[DO NOT MERGE] Erlay: bandwidth-efficient transaction relay protocol (Full implementation) #30277

pull sr-gi wants to merge 33 commits into bitcoin:master from sr-gi:202406-erlay-full-draft changing 16 files +2685 −94
  1. sr-gi commented at 5:18 pm on June 12, 2024: member

    Erlay Project Tracking: #30249


    This is a full implementation of Erlay. Its purpose is to check the integrity and correctness of the implementation against changes/additions that may originate from the review process and/or rebases on top of newer functionality.

    This is not to be merged. Functionality will be spread across multiple smaller PRs to ease the review process.


    Approach

    The implementation approach builds on the following assumptions:

    • Fanout (the current relay method) is faster than Erlay, but less bandwidth efficient
    • Fanout is optimal if the node we want to announce a certain transaction doesn’t know about it (but of course, we don’t have that information)

    The general approach works as follows:

    Reconciliation is used alongside fanout to relay transactions across the network. For Erlay nodes, the relay method will be decided per-transaction, instead of per connection, meaning that Erlay connections will do both fanout and reconciliation depending on the transaction (legacy connections will do only fanout, obviously).

    The parameters selected for fanout are minimized to maximize the bandwidth saving. The current selected defaults are 4 outbound peers and 10% of inbounds. The relay logic depends on the type of connection and how the transaction has been received:

    • For outbound connections, if the transaction was received via fanout (or originates in us), we fanout until up to N peers know about it. We do this by checking the m_tx_inventory_known_filter, so their announcements also count. If the transaction was received via reconciliation, we simply reconcile with the rest of our peers.
    • For inbounds, we select 10% of our connections and rotate that selection periodically.

    The reasoning for this is trying to guess how far the transaction has made it into the network with imperfect information. Knowing that fanout is faster than reconciliation, we want to have a higher fanout rate at the very beginning of the propagation, to get as far as we can, being fully efficient. This can be tied to how many of our peers know about the transaction already. Once the transaction is sufficiently spread, we can just reconcile it with the rest of our peers. This does not apply to inbounds, as they are not trusted, and the metric will be easily abused, plus it may be used to leak transaction origin information. For them, we just keep a low fanout rate.

    Testing and simulating

    The last two commits of this PR are currently for simulation only. They allow to easily config the inbound/outbound fanout rate without having to recompile the code, and make full reconciliation more efficient.

  2. DrahtBot commented at 5:18 pm on June 12, 2024: contributor

    The following sections might be updated with supplementary metadata relevant to reviewers and maintainers.

    Code Coverage & Benchmarks

    For details see: https://corecheck.dev/bitcoin/bitcoin/pulls/30277.

    Reviews

    See the guideline for information on the review process. A summary of reviews will appear here.

    Conflicts

    Reviewers, this pull request conflicts with the following ones:

    • #32189 (refactor: Txid type safety (parent PR) by marcofleon)
    • #30116 (p2p: Fill reconciliation sets (Erlay) attempt 2 by sr-gi)
    • #29415 (Broadcast own transactions only via short-lived Tor or I2P connections by vasild)
    • #28463 (p2p: Increase inbound capacity for block-relay only connections by mzumsande)
    • #27826 (validation: log which peer sent us a header by Sjors)

    If you consider this pull request important, please also help to review the conflicting pull requests. Ideally, start with the one that should be merged first.

    LLM Linter (✨ experimental)

    Possible typos and grammar issues:

    • “annoincing” -> “announcing” [typo in comment slows comprehension]
    • “for out own transactions” -> “for our own transactions” [typo in comment]
    • “based simulation results” -> “based on simulation results” [missing “on”]
    • “No transaction were created” -> “No transactions were created” [plural agreement]
    • “REQRXRCNCL” -> “REQTXRCNCL” [message name typo in test log]

    drahtbot_id_4_m

  3. sr-gi marked this as a draft on Jun 12, 2024
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    Debug: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/runs/26144314909

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    Try to run the tests locally, according to the documentation. However, a CI failure may still happen due to a number of reasons, for example:

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    Try to run the tests locally, according to the documentation. However, a CI failure may still happen due to a number of reasons, for example:

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  67. dergoegge commented at 3:43 pm on June 20, 2025: member

    I was fuzzing this branch with fuzzamoto and it looks like it actually found a remotely reachable assertion.

