Hi Ethan, That's a great question. First, I don't speak for Bitcoin Core by any means (btcd has also implemented BIP 324 FWIW). Based on past observed behavior, they typically prefer to keep dependencies slim. Many years ago there was a concerted push to remove openssl as a dependency from the project. So I would imagine the idea of rolling out full blown TLS 1.3 might encounter some resistance. In terms of cryptography, BIP 324 as defined uses secp256k1. TLS 1.3 as specified doesn't support secp256k1 within the set of supported cipher suites. If ensuring that BIP 324 continues to implement an oblivious KEM is a key requirement, then TLS 1.3 doesn't fit the bill. Regarding a hybrid PQ KEM, there exists an IETF to add a new key agreement suite to TLS 1.3: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/. Only secp256+384(r1) and x25519 are supported as elliptic curves in this draft. One additional aspect is that today BIP 324 doesn't implement authentication at all, you only get confidentiality. TLS 1.3 would mean introducing certificates in some fashion, thereby coupling concerns from the original PoV of Bip 324. BIP 324 also includes as section in the BIP detailing the rationale of BIP 324 over a more general purpose protocol (mentions some of the points above): https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki#:~:text=Why%20not%20use%20a%20general%2Dpurpose%20transport%20encryption%20protocol%3F . -- Laolu On Tue, May 5, 2026 at 2:18 PM Ethan Heilman wrote: > Thanks Laolu for thinking through making PQ BIP 324 and writing this up. > > Reading through what you wrote made me what wonder, why not use this as an > opportunity to move to TLS 1.3? > > What's the case against using TLS 1.3 for PQ P2P connection encryption? Is > there some functionality that TLS 1.3 is lacking that we really want? Is > the case against solely to not have TLS 1.3 as a complex dependency in > bitcoin-core? > > The advantages of TLS 1.3: > > 1. Make Bitcoin P2P connections blend in with all the other TLS > connections. This isn't strong privacy, you can distinguish TLS encrypted > Bitcoin traffic via timing and size, but it reduces accidents where a > firewall sees an unknown protocol and blocks it. > > 2. Use of QUIC for faster relay, oblivious HTTP and QUIC > tunnels-in-tunnels for private relay and similar protocols. > > 3. Lots of eyeballs on TLS 1.3, we don't need to build or maintain it. > > > On Tue, May 5, 2026, 00:41 Olaoluwa Osuntokun wrote: > >> Hi y'all, >> >> In case you weren't already tired of all the recent dev list chatter re >> post >> quantum cryptography, here's another! >> >> When the topic of Bitcoin transitioning to a post quantum world is >> brought up, >> the discussion typically focuses on the consensus layer re swapping out >> vulnerable signature schemes. However, the consensus layer isn't the only >> area >> of Bitcoin that relies in cryptography that would be broken in the face >> of a >> powerful quantum computer! That's right, I'm talking about BIP 324, the >> peer to >> peer encryption BIP for Bitcoin. >> >> Like everything else on the Internet today, BIP 324 uses ECDH to allow two >> connecting peers to derive a shared secret known only to them, which is >> then >> used to encrypt all traffic between them. As ECDH relies on Elliptic Curve >> cryptography, a future quantum computer would be able to eavesdrop on a >> p2p >> handshake transcript, then derive the underlying private keys to the >> ephemeral >> ECDH public key, permitting it to decrypt all traffic. It's actually >> worse than >> that, as today adversaries can collect all encrypted p2p Bitcoin traffic, >> with >> the hope of being able to decrypt it all at a future date. This is >> commonly >> referred to as the: "harvest, decrypt later" (HNDL) strategy [11]. >> >> Compared to a consensus change, which requires widespread market >> agreement, and >> coordination to achieve, upgrading BIP 324 to be post quantum resistant >> is a >> much lower hanging fruit worthy of pursing immediately. >> >> Last week I starting thinking a bit about this topic, brushing up on the >> latest >> literature/techniques, and stumbled onto