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Sat, 21 Nov 2026 13:55:34 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:6615:b0:4c4:a040:958b with SMTP id 5614622812f47-57a028e42f3mr5134968b6e.0.1795298134848; Sat, 21 Nov 2026 13:55:34 -0800 (PST) Received: by 2002:a05:690c:e212:20b0:8b4:c9fa:2c76 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b521b25543ms7b3; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:15:44 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:89:b0:8b4:d91e:cb37 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b518e8bd2emr26211837b3.11.1795212944036; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:15:44 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:15:43 -0800 (PST) From: Cory Fields To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <3Si-X9YGMmYLUCsKqrf8g84uAsg2xdkZMDpHXcLgqC1_KTnCw1J8kylgHw8PyGNjMkT4tpxSfKwnVNxX8QbnzuSzFDkdGGe96a7q_GTLnWg=@proton.me> References: <40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n@googlegroups.com> <6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n@googlegroups.com> <3Si-X9YGMmYLUCsKqrf8g84uAsg2xdkZMDpHXcLgqC1_KTnCw1J8kylgHw8PyGNjMkT4tpxSfKwnVNxX8QbnzuSzFDkdGGe96a7q_GTLnWg=@proton.me> Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_234539_861577541.1795212943720" X-Original-Sender: foss@coryfields.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) ------=_Part_234539_861577541.1795212943720 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_234540_987353804.1795212943720" ------=_Part_234540_987353804.1795212943720 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attempting to use the Google Groups web interface to respond inline,=20 hopefully this goes ok... =20 On Wednesday, November 18, 2026 at 7:30:51=E2=80=AFPM UTC-5 conduition wrot= e: It's a neat idea conceptually (your superposition joke elicited a hearty=20 chuckle!), but I fear your stated goal of "make it impossible to reason=20 about how many coins are quantum-safe" is contrary to one of the most=20 important metrics we need: a gauge for the progress of PQ migration.=20 Without that we are effectively guessing about the ratio of classical/PQ=20 coins when making future soft fork decisions, which seems like shaky=20 ground.=20 =20 It's not a goal, it's an observation. Deliberately making it impossible to= =20 reason about how many coins are quantum-safe (and how much of a threat a=20 quantum computer actually poses) is possible. I agree that would likely not= =20 be a good thing. But it's worthy of being common knowledge. =20 A quantum attacker could simply neglect to attack outputs created after the= =20 "landmine" soft fork was activated, and be certain that they'll never step= =20 on one. If any new output could be a landmine, the attacker would just=20 focus on old outputs, e.g. satoshi era coins, and still have plenty of=20 profit. =20 To be clear, landmines are new utxos which contain hidden proofs of signing= =20 ability for _other_ utxos. After a landmine soft fork and pre-qday (so,=20 say, 2 years from now), if I were Satoshi, I could create a landmine which= =20 embeds a proof that I can spend the coinbase output from block 1. Then=20 post-qday, If a quantum attacker attempts to steal the ancient coins, I=20 reveal the proof in my recent landmine. In doing so, I take the coins and= =20 the attacker's collateral for myself, 100btc total. It's likely true that Satoshi's coins will/can never be spent, but not=20 100%. As of now, if Satoshi is still around and capable of spending their= =20 coins, they have very good reason not to do so as it would change the=20 economic assumptions held by many users. So even if they could, they likely= =20 wouldn't. But if they were to wait until after qday and activate a=20 landmine, they could decimate the threat of future quantum attacks. Much=20 like the tripwire idea, the existence of the threat, however unlikely,=20 means it can't be ignored. =20 Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but= =20 in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc,= =20 and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc= =20 in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to= =20 keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the=20 vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required=20 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending= =20 conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an=20 auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction= =20 period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it= =20 to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are= =20 lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction= =20 continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. This is confusing. How does the network distinguish an attacker from the real honest user? If= =20 the honest user is trying to rescue their coins, why do they have to endure= =20 this rigmarole in order to do it, rather than using a rescue protocol like= =20 commit/reveal? =20 A landmine _is_ a rescue protocol. It just has an additional incentive=20 feature. Perhaps I should've separated the two ideas in my original mail.= =20 Other rescue schemes could use the collateral/timelock trick as well. I left this out of the original message for simplicity, but it'd be trivial= =20 to add an exception to the collateral/timeout rules if a pre-qday ownership= =20 proof (in this case, a landmine) is included as an input along with the=20 vulnerable coin spend. So you'd either have to attach a proof _or_=20 collateral in order to spend a pre-qday utxo. In the absence of a proof,=20 the clock starts for the original owner to grab the attacker's collateral.= =20 The same protocol could be used for other pre-qday signing ability reveals= =20 like bip32 seed knowledge, landmines aren't special here. Why does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He= =20 hasn't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would= =20 spend a given UTXO.=20 =20 This is exactly the kind of question I was trying to evoke with the auction= =20 thought experiments! At this point, Bob, the quantum attacker, and the=20 original owner all have the same ability to spend the coin. So who should= =20 succeed? Assuming there's no rescue transaction possible, as far as the=20 outside world is concerned, all three are equal. PQ conversations thus far have essentially boiled this down to 2 choices:= =20 freeze the coins (nobody gets the coins which can't be safely rescued), or= =20 leave them vulnerable. When leaving them vulnerable, the attacker will=20 almost certainly take the coins with exposed pubkeys, as the original owner= =20 would've moved them if they could've and were aware of the quantum risk. I'm introducing a new possibility: when a pre-qday spend happens, there's a= =20 time window in which coins can be rescued with a proof of pre-qday=20 knowledge. If that timeout expires, a fair auction begins. This has the=20 benefit of avoiding a unilateral coin freeze while also not rewarding the= =20 attacker more than any other user. Potentially going further and punishing= =20 them for trying, leading to a "the only winning move is not to play"=20 scenario for everyone involved. The tricky part then becomes defining the= =20 rules for the auction. Why would landmine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, given that= =20 it was created beyond a landmine soft fork was deployed? Landmines could be planted on any legacy utxo any time after a landmine=20 soft-fork and before qday. =20 Why does Carol's 30 BTC bid win over Bob's 40 BTC bid? I'm not sure i see= =20 the logic here. There are many ways to conduct an auction, this is just an example. In this= =20 case, it's a silent auction where the highest bidder wins. But because=20 you're bidding on Bitcoin with Bitcoin, given two users with the same=20 stake, the winner is the person who's willing to take the _least_ amount of= =20 profit. =20 Could you clarify what you mean by "staking"? AFAICT nobody has any coins= =20 timelocked or staked in any enforceable way (except apparently for the=20 legacy UTXO?) In this scenario, Bob has created his "bid" pre-qday by creating a 50btc=20 output which contains a hidden leaf which contains a bid amount and=20 reference to a vulnerable output. Post-qday, only pre-qday bids are=20 considered. If Bob spends his 50btc in the meantime via a different leaf,= =20 he loses his bid as well. So even though the coin was never timelocked, its= =20 age when revealed as a bid proves he had skin in the game. As another auction scenario, it could be that the winner is decided based= =20 solely on bid age. In yet another, a new output type could be added that=20 could _only_ be spent as a quantum bid, effectively locking it up forever= =20 otherwise. That demonstrates a much bigger ante... If someone is willing to= =20 potentially burn 50 coins in order to take (say) 25btc of a Satoshi-era=20 utxo, on a bet that qday comes years later and a steal is attempted, I'd=20 say they deserve the win. The bid/stake/auction possibilities are endless :) =20 Secondary concern: The collateralization requirement makes it possible to= =20 create outputs you cannot spend without access to more bitcoins for=20 collateral. Tractable but very awkward UX. Thanks for pointing this out. See above about the exception for post-qday= =20 spends which reveal pre-qday ownership proofs in the same tx. Like other=20 rescue schemes, no collateral is needed in that case.=20 =20 regards, conduition=20 Thank you very much for the thoughtful response! Cory --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= ffd99327-f633-4e2e-bc54-cc1389ffebccn%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_234540_987353804.1795212943720 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Attempting to use the Google Groups web interface to respond inli= ne, hopefully this goes ok...
=C2=A0
On Wednesday, November 18, 2026 at 7:30:51=E2=80=AFPM UTC= -5 conduition wrote:

It's a neat idea conceptually (your superpo= sition joke elicited a hearty chuckle!), but I fear your stated goal of "ma= ke it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe" is contra= ry to one of the most important metrics we need: a gauge for the progress o= f PQ migration. Without that we are effectively guessing about the ratio of= classical/PQ coins when making future soft fork decisions, which seems lik= e shaky ground.=C2=A0
=C2=A0
It's no= t a goal, it's an observation. Deliberately making it impossible to reason = about how many coins are quantum-safe (and how much of a threat a quantum c= omputer actually poses) is possible. I agree that would likely not be a goo= d thing. But it's worthy of being common knowledge.
=C2=A0<= /div>
A quantum attacker could sim= ply neglect to attack outputs created after the "landmine" soft fork was ac= tivated, and be certain that they'll never step on one. If any new output c= ould be a landmine, the attacker would just focus on old outputs, e.g. sato= shi era coins, and still have plenty of profit.
=C2= =A0
To be clear, landmines are new utxos which contain hidden pro= ofs of signing ability for _other_ utxos. After a landmine soft fork and pr= e-qday (so, say, 2 years from now), if I were Satoshi, I could create a lan= dmine which embeds a proof that I can spend the coinbase output from block = 1. Then post-qday, If a quantum attacker attempts to steal the ancient coin= s, I reveal the proof in my recent landmine. In doing so, I take the coins = and the attacker's collateral for myself, 100btc total.

