* [bitcoindev] [Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero
@ 2026-07-11 22:08 Junhyuk Jun Lee
2026-07-13 22:58 ` Melvin Carvalho
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Junhyuk Jun Lee @ 2026-07-11 22:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bitcoindev
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Hi, list.
*I'd like to share a paper on Bitcoin security in the fee-only regime,
after block rewards reach zero. *
This paper analyzes at what point deviating from honest mining becomes the
rational strategy and how to prevent massive deviation for
profit-maximizing miners using Base Fee, Fee Floor, and adaptive block
size rules .
*Results:*
1. We define a threshold (G_t) that signals when deviation becomes rational
in a fee-only regime.
2. In simulation, deviation becomes rational at fee differentials as low as
0.17% of transaction fees when the block reward reaches zero by continuous
halving.
3. We evaluate three mitigations and their effect on the deviation
threshold: base fees, fee floors, and adaptive block sizing.
*Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503 <https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503>*
Related discussion on Delving Bitcoin, including recent fee-equilibrium
modeling that approaches the same regime from the revenue side:
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/research-bitcoin-after-block-rewards-preventing-miners-deviation-when-the-bitcoin-rewards-is-zero/2626
https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/addressing-the-diminishing-block-subsidy/2640
Feedback on the model and its assumptions is welcome and whether the
mitigations are realistic as soft forks.
Best,
Junhyuk Lee
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* Re: [bitcoindev] [Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero
2026-07-11 22:08 [bitcoindev] [Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero Junhyuk Jun Lee
@ 2026-07-13 22:58 ` Melvin Carvalho
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Melvin Carvalho @ 2026-07-13 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Junhyuk Jun Lee; +Cc: bitcoindev
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ne 12. 7. 2026 v 0:09 odesílatel Junhyuk Jun Lee <xodn348@gmail.com> napsal:
> Hi, list.
>
> *I'd like to share a paper on Bitcoin security in the fee-only regime,
> after block rewards reach zero. *
>
> This paper analyzes at what point deviating from honest mining becomes the
> rational strategy and how to prevent massive deviation for
> profit-maximizing miners using Base Fee, Fee Floor, and adaptive block
> size rules .
>
> *Results:*
>
> 1. We define a threshold (G_t) that signals when deviation becomes
> rational in a fee-only regime.
> 2. In simulation, deviation becomes rational at fee differentials as low
> as 0.17% of transaction fees when the block reward reaches zero by
> continuous halving.
> 3. We evaluate three mitigations and their effect on the deviation
> threshold: base fees, fee floors, and adaptive block sizing.
>
> *Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503
> <https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.05503>*
>
At what halving epoch does your model predict deviation becomes materially
significant in practice?
For example, could this begin around 2040, when the subsidy falls to
roughly 0.195 BTC per block, or only much later?
>
>
> Related discussion on Delving Bitcoin, including recent fee-equilibrium
> modeling that approaches the same regime from the revenue side:
>
> https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/research-bitcoin-after-block-rewards-preventing-miners-deviation-when-the-bitcoin-rewards-is-zero/2626
> https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/addressing-the-diminishing-block-subsidy/2640
>
> Feedback on the model and its assumptions is welcome and whether the
> mitigations are realistic as soft forks.
>
> Best,
> Junhyuk Lee
>
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> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAEOyoSPQt%3DTTN-JOVxmCk9UvD1MMHwoHPSvm34Zf2gv8RjcxNg%40mail.gmail.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CAEOyoSPQt%3DTTN-JOVxmCk9UvD1MMHwoHPSvm34Zf2gv8RjcxNg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .
>
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2026-07-11 22:08 [bitcoindev] [Research] Bitcoin After Block Rewards: preventing miner deviation as the block rewards approaches zero Junhyuk Jun Lee
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