composition syscalls:
sys_veri= fy_integrity+sys_verify_integrity2. We can then assembled a
series o= f these proofs into a _single_ statement, which can save block
space= by aggregating N proofs into a single proof.

-- Laolu

[1]: <= a href=3D"https://tinygo.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer nofollow noopener" target= =3D"_blank">https://tinygo.org/

[2]: https://riscz= ero.com/

[3]: https://eprint.iacr.org= /2025/1307

[4]: https://eprint.iacr.org= /2023/362

[5]: https://microsoft.git= hub.io/Picnic/

[6]: https://= en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BHT_algorithm

[7]: https://github.com/Roasbeef/go-zkvm/= blob/main/docs/ecall-reference.md

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--0000000000006457c6064f0d3717--