a few key design questions. The >> goal >> of this post isn't to propose a new concrete p2p encryption BIP, instead >> I want >> to start discussion on the various design tradeoffs that came up as I was >> researching this p2p encryption transition. >> >> ## PQ BIP 324 Design Questions >> >> 1. Do we want to pursue a hybrid KEM (key encapsulation mechanism), or go >> with >> a pure PQ KEM? >> >> 2. Is it still a key requirement that the initial handshake be >> indistinguishable from a random byte string? >> >> 2a. If yes to the above, then should we go with >> classical-then-pq-upgrade, >> or a one shot hybrid oblivious KEM. >> >> >> ## A Brief Intro to KEMs + ML-KEM >> >> First, let's introduce the new primitive we have to work with: ML-KEM >> (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) [1][2]. As it says on >> the >> tin, ML-KEM is a lattice based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism. The phrase KEM >> might sound unfamiliar with those comfortable with ECDH, but ECDH is >> actually a >> KEM itself. >> >> A KEM has 3 algorithms: >> * KeyGen() -> {sk, pk} >> * Generates a public/private secret key pair >> >> * Encaps(pub) -> {secret, capsule} >> * Generates a new secret value, and a "capsule", which only the >> holder of >> pub can use to obtain the secret value. >> >> * Decaps(priv, capsule) -> secret >> * Uses the private key to extract the secret from the capsule >> >> >> If you squint a bit, then you'll see that ECDH is a KEM, and a rather >> elegant >> one at that: >> * KeyGen() -> {k, k*G} >> * Normal EC key generation. >> >> * Encaps(pub) -> {capsule = x*G, secret = pub*x} >> * The core ECDH routine. The ephemeral public key is actually the >> "capsule". The resulting secret is the ECDH output with the remote >> party's KEM public key and the local secret. >> >> * Decaps(priv, capsule) -> secret = priv * capsule >> * The receiver completes the key exchange using the ephemeral >> public key >> and their own private key. >> >> ECIES is another flavor of EC based KEM. >> >> One thing worth noting is that AFAICT, so far in the NIST PQC world [4], >> there is >> no known non-interactive key exchange protocol like we enjoy today with >> ECDH. >> IIUC, the reason is that lattice based schemes derived from the LWE [3] >> problem, whose security is predicated on using "noise" to hide a secret >> value. >> For these cryptosystems, usually a type of "hint" is sent to make >> everything >> work out nicely like in ECDH. However, in the stricter non-interactive >> setting >> (no messages sent), this doesn't map cleanly. >> >> As a result, ML-KEM looks more like a hybrid encryption protocol (Alice >> encrypts a shared secret to bob using asymmetric lattice crypto). >> >> ## To Hybrid KEM, Or Not to Hybrid KEM >> >> This brings us to our first design question.... >> >> Should we use a hybrid KEM or a pure post quantum one? >> >> A hybrid KEM would keep the existing ECDH, _also_ do ML-KEM, then securely >> combine (there's some subtlety there, see [6][7]) the resulting in a >> final secret value for encryption. A hybrid KEM is attractive as an >> encryption >> channel derived from such a KEM is secure if _any_ of the combined >> schemes are >> secure. This permits schemes to hedge a bit, as hey, maybe the PQ stuff is >> actually broken in the future but ECDH isn't. If it's the other way >> around, >> then your encryption scheme is still secure. >> >> ### Pure ML-KEM P2P Encrypted Handshake >> >> If we opt to not use a hybrid scheme, then the Elligator layer can be >> dropped >> all together. Instead, the 1.1 KB (ML-KEM-768) encapsulation keys are >> sent, >> keeping the trailing garbage+terminator in tact. >> >> The initial handshake would look something like: >> * Alice -> Bob: alice_encaps || initiator_garbage >> * Alice derives an encapsulation key, and sends it to Bob. >> >> * Bob -> Alice: ml_kem_capsule || responder_garbage || >> responder_garbage_terminator || first_encrypted_packet >> * Bob uses Alice's encapsulation key to encapsulate a random secret, >> and >> sends it over to Alice. He can also encrypt the first message at this >> point. >> >> * Alice -> Bob: initiator_garbage_terminator || first_encrypted_packet >> * Alice de-encapsulates the shared secret, and can now also start to >> encrypt >> messages. >> >> We'd then replace `v2_ecdh` with something like a `v3_mlkem` that derives >> the >> final shared secret based on the sent/received transcript up until that >> point: >> * `sha256_tagged("bip324_ml_kem", ml_kem_secret, alice_encaps, >> ml_kem_capsule)` >> >> ### Hybrid ML-KEM P2P Encrypted Handshake >> >> If we want to use a hybrid combiner, then along side the normal ellswift >> keys, >> the ML-KEM-768 encap key is also sent: >> >> * Alice -> Bob: ellswift_alice || alice_encaps || initiator_garbage >> * Bob -> Alice: ellswift_bob || ml_kem_capsule || responder_garbage || >> responder_garbage_terminator || first_encrypted_packet >> * Alice -> Bob: initiator_garbage_terminator || first_encrypted_packet >> >> Then following guidelines of [7], we'd then replace `v2_ecdh` with >> something >> like `v3_hybrid_shared_secret`: >> * `sha256_tagged("bip324_ellswift_xonly_ecdh_mlkem_768", ml_kem_ss, >> ecdh_point_x32, alice_encaps, ml_kem_capsule, ellswift_alice, ellswift_bob)` >> >> ## PQ/Hybrid Obfuscated KEMs >> >> At this point, those that are familiar with BIP 324 will recognize that >> both >> the pure PQ and hybrid versions renders the ElligatorSwift usage pretty >> much >> useless. ElligatorSwift encodes a 32-byte public key as a 64-byte value >> which >> is indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed bitstream. In a bubble, >> this >> means that the initial BIP 324 handshake to a 3rd party observer just >> looks >> like random bytes. However, with the introduction of ML-KEM, the ML-KEM >> encapsulation key is sent in plaintext over the wire. An ML-KEM key has >> identifiable structure, as it's a giant vector of polynomial coefficients >> mod >> 3329, which is easily recognizable over the wire. >> >> Luckily, there's an ML-KEM analogue to ElligatorSwift, called Kemeleon >> [8][9][10]! In a similar fashion to ElligatorSwift, it takes an ML-KEM >> public >> key, then encodes it as one giant integer, utilizing rejection sampling. >> Kemeleon applies this mapping both to the encapsulation keys, and also the >> capsule ciphertext that encrypts the shared secrets. The ML-KEM keys end >> up >> being a bit smaller, while the ciphertexts map to a larger value. Another >> tradeoff is that the Kemeleon key generation is ~3x slower than normal >> ML-KEM >> generation. >> >> One thing to note here is that Kemeleon's "looks random" property isn't >> quite >> on the same footing as ElligatorSwift's. ElligatorSwift is statistically >> indistinguishable from random, since every 512-bit string is a valid >> encoding. >> Kemeleon's indistinguishability is computational, resting on a Module-LWE >> style assumption. So if you naively concatenate an ElligatorSwift key and >> a >> Kemeleon key, the pair is only as obfuscated as the weakest visible half. >> This >> asymmetry is what motivates the OEINC construction discussed below. >> >> This brings us to our second design question.... >> >> Do we still want to ensure that the BIP-324 handshake looks identical to a >> pseudorandom bytestream from the very first message? >> >> Assuming yes, then AFAICT, we have two classes of options here: >> 1. Retain the existing BIP-324 outer ElligatorSwift handshake, but use >> ML-KEM >> within that initial encrypted transport to upgrade to a PQ shared >> secret. >> >> 2. Use the Outer Encrypts Inner Nested Combiner (OEINC - "OINK") >> combiner >> from [8]. >> >> 3. Attempt to adapt Drivel from [8] into the Bitcoin p2p setting. >> >> ### Classical Encrypted Channel Upgrades to PQ >> >> With the first option, we simply use one KEM right after the other. So >> BIP 324 >> v2 would be mostly unchanged, then we _upgrade_ to BIP 324 v3 within v2. >> >> A sketch of this would be something like: >> * Phase 0: normal BIP 324 handshake >> * Phase 1: negotiation of PQ KEM scheme over the encrypted handshake >> * Can be optional, if we just pick a set PQ KEM scheme. >> * Before this point, no Bitcoin p2p message should be sent, as the >> channel >> isn't PQC protected yet. >> * Phase 2: do