It is not obvious to me from reading https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/1f6ab1215bbb1f8a5f1743c3c413b95ad08090df/doc/JSON-RPC-interface.md#security what the security expectations are for a machine serving the RPC interface about what a credentialed RPC client can do on the machine outside of affecting the node it has credentials for.
It seems to me that users should expect that RPC clients with credentials will have all the same privileges as the bitcoind process does on the machine, since, for example users can specify arbitrary wallet paths on the machine means that users should expect that RPC clients with credentials will have all the same privileges as the bitcoind process does on the machine (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32273). It doesn’t seem far fetched to me to imagine that someone at some point naively ran multiple unsandboxed nodes on the same machine, provided credentials to users, and did not realize that those users could load each other’s wallets.
If that’s correct, then the actionable form of the question is: Is this something that should be more clearly stated to users in any way, or is the situation I’m describing contrived and unrealistic, where a user trusts an RPC client with a node, but not with the whole machine and doesn’t in any way sandbox/container the node.