It's likely true that Satoshi's coins will/can never be spent, but = not 100%. As of now, if Satoshi is still around and capable of spending the= ir coins, they have very good reason not to do so as it would change the ec= onomic assumptions held by many users. So even if they could, they likely w= ouldn't. But if they were to wait until after qday and activate a landmine,= they could decimate the threat of future quantum attacks. Much like the tr= ipwire idea, the existence of the threat, however unlikely, means it can't = be ignored.
=C2=A0
Pre-q= day, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in t= his case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and = a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in = the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to ke= ep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained.


Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated= with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the req= uired 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above sp= ending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc.
=
Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now a= n auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction= period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it = to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are l= ost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction co= ntinues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit.

= This is confusing.


How does the network distinguish an att= acker from the real honest user? If the honest user is trying to rescue the= ir coins, why do they have to endure this rigmarole in order to do it, rath= er than using a rescue protocol like commit/reveal?
= =C2=A0
A landmine _is_=C2=A0 a rescue protocol. It just has an ad= ditional incentive feature. Perhaps I should've separated the two ideas in = my original mail. Other rescue schemes could use the collateral/timelock tr= ick as well.

I left this out of the original mes= sage for simplicity, but it'd be trivial to add an exception to the collate= ral/timeout rules if a pre-qday ownership proof (in this case, a landmine) = is included as an input along with the vulnerable coin spend. So you'd eith= er have to attach a proof _or_ collateral in order to spend a pre-qday utxo= . In the absence of a proof, the clock starts for the original owner to gra= b the attacker's collateral. The same protocol could be used for other pre-= qday signing ability reveals like bip32 seed knowledge, landmines aren't sp= ecial here.

= Why does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He h= asn't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would = spend a given UTXO.=C2=A0
=C2=A0
This= is exactly the kind of question I was trying to evoke with the auction thought experiments! At this point, Bob, the quantum attacker,=20 and the original owner all have the same ability to spend the coin. So=20 who should succeed? Assuming there's no rescue transaction possible, as far= =20 as the outside world is concerned, all three are equal.

PQ conversations thus far have essentially boiled this down to 2 ch= oices: freeze the coins (nobody gets the coins which can't be safely rescue= d), or leave them vulnerable. When leaving them vulnerable, the attacker wi= ll almost certainly take the coins with exposed pubkeys, as the original ow= ner would've moved them if they could've and were aware of the quantum risk= .

I'm introducing a new possibility: when a pre-qday spend happe= ns, there's a time window in which coins can be rescued with a proof of pre= -qday knowledge. If that timeout expires, a fair auction begins. This has t= he benefit of avoiding a unilateral coin freeze while also not rewarding th= e attacker more than any other user. Potentially going further and punishin= g them for trying, leading to a "the only winning move is not to play" scen= ario for everyone involved. The tricky part then becomes defining the rules= for the auction.

Why would landmine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, = given that it was created beyond a landmine soft fork was deployed?

Landmines could be planted on any legacy u= txo any time after a landmine soft-fork and before qday.
=C2=A0
Why does Carol's 30 BTC bid wi= n over Bob's 40 BTC bid? I'm not sure i see the logic here.

There are many ways to conduct an auction, t= his is just an example. In this case, it's a silent auction where the highe= st bidder wins. But because you're bidding on Bitcoin with Bitcoin, given t= wo users with the same stake, the winner is the person who's willing to tak= e the _least_ amount of profit.
=C2=A0
Could you clarify what you mean by "staking"? AFAICT no= body has any coins timelocked or staked in any enforceable way (except appa= rently for the legacy UTXO?)

In thi= s scenario, Bob has created his "bid" pre-qday by creating a 50btc output w= hich contains a hidden leaf which contains a bid amount and reference to a = vulnerable output. Post-qday, only pre-qday bids are considered. If Bob spe= nds his 50btc in the meantime via a different leaf, he loses his bid as wel= l. So even though the coin was never timelocked, its age when revealed as a= bid proves he had skin in the game.

As another = auction scenario, it could be that the winner is decided based solely on bi= d age. In yet another, a new output type could be added that could _only_ b= e spent as a quantum bid, effectively locking it up forever otherwise. That= demonstrates a much bigger ante... If someone is willing to potentially bu= rn 50 coins in order to take (say) 25btc of a Satoshi-era utxo, on a bet th= at qday comes years later and a steal is attempted, I'd say they deserve th= e win.

The bid/stake/auction possibilities are e= ndless :)
=C2=A0
Se= condary concern: The collateralization requirement makes it possible to cre= ate outputs you cannot spend without access to more bitcoins for collateral= . Tractable but very awkward UX.

Th= anks for pointing this out. See above about the exception for post-qday spe= nds which reveal pre-qday ownership proofs in the same tx. Like other rescu= e schemes, no collateral is needed in that case.=C2=A0
=C2=A0
regards,
conduition=C2=A0

Thank you very much for the thoughtf= ul response!
Cory

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