     02025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: reqsketchext (64 bytes) peer=5
     12025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=5
     22025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=5
     32025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=5
     42025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=5
     52025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: sendtxrcncl (71 bytes) peer=5
     62025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sendtxrcncl received after verack, disconnecting peer=5
     72025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] Resetting socket for peer=5
     82025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [txreconciliation] Forget txreconciliation state of peer=5
     92025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] Cleared nodestate for peer=5
    102025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: sketch (64 bytes) peer=7
    112025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] ProcessMessages(sketch, 64 bytes): Exception 'DataStream::read(): end of data: iostream error' (NSt8ios_base7failureB5cxx11E) caught
    122025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=7
    132025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=7
    142025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=7
    152025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=7
    162025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: reqsketchext (64 bytes) peer=7
    172025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=7
    182025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=7
    192025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: ping (8 bytes) peer=7
    202025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] sending pong (8 bytes) peer=7
    212025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) [net] received: sketch (71 bytes) peer=0
    222025-06-20T15:12:09Z (mocktime: 2011-02-02T23:20:02Z) Using Minisketch implementation number 1
    23bitcoind: minisketch/include/minisketch.h:342: Minisketch &Minisketch::Deserialize(const T &, typename std::enable_if<std::is_convertible<typename std::remove_pointer<decltype(obj.data())>::type (*)[], const unsigned char (*)[]>::value && std::is_convertible<decltype(obj.size()), std::size_t>::value, std::nullptr_t>::type) [T = std::vector<unsigned char>]: Assertion `GetSerializedSize() == obj.size()' failed.
    24[2025-06-20T15:12:09Z ERROR fuzzamoto::runners] Test case failed: Target is not alive: Failed to check if node is alive: JsonRpc(Transport(Minreq(IoError(Os { code: 111, kind: ConnectionRefused, message: "Connection refused" }))))
    

    I’m surprised our existing fuzz tests do not catch this (process_messages might but I haven’t tried), but it looks like we actually never call Minisketch::Deserialize with bytes straight from the fuzzer but rather only with result from Minisketch::Serialize (maybe to avoid the assertion? not sure):

    https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/154b98a7aaae248f5d40ca567d1ec51410d09bae/src/test/fuzz/minisketch.cpp#L68-L69

    Bsae64 of the bytes passed to Deserialize: 0NDf7u7u0NDQ7u7u7u7u7u7Q7u7u7u7qKSm40NDQ0NDQ

  68. sr-gi force-pushed on Jun 20, 2025
  69. refactor: remove legacy comments
    These comments became irrelevant in one of the previous code changes.
    They simply don't make sense anymore.
    78b13474df
  70. p2p: Functions to add/remove wtxids to tx reconciliation sets
    They will be used later on.
    2a57e290b2
  71. p2p: Make short id collision detectable when adding wtxids to tx reconciliation sets d83a72a382
  72. p2p: Add PeerManager method to count the amount of inbound/outbounds fanout peers cabb66c12b
  73. p2p: Cache inbound reconciling peers count
    It helps to avoid recomputing every time we consider
    a transaction for fanout/reconciliation.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    8eac55df27
  74. p2p: Add method to decided whether to fanout or reconcile a transactions
    Fanout or reconciliation is decided on a transaction basis, based on the following criteria:
    
    If the peer is inbound, we fanout to a pre-defined subset of peers (which is rotated periodically).
    If the peer is outbound, we will reconcile the transaction if we received it via reconciliation, or
    defer the decision to relay time otherwise. At relay time, we will fanout to outbounds until a threshold is met
    (selecting peers in the order their timers go off) and reconcile with the rest.
    
    With this approach we try to fanout when we estimate to be early in the propagation of the transaction,
    and reconcile otherwise. Notice these heuristics don't apply to inbound peers, since they would be easily
    exploitable. For inbounds we just aim for a target subset picked at random.
    6e94c65f6a
  75. p2p: Add transactions to reconciliation sets
    Transactions eligible for reconciliation are added to the reconciliation sets. For the remaining txs, low-fanout is used.
    
    Co-authored-by:  Gleb Naumenko <naumenko.gs@gmail.com>
    749b586641
  76. p2p: Add consider_fanout to RelayTransaction
    This can be squashed into the previous commit, it is split for now to ease review
    
    When scheduling the relay of a transaction (RelayTransaction) we should consider
    whether it is worth fanning it out, or only reconciling it. This depends, partially,
    on how the transaction was received.
    
