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[109.224.244.16]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id d2e1a72fcca58-8c87295208asi8801b3a.6.2026.11.19.09.29.27 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:29:28 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of darosior@protonmail.com designates 109.224.244.16 as permitted sender) client-ip=109.224.244.16; Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 17:29:20 +0000 To: Anthony Towns From: "'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" Cc: Ram , Bitcoin Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] [BIP Proposal] Stale Tip Relay Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: <3rRzUIQUWDcT-ASQXvovARX12jzE0UWy0RQ8fk7M_z3bW_k2LWPPEvRhoD6sEe3GW3fjCdtzLOZN34TCsB2CI6iRcdjer9Y8QiNwUh2QepI=@protonmail.com> Feedback-ID: 7060259:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 9a53c665e35fe2064305347d6a9fcf64b07308a2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Original-Sender: darosior@protonmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@protonmail.com header.s=protonmail3 header.b=ihsPKQ9Q; spf=pass (google.com: domain of darosior@protonmail.com designates 109.224.244.16 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=darosior@protonmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=protonmail.com X-Original-From: Antoine Poinsot Reply-To: Antoine Poinsot Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) On Monday, November 16th, 2026 at 2:18 AM, Anthony Towns wrote: > Hmm, Claude argues that I unfairly misinterpreted this [...] Had a similar experience in drafting my previous reply. Claude for Nobel Pe= ace Prize? > > I think an option for this kind of thing is counterproductive. It needs= to > > be on by default to have an effect anyways, >=20 > This isn't true. Presuming stale headers/blocks are relayed via > block-relay-only connections, and stale tips within the last 4+ days > are relayed, you get near 100% of stale tips relayed even if only 1% > of ~10k listening nodes use this new feature. Essentially: >=20 > * 100 listening nodes support the feature > * 1 such node hears about the stale block at time t=3D0 > * every five minutes, every node that knows about the stale tip connects > to a random listening node, with 1% chance that that node supports > stale tip relay, in which case it's shared if that node doesn't also > already know about the stale tip > * this happens about 1000 times over four days >=20 > So if the outcome you're interested in is just greater awareness of > stale blocks for research and analysis purposes, this works fine. Good point, i had overlooked that. Wouldn't this approach have the same bli= nd spot as today's though? It would work well for races, where parts of the network are split = between two blocks, which already reach monitors today with high probability, but would fail to= detect "late solves", since it would require the pool's node to turn on the option. >=20 > Alternatively, if your goal is improved relay of block data in the event > of a reorg due to a child of a stale block becoming the new most-work > tip, you also don't need many nodes: you just need a backbone of nodes > that relay stale blocks to each other, and that are geographically > distributed, reasonably well-connected, and validate new blocks fairly > quickly. That allows those nodes to update quickly, and allows them > to quickly relay validated blocks to their nearby peers, so that the > round-trip delay is tens of milliseconds (due to locality) rather than > hundreds of milliseconds. >=20 > So personally, I strongly disagree with the conclusion that there's a > need for this to be either mandatory or on-by-default for it to be useful= . Yes, that was a misunderstanding on my part, though i think the point above= , that keeping stale block relay optional would mostly help relay the type of stale blocks we al= ready know about, holds. Optional stale block relay also slows their propagation, which reduces the = concern about changing the default block relay incentive structure. >=20 > > and if we think that it could > > impose costs substantial enough that a node runner may want to disable = it (i > > don't) then we should reconsider our approach to data collection. >=20 > I haven't seen this code run in the wild, so personally I think it's > premature to talk about enabling it by default at all, so I think "none" > as the default is sensible as things stand. Sure, but it would have also been possible to introduce the code behind a d= ebug-only option at first, to be removed at the same time it is enabled by default. >=20 > On signet in particular, I