Add jonasschnellis new NIST-P 256 signing key #9899

pull jonasschnelli wants to merge 1 commits into bitcoin:master from jonasschnelli:2017/03/key changing 1 files +126 −110
  1. jonasschnelli commented at 1:04 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512

    Removed old expired keys. Added a new NIST-P 256 subkey that will be used to sign git merges and gitian builds. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

    iHUEARMKAB0WIQRDU2HzXdDCNVJGfeBxOm5iFuoefwUCWLbGCwAKCRBxOm5iFuoe fzm+AQCW5rLFUQ29eUG0MvEyqI+DYpJIDSzELZWmaxCERB5ewgD6Au9iaRozesPb KVQ3CYim9FyAJFFg3gALKPNHkv51OW8= =Yp9o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  2. Add jonasschnellis new NIST-P 256 signing key
    Remove expired keys
    44e6d7b63c
  3. jonasschnelli added the label Scripts and tools on Mar 1, 2017
  4. MarcoFalke commented at 1:22 PM on March 1, 2017: member

    I don't think it is possible to delete keys when they have been made public once. Also, it should be sufficient to upload the new subkeys to a keyserver instead of updating the key here. (We can't possibly keep up with updating the keys here anyway, considering that every couple of days there are new signatures, revocations, subkeys, etc...)

  5. jonasschnelli commented at 2:08 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    @MarcoFalke: Deleted keys: you can still download them from the key servers. The expired and here deleted keys where only used for gitian builds <= 0.11 (not for git commit signatures).

    I have pushed the new key to some keyservers, but, this repository seems to give more security then a gpg key server, this is why I think gitian keys should be stored here,... also for the reason that they could – in theory – be shipped with the deterministic built binary in order to verify new builds.

  6. MarcoFalke commented at 5:12 PM on March 1, 2017: member

    Hmm, I can't verify your signature on a vanilla xenial box with the gpg apt.

    gpg --verify 9899 
    gpg: Signature made Wed Mar  1 13:00:59 2017 UTC using ? key ID 16EA1E7F
    gpg: Can't check signature: unknown pubkey algorithm
    

    So I think this will not only break travis, but also make it harder for ppl to verify.

  7. jonasschnelli commented at 5:25 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    It requires gpg >= 2.1.17 with ECDSA support to verify those signatures. I think a project like Bitcoin Core should no longer only-rely on RSA for code sign and commit signatures. Github and many other projects have started to support ECDSA.

  8. gmaxwell commented at 5:39 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    I do not know of anyone with a founded belief P256 offers more security that 4096 bit RSA. But thats fine, not all keys here need to be equally secure.

    But it is an issue that there is no support for this in the stable version of GPG and so many systems cannot support this key and probably won't until after there is a stable GPG with ECC support (I believe this will 2.2) which has been out for a while-- which will probably be next year.

  9. MarcoFalke commented at 8:00 PM on March 1, 2017: member

    requires gpg >= 2.1.17

    2.1.0 should be enough, which actually ships with xenial and later. Though, I'd still prefer to wait a few months/years for the reasons @gmaxwell mentioned.

  10. jonasschnelli commented at 8:34 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    Okay. Fair enough,... then I (grudgingly) generate again a RSA4096 key.

  11. jonasschnelli commented at 9:25 PM on March 1, 2017: contributor

    Closing...

  12. jonasschnelli closed this on Mar 1, 2017

  13. MarcoFalke locked this on Sep 8, 2021

github-metadata-mirror

This is a metadata mirror of the GitHub repository bitcoin/bitcoin. This site is not affiliated with GitHub. Content is generated from a GitHub metadata backup.
generated: 2026-04-24 12:15 UTC

This site is hosted by @0xB10C
More mirrored repositories can be found on mirror.b10c.me