normal ML-KEM within the ElligatorSwift derived encrypted >> transport >> 1. Alice sends the encapsulation key >> 2. Bob derives a secrets, encrypts it using the encapsulation key >> 3. Both sides then derive a PQ shared secret, ss_PQ >> * Phase 3: both sides use a hybrid combiner like sketched out above to >> derive >> a new set of transport keys >> * Phase 4: both sides rekey, switching over to a new the transport keys >> >> The upside of this option is that the outer part of BIP 324 remains >> unchanged, >> then with another round trip, we're able to upgrade the encryption keys >> to PQ >> hybrid security. The downside is that the very first messages sent aren't >> PQ >> from the start, but a PQ adversary wouldn't be able to decrypt the actual >> Bitcoin p2p messages (as we wait to send those until the upgrade). The >> handshake still looks like just random bytes. >> >> ### Outer Encrypts Inner Nested Combiner >> >> For the second option, [8] (with talk video [9] and slides [10]) >> describes an >> OEINC scheme where the outer KEM >> encrypts the inner KEM, wherein the KEM ciphertext of an inner KEM is >> encrypted >> using a shared secret derived from the outer KEM. The two KEM ciphertexts >> and >> the two derived keys are then used alongside a hybrid combiner to derive a >> final shared secret. >> >> Unlike the classical-then-pq-upgrade that establishes a classical >> channel, then >> uses that to upgrade to pq channel, OEINC is a special hybrid combiner >> that >> achieves a similar output but in one swoop. It defines a special KEM, >> which can >> then be used as the KEM in the very first handshake I sketched out. >> >> A sketch of this KEM looks something like: >> * Setup: >> * The outer KEM is BIP 324's ElligatorSwift-encoded secp256k1 DHKEM. >> * It serves as the outer KEM because its on-wire encoding is >> statistically indistinguishable from random. >> * The inner KEM is ML-Kemeleon. >> >> * KeyGen(): >> * (kem_secret_outer, kem_pubkey_outer) = outKEM.Gen() >> * (kem_secret_inner, kem_pubkey_inner) = inKEM.Gen() >> * combined_pubkey = (kem_pubkey_outer, kem_pubkey_inner) >> * combined_secret = (kem_secret_outer, kem_secret_inner) >> >> * Encaps(combined_pubkey): >> * (shared_secret_outer, capsule_outer) = >> outKEM.Encap(kem_pubkey_outer) >> * (encrypt_key_1, encrypt_key_2) = KDF(shared_secret_outer) >> * (shared_secret_inner, capsule_inner) = inKEM.Encap(kem_pubkey_inner) >> * encrypted_capsule_inner = encrypt(encrypt_key_1, capsule_inner) >> * combined_capsule = capsule_outer || encrypted_capsule_inner >> * combined_shared_secret = combine(encrypt_key_2, >> shared_secret_inner, combined_capsule) >> >> * Decaps(combined_secret, combined_capsule): >> * (capsule_outer, encrypted_capsule_inner) = combined_capsule >> * shared_secret_outer = outKEM.Decaps(kem_secret_outer, capsule_outer) >> * (encrypt_key_1, encrypt_key_2) = KDF(shared_secret_outer) >> * capsule_inner = decrypt(encrypt_key_1, encrypted_capsule_inner) >> * shared_secret_inner = inKEM.Decaps(kem_secret_inner, capsule_inner) >> * combined_shared_secret = combine(encrypt_key_2, >> shared_secret_inner, combined_capsule) >> >> >> This is done over just sending the two encapsulated secrets plainly as I >> outlined above in order to achieve a stronger security notion. The issue >> with >> this though is that though ciphertext uniformity (the encapsulated >> secrets) is >> achieved, the two public keys sent are randomly looking, but not in a >> uniform >> manner. In practice, this might not really matter much AFAICT (a >> theoretical >> adversary would be able to distinguish the Elligator half from the >> Kemeleon >> half). >> >> ### Drivel: PQ-Obfuscated Authentication >> >> The biggest issue with Drivel as a fit for BIP 324 is that it expects the >> initiator to already know a long term static public key for the >> responder. In >> the case of BIP 324, only ephemeral keys are exchanged, so there's no long >> term public keys known to either side. >> >> To get around this, we could extend BIP 155 (or make a new one likely, >> given >> size limits) to include a signed OKEM key. However then that would >> introduce >> authentication into