    For non-Erlay peers, we always consider_fanout (in fact, we only fanout).
    For Erlay peers, if the peer is inbounds, we always consider fanout, and deffer the
    decision of to whom to relay time. If the peer is outbound, we consider fanout if the
    transaction was received via fanout, and only reconcile if it was received via reconciliation
    (who to fanout to is also deferred to relay time).
    
    Until the Erlay P2P flow is merged, consider_fanout is always true.
    c3cce43d0c
  77. p2p: Add helper to compute reconciliation tx short ids and a cache of short ids to wtxids 475f845e21
  78. p2p: Deal with shortid collisions for reconciliation sets
    If a transaction to be added to a peer's recon set has a shot id collisions (a previously
    added wtxid maps to the same short id), both transaction should be fanout, given
    our peer may have added the opposite transaction to our recon set, and these two
    transaction won't be reconciled.
    422085b919
  79. p2p: Add peers to reconciliation queue on negotiation
    When we're finalizing negotiation, we should add the peers
    for which we will initiate reconciliations to the queue.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    3f38c76b9f
  80. p2p: Track reconciliation requests schedule
    We initiate reconciliation by looking at the queue periodically
    with equal intervals between peers to achieve efficiency.
    
    This will be later used to see whether it's time to initiate.
    40f3bfb7a4
  81. p2p: Initiate reconciliation round
    When the time comes for the peer, we send a
    reconciliation request with the parameters which
    will help the peer to construct a (hopefully) sufficient
    reconciliation sketch for us. We will then use that
    sketch to find missing transactions.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    ef15c7541d
  82. test: Functional test for reqtxrcncl
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    cc28104adc
  83. p2p: Handle reconciliation request
    Store the parameters the peer sent us inside the
    reconciliation request.
    15cd93cd76
  84. p2p: Add helper to compute sketches for tx reconciliation 09c8da4619
  85. p2p: Respond to a reconciliation request
    When the time comes, we should send a sketch of our
    local reconciliation set to the reconciliation initiator.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    b94b43739a
  86. p2p: Add a function to identify local/remote missing txs
    When the sketches from both sides are combined successfully,
    the diff is produced. Then this diff can (together with the local txs)
    be used to identified which transactions are missing locally and remotely.
    c813c9aa9b
  87. Use txid/uint256 in CompareInvMempoolOrder
    This will help to reuse the code later on in the function
    to announce transactions.
    3bf5ec5454
  88. p2p: Handle reconciliation sketch and successful decoding
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    2cc2e60a11
  89. sr-gi force-pushed on Jun 20, 2025
  90. sr-gi commented at 8:08 pm on June 20, 2025: member

    @dergoegge It should be fixed now.

    When computing sketches, the capacity was derived from the size of the received data, but it was never checked that the received data size was a multiple of the sketch element size {BYTES_PER_SKETCH_CAPACITY}. Therefore, a sketch could be created such that the capacity was smaller than the data to be decoded into it, making it crash.

    Happy to run the fuzzer over the new code in case I’ve missed anything.

  91. sr-gi force-pushed on Jun 20, 2025
  92. dergoegge commented at 4:45 pm on June 23, 2025: member
    Have been running the fuzzer all day and the bug appears to be fixed (and no other bugs so far).
  93. SQUASH-ME: Flags tx as received via recon if it was requested via recondiff
    TODO: We may be OK defining a smaller m_recently_requested_short_ids, since
    its contents only really matters for less than a minute
    58d5ffa897
  94. p2p: Request extension if decoding failed
    If after decoding a reconciliation sketch it turned out
    to be insufficient to find set difference, request extension.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    6d518abe11
  95. p2p: Be ready to receive sketch extension
    Store the initial sketches so that we are able to process
    extension sketch while avoiding transmitting the same data.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    09e60e684c
  96. p2p: Prepare for sketch extension request
    To be ready to respond to a sketch extension request
    from our peer, we should store a snapshot of our state
    and capacity of the initial sketch, so that we compute
    extension of the same size and over the exact same
    transactions.
    
    Transactions arriving during this reconciliation will
    be instead stored in the regular set.
    