think sharing stale headers only has potential > DoS issues, since generating "fake" headers by reusing an existing > signature isn't hard, and PoW-valid stale headers aren't pruned. The BIP > addresses this for signet by recommending setting the "prefers_blocks" > flag to true, but that's only possible if that option exists. Ok fair enough. I was going to point out that Signet is already DoSable, bu= t how stale tip relay amplifies that DoS is a meaningful change. I=E2=80=99m not sure though how = much complexity is warranted to avoid making signet more DoSable, given we already assume there isn=E2=80= =99t someone out there who cares enough to DoS it. >=20 > Pretty much that exact argument has been made repeatedly over the past > few years, and been demonstrably wrong each time: for opt-in RBF, large > OP_RETURNs, and sub-1sat feerates. Bitcoin is only censorship-resistant i= f > the cost of routing around a censor is cheap, as otherwise a prospective > censor could simply regulate and DoS any part of the public network that > doesn't comply with its dictates. But fortunately it is cheap and easy > to route around the public network if necessary/desirable. This is a false equivalence. For censorship resistance, you need a single m= iner defecting. For changing the default mining incentives, you need miners coordinating around= an alternative block relay infrastructure. Furthermore, in the censorship resistance case, the single miner is incenti= vized to mine the censored transaction. In the changing mining incentives case, the miner who= wants to spend a bit more time mining on their stale blocks needs to convince the other miners t= o opt into their alternative relay network, and it's not clear that they are incentivized to= do that. >=20 > > > This is effectively https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_princ= iple > > > > > > I don't think it makes sense -- if we're afraid this feature would be > > > detrimental, then we should be equally worried about it if an attacke= r > > > were to implement something similar in secret, and should thus perfor= m > > > the analysis and, if appropriate, implement countermeasures anyway: > > > > I disagree. The current public relay network is the status quo. Changin= g > > the default behaviour of the public relay network is not the same as > > miners coordinating to deviate from it. >=20 > A peer-to-peer network means that you don't get any control over whether > it changes or not -- that's up to each individual peer. Heh, now it's you being snarky.. Of course this was not about controlling what people run, but being honest = about the impact that changing Bitcoin Core's defaults has. >=20 > In so far as any participant thinks they'll benefit from something other > than the status-quo, they'll deviate from it. The only coordination > required is amongst the individuals that see a benefit to a change. This part of your response reads as if i was proposing a change to block re= lay policy that each individual miner could benefit by deviating from. That's a bit frustra= ting, as in reality i'm not the one proposing a change, and i am simply giving an argument that a c= hange to default block relay policy may be beneficial to some individual miners, without meaning t= hey would have necessarily sought it had the default not been changed (because it would ha= ve meant coordinating with other miners etc.). >=20 > > For instance, a miner may not want to develop infrastructure to relay > > stale blocks, then go lobby other miners to adopt it, for a slight incr= ease > > in expected revenue. But that same miner might well tweak their job > > distribution, if the relay infrastructure is already deployed across th= e > > network. >=20 > > The effect here is in the event of a race, non-selfish miners can reorg > > faster to a non-selfish miner winning the race. That's true, but the > > advantage is dwarfed by that of Selfish mining, and i think all bets > > are off anyways if a miner is actively attacking the network. > > > > My point was how this change might incentivize (or not!) a pool operato= r > > to tweak their settings slightly, within the framework of not trying to > > bypass the public relay network / pull off an involved attack like > > Selfish mining. >=20 > I had assumed you were talking about miners being incentivised to attack > bitcoin (or to violate the criteria that make someone an "honest" miner), > not to merely "tweak their job distrubution". Ok, maybe i could have been clearer. Stale block relay is insignificant in = the case of a Selfish Mining attack. I'm simply pointing out that changing default relay policy m= ay incentivize