the combined set, which explicitly wasn't a design >> goal >> of BIP 324. >> >> With that caveat in mind, here's the construction itself. Drivel [8] >> combines >> the OEINC scheme with another layer that out-of-the-box assumes an >> asymmetric >> protocol within a set client and server. The client uses an existing OEINC >> KEM public key published by the server to then encrypt a fresh new >> ephemeral >> KEM. >> >> ----- >> >> So there we have it. Before drafting a concrete v3 transport, we need to >> decide if we want a hybrid KEM, or are fine with a pure PQ KEM. Then we >> need to >> decide if we want to attempt to maintain the current quality where the p2p >> handshake transcript is indistinguishable from random. If yes, then that >> forces >> another series of decisions re how to construct/compose an oblivious KEM >> from >> available primitives. >> >> At a glance, the route of classical-then-pq-upgrade seems to be the >> simplest. >> BIP 324 stays as is, then we run ML-KEM within that. The ML-KEM keys are >> encrypted, so there's no need to sprinkle in the layer of Kemeleon. >> >> If we want a nice combined protocol, then we should investigate the OEINC >> route. It's more data to send as part of the initial handshake, but we >> still >> keep ElligatorSwift and use that as the outer KEM. >> >> If for some reason we're concerned with a future adversary gaining a >> distinguisher for Kemeleon, then maybe we need to bite the bullet and also >> roll out a full blown PQ authentication protocol along side everything. >> >> One thing worth flagging for any of the byte-0 designs (where PQ material >> is >> sent in the clear on the very first flight, like the hybrid and OEINC >> sketches >> above): ML-KEM-768 makes the responder do real work before it can decide >> if a >> connection is even legit. Today, the responder only needs the first 64 >> bytes >> of an ElligatorSwift share before it can derive the shared secret. With >> ML-KEM-768, the responder has to read and validate a 1184 byte >> encapsulation >> key before running Encaps, and FIPS 203 mandates input checks on every >> Encaps >> and Decaps. In a permissionless P2P network, that's a meaningful change in >> inbound DoS surface, and probably calls for stricter handshake byte >> limits, >> tighter timeouts, and possibly some form of stateless cookie/puzzle if >> handshake floods become a real problem. The classical-then-pq-upgrade path >> sidesteps most of this since the PQ material only shows up after the v2 >> channel is up. >> >> With all that said, after the above design decisions are addressed, there >> aren't too many concrete blockers here w.r.t rolling this out. Of course >> the >> development (eg: selecting/creating a library for ML-KEM and maybe >> ML-Kemeleon), and upgrade will take some time. But unlike the consensus >> layer, p2p encryption doesn't require the widespread market agreement >> that an >> actual soft fork does. BIP 324 is a much shorter walk to PQ than the >> consensus >> layer, and serves as a sort of PQ warm up before the bigger soft fork is >> tackled. >> >> >> -- Laolu >> >> [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ML-KEM >> [2]: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final >> [3]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_errors >> [4]: This statement ignores Isogeny based crypto, and also SWOOSH [5] as >> it requires 200 KB pubkeys >> [5]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/271 >> [6]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/024 >> [7]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1364 >> [8]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1086 >> [9]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvFCYUq5rGg >> [10]: >> https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2025/kemeleon/images-media/kemeleon.pdf >> [11]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvest_now,_decrypt_later >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAO3Pvs9U3prZJiDs0Ns7LSA07R8hM-GQou_FcTZZz-JUQpUYHw%40mail.gmail.com >> >> . >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. 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