    Co-authored-by: Gleb Naumenko <naumenko.gs@gmail.com>
    5a3d23576b
  97. p2p: Keep track of announcements during txrcncl extension 6954ad5e02
  98. p2p: Handle reconciliation extension request
    If peer failed to reconcile based on our initial response sketch,
    they will ask us for a sketch extension. Store this request to respond later.
    98e7d34573
  99. p2p: Respond to sketch extension request
    Sending an extension may allow the peer to reconcile
    transactions, because now the full sketch has twice
    as much capacity.
    443dec95e7
  100. p2p: Handle sketch extension
    If a peer sent us an extension sketch, we should
    reconstruct a full sketch from it with the snapshot
    we stored initially, and attempt to decode the difference.
    
    Co-authored-by: Sergi Delgado Segura <sergi.delgado.s@gmail.com>
    ca7d5972be
  101. p2p: Add a finalize incoming reconciliation function
    This currently unused function is supposed to be used once
    a reconciliation round is done. It cleans the state corresponding
    to the passed reconciliation.
    f3394738fa
  102. p2p: Handle reconciliation finalization message
    Once a peer tells us reconciliation is done, we should behave as follows:
    - if it was successful, just respond them with the transactions they asked
      by short ID.
    - if it was a full failure, respond with all local transactions from the reconciliation
      set snapshot
    - if it was a partial failure (only low or high part was failed after a bisection),
      respond with all transactions which were asked for by short id,
      and announce local txs which belong to the failed chunk.
    ced49517f1
  103. p2p, test: Add tx reconciliation functional tests
    We may still need to add more tests, specially around extensions (if we keep them)
    
    Co-authored-by: Gleb Naumenko <naumenko.gs@gmail.com>
    64010cdf35
  104. REMOVE-ME, SIMS-ONLY: Adds options to configure in/out fanout rates 3f0ab2c22a
  105. REMOVE-ME, SIMS-ONLY: shortcut full-recon
    If the fanout rates are set to zero, simply shortcut ShouldFanoutTo
    b257252a46
  106. sr-gi force-pushed on Jun 23, 2025
  107. maflcko commented at 3:34 pm on June 26, 2025: member

    I’m surprised our existing fuzz tests do not catch this (process_messages might but I haven’t tried), but it looks like we actually never call Minisketch::Deserialize with bytes straight from the fuzzer but rather only with result from Minisketch::Serialize (maybe to avoid the assertion? not sure):

    I tried this by starting 8 fuzz processes 5 days ago. 7 still run and one of them crashed after two days. I minimized the input:

     0$ git log -1 
     1commit bd242fd6e3f42e03a8c8abf23f9e9275d3580336 (HEAD)
     2
     3$ echo 'AAAAAABkZVNcAHNlbmR0eHJjbmNsADvN19f/102t//94AFxnd3R4aWRyZWxheQBsXAB2ZXJhY2sA
     4//96z3pcAHNrZXRjaAD/AAkJCQkJCQ0JcmVjb25jcgCtrQEAAAnhCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQCtrQEA
     5AFxnYa2tAQBh/G6pWyYAACFnAAAAra0BAAAAAAAAY2ZjaGVjZCFnAAAAra0BAADTqVsmAAAhZwAA
     6AK2tAQAA' | base64 --decode > /tmp/a.crash
     7
     8
     9$ FUZZ=process_messages ./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz /tmp/a.crash 
    10INFO: Running with entropic power schedule (0xFF, 100).
    11INFO: Seed: 3544817665
    12INFO: Loaded 1 modules   (389355 inline 8-bit counters): 389355 [0x60e155e10eb0, 0x60e155e6ff9b), 
    13INFO: Loaded 1 PC tables (389355 PCs): 389355 [0x60e155e6ffa0,0x60e156460e50), 
    14./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
    15Running: /tmp/a.crash
    16fuzz: minisketch/include/minisketch.h:342: Minisketch &Minisketch::Deserialize(const T &, typename std::enable_if<std::is_convertible<typename std::remove_pointer<decltype(obj.data())>::type (*)[], const unsigned char (*)[]>::value && std::is_convertible<decltype(obj.size()), std::size_t>::value, std::nullptr_t>::type) [T = std::vector<unsigned char>]: Assertion `GetSerializedSize() == obj.size()' failed.
    17...
    

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