some miners to change their strategy slightly, which could result in overall inf= erior network conditions. The example i gave in my first reply was that they may be incentivized to b= riefly keep mining on a stale block after it lost a race, because stale block relay increases the e= xpected revenues of doing so. (Which doesn't necessarily mean it makes it profitable! See below.) In this example, should it turn out that they profit from doing so, the res= ulting inferior network conditions would probably not have happened if it was not for the default b= lock relay policy change. Because achieving the same would have required convincing all (or most) oth= er miners to deviate to a different block relay regime, all that for little expected revenues for the= interested miners, and probably little to no benefit to other miners. To be clear, again, i am not particularly concerned about this. Any change = in incentives i can think of is tiny (though i may be missing some!) and i merely pointed out that ch= anging these incentives was unnecessary to get what i consider to be most of the value of stale tip= relay. You disagree that only relaying headers gives most of the value. I'm not co= nvinced, but if others think the value of relaying full blocks is worth it, i do not want to be a = blocker (at least not on these grounds). >=20 > To be explicit, I think an "attack" looks like either: >=20 > * miners don't publish the full block data when they find a block with > valid PoW, and/or > * miners mine blocks with the "prev_block" hash referring to a block > with less cumulative PoW than some other known (valid) block If we apply this definition strictly, all pools "attack" the network in the= (non trivial --see stratum.work) time interval between receiving a new block and switching all= their hashers to a new job. So i think it's more nuanced, and there is a meaningful distinction be= tween a pool delaying job renewal / not trying to minimize it as much, and a pool implementing a full= Selfish Mining like strategy. >=20 > Conversely, for "tweaking their pool/template settings" the only relevant > thing I can think of is running "preciousblock" so that they switch to > a block with equal cumulative PoW, rather than mining on top of the > first-seen block with that amount of work. I think that is already the > rational thing to do, and that stale block relay doesn't change this; I'l= l > do numbers on that below. [...] One example i gave is to not renew the jobs to your hashers immediately aft= er you lost a race. This is a small effect, much smaller than switching your strategy from "stock Bi= tcoin Core" to "preciousblock", but if a miner can just do it unilaterally and benefit, th= ey might. As per my answer to your numbers below, turns out that doing so is not prof= itable, at least without turning it into a complete strategy that i would qualify as an attack. But = it's a different effect from the only relevant one you could think of, so i think we shouldn't be t= oo confident that we can anticipate all possible ways a block relay policy change may affect mining = incentives. > [...] I also don't think that has any impact on the > network as a whole, provided neither of the "attacks" above take place. This is incorrect. Not mining on the first seen tip decreases the stale rat= e of the larger miners and increases the stale rate of the smaller miners. From a simulation run w= hich approximates current network conditions [0], this shifts stale rates for the biggest min= er from 0.368% to 0.352%, and that of the smallest miner from 0.556% to 0.590%. With profit margins a= t 2% of revenue, that's about +0.8% of profit for the largest miner and -1.7% of profit for the sma= llest miner. [0]: Using the branch at https://github.com/darosior/miningsimulation/issue= s/2 with 2s of external propagation time and 1s of internal propagation time, uniform across m= iners. >=20 > > I agree the effects are most likely small, i=E2=80=99m just not convinc= ed they are > > negligible. >=20 > So numbers. A block is found. A pool with 20% hashrate sees the new block= , > then moments later one of its workers submits a competing solve at the > same height with the same parent, and hence the same cumulative PoW. The > pool has two options: > > * mine on top of the first seen block: receive 3.125 BTC with about > 20% chance (exp value 0.625 BTC) > > * mine on top of its own competing block: receive 6.25 BTC with perhaps > 19.8% chance (5s additional relay time due to a 1-block reorg creating > additional potential for a race; exp value 1.24 BTC) > > Assuming miners request new work every 3s, then a miner with 20% hashrate > would expect to hit that tradeoff once every 2 weeks [0]. So expected > benefit of mining on their own block is about 16.1 BTC per year already, > and that miner would be expected to trigger a one block reorg once every > 10 weeks or so, I think. > > [0] 1/(1-exp(3/2 / -600 * 20%)) =3D 2000 blocks > > If you improve the reorg-race window substantially, dropping it from > 5s to 1s, the expected value over a year rises to 16.36 BTC; if you > think the reorg-race window was originally much worse, say 60s, then > the expected value over a year was still about 13.3 BTC. So this improves the expected revenue of an already widespread (but still d= etrimental) strategy by about 0.26 BTC/yr (for a 20% miner), in the pessimistic case. The gains sca= le linearly with the time saved, and quadratically with the share of the hashrate. But this merely strengthens the incentive to switch to a (detrimental but) = already widely adopted strategy. What i had in mind was a different effect, which my Claude tells = me is known as Stubborn mining (Nayak et al.), and as far as i know is not widely adopted. For a 40= % miner, default stale block relay would increase the expected revenues of stubbornly mining on to= p of his own block in the event he lost a race by roughly 0.4BTC/yr. That comes on top of the ~0.= 9 BTC/yr that stale relay adds to preciousblock for a 40% miner (the effect you estimated). But stubborn mining is only profitable if you actually adopt it as a long t= erm strategy. Stale block relay does increase the expected revenue of continuing to mine briefly on y= our block after you lost a race, but it does not quite make it profitable. So this is much more than= simply tweaking job distribution, and moreover would definitely fall into the attack category a= t this point. What you calculated seems indeed to be the extent of the effect of stale bl= ock relay on "honest" mining incentives, as far as i can tell. > > > > [1] I don't think there's any concern about sharing stale blocks that > > > have signficantly less cumulative work than the current tip, whic= h > > > already occurs via the stale-blocks repo at > > > https://github.com/bitcoin-data/stale-blocks/ > > Fair to distinguish between relaying near tip vs historical blocks. But > > this is not about sharing, it's about what should be relayed on the pub= lic > > network in real time, so i don't think the Github repo is relevant here= . >=20 > The github repo probably could be made a real-time resource; on > the publish side you'd automatically merge PRs after validating > proof-of-work and recency (PRs are already automatically > created for stale blocks seen by fork-observer instances, > though not promptly), and on the receive side you'd monitor > https://api.github.com/repos/bitcoin-data/stale-blocks/commits/HEAD > and fetch updates when that changes, then submitblock any new (recent) > block data. Centralised, permissioned, vulnerable to github outages, > and requires a bunch of extra technology layers though. >=20 > So I think it's directly comparable, particularly for the purposes of any > concerns about the impact of additional data availability on incentives. I don't think it is, because it would still require getting all other miner= s to connect to that alternative relay mechanism, as per the discussion above. >=20 > That said, while they exist, I don't think the benefits of real-time > relay of stale block data are particularly large, so I don't think that's > worth prioritising very much. >=20 > My suspicion is that with widespread stale header relay we'll see an > increase in the observable stale block rate from 1-in-1000 to perhaps > 1-in-400 (the sqrt of the observed frequency of two-block-reorgs [1]) or > more. If we don't also support stale block relay, I think we'll miss out > on the ability to analyse those stale blocks, which would be disappointin= g > from a research angle, and may raise avoidable fears/concerns from a > "don't trust, verify" / paranoia angle. Fair enough. Reassuring people who jump to conclusions with no evidence isn= =E2=80=99t an argument I buy, but i understand where you are coming from and i agree it=E2=80=99s a nice to h= ave. >=20 > [1] https://bnoc.xyz/t/two-block-reorg-at-height-941880/97/9 >=20 > > (Also, not important to your argument, but there is a typo in your > > numbers with a lower hashrate: s/3.139/3.137/) >=20 > (Yeah, I manually transcribed and rounded, and missed a 6) >=20 > Cheers, > aj Best, Antoine --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= oBD8E4x4wLHU_TcMdLuADKLL48HcUAhyf7NCDOufueOMfRuJnF1bDnmCzUxqkscA41b1dVgC8lV= H3nsueIYVVjTiDnobz0M3e345qHttx4w%3D%40protonmail.com.