* [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions @ 2026-11-04 21:05 Cory Fields 2026-11-17 15:51 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Cory Fields @ 2026-11-04 21:05 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 9820 bytes --] I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. For the below, I'm assuming a future where: - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like Tripwire and/or manually) - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on this later) - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-fork rules. ## Quantum Landmines This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discussed here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work. Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above proof - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding her private key. The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taking the attacker's collateral. Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft. ## Staked Auction The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines. But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum attacker post-qday and take their collateral? Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to spend a legacy output: - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a bid is sufficient to spend - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as profit. The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacker can bid on before qday. There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. ## Sats Auction When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it could be used here. In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: - Collateral ratio - Min/Max bids and intervals - Where do the loser's coins go? ## Desired Auction Outcome Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome would be. - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in the first place? - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers sometimes winning to encourage the process? - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com. [-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 10397 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions 2026-11-04 21:05 [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions Cory Fields @ 2026-11-17 15:51 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 2026-11-17 17:25 ` Cory Fields 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List @ 2026-11-17 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cory Fields; +Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 11071 bytes --] Hi Cory, > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable intentionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong thing to incentivize. regards, conduition On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields <foss@coryfields.com> wrote: > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like Tripwire and/or manually) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on this later) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-fork rules. > > ## Quantum Landmines > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discussed here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work. > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above proof > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding her private key. > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taking the attacker's collateral. > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft. > > ## Staked Auction > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines. > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to spend a legacy output: > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a bid is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as profit. > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacker can bid on before qday. > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. > > ## Sats Auction > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it could be used here. > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > - Collateral ratio > - Min/Max bids and intervals > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome would be. > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in the first place? > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers sometimes winning to encourage the process? > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/eOU8hptEwRmWqXhtvW0jh5hf3jDya8G-Uw2t2SPPWS8FLDuCx4K56XczgyVhUzj3_fAUG2hrhnAFz7pLiQJhRURHr93f_-AyPWHzoGVI95I%3D%40proton.me. [-- Attachment #1.1.2.1: Type: text/html, Size: 13463 bytes --] [-- Attachment #1.2: publickey - conduition@proton.me - 0x474891AD.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 649 bytes --] [-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 323 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions 2026-11-17 15:51 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List @ 2026-11-17 17:25 ` Cory Fields 2026-11-18 23:45 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: Cory Fields @ 2026-11-17 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 13683 bytes --] Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look. Yes, the landmine would be purposeful bait. The reason it's interesting is because it makes it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe at any given time. This would have the effect of rendering any "freeze the coins that can't be safely spent" argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerability of _any_ unspent output, Satoshi's included, could not be known until attempting to steal it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense against a quantum attacker :) I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving coins seems backwards at first glance, but another way of looking at it is that the coins are "moved" as soon as the landmine is planted, in that they're protected and safely spendable at that point. It's just that their safety is not observable to anyone else. Depending on how forking and migration go, that could be a feature or an anti-feature. I presented these ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no other proposals for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to allow but disincentivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain transactions should we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but with these thought experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead ask "can we co-exist with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". Obviously I can't answer that question myself, but when attempt to reason through it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with involved financial punishments for theft and rewards for defending the chain against attacks. Landmines achieve both of those. It seems to me that if recovery schemes are on the table, it's worth considering whether we could take them a step further and use them as an actual offense/defense rather than just an escape hatch. The same collateral rules employed by landmines could be added to any recovery scheme in order to change the incentives. I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm definitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just sharing the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :) On Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 11:00:09 AM UTC-5 conduition wrote: > Hi Cory, > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. > > > If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior > to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an > quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable > intentionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the > wrong thing to incentivize. > > regards, > conduition > > > > On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields < > fo...@coryfields.com> wrote: > > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migration > to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how > to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, > I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is > just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like > Tripwire and/or manually) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in > order to be spent (more on this later) > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet > certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant > constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly > by soft-fork rules. > > ## Quantum Landmines > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discussed > here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a > quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe > output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any > legacy output type would work. > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also > embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine > this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it > also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is > signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never > revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new > rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a > transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe > output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the > private key is sufficient to spend > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one > signed for in the above proof > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent > as usual. > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except > that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding > her private key. > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe > 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, > and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described > above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the > attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the > output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends > the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an > input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while > also taking the attacker's collateral. > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just > like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes > Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable > coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as > they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that > on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to > theft. > > ## Staked Auction > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated > private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a > quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by > landmines. > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to > empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum > attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to > spend a legacy output: > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday > knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a > bid is sufficient to spend > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can > be spent as usual. > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated > landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, > but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of > 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid > of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In > order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be > constrained. > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the > vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required > 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending > conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an > auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction > period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it > to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are > lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction > continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her > staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but > nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 > coins as profit. > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum > attacker can bid on before qday. > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back > so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused > collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or > thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. > Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked > lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by > the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the > attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker > only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus > they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. > > ## Sats Auction > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested > that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See > the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it > could be used here. > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout > mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine > timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the > second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction > continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more > in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and > thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker > trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their > collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the auction > going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the > logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is > no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly > indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial > recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > - Collateral ratio > - Min/Max bids and intervals > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are > lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin > auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the > best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most > desirable outcome would be. > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in > the first place? > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers > sometimes winning to encourage the process? > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an > auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent > output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even > change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is > increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n%40googlegroups.com. [-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 16167 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions 2026-11-17 17:25 ` Cory Fields @ 2026-11-18 23:45 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 2026-11-20 22:15 ` Cory Fields 0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread From: 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List @ 2026-11-18 23:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Cory Fields; +Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 17511 bytes --] It's a neat idea conceptually (your superposition joke elicited a hearty chuckle!), but I fear your stated goal of "make it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe" is contrary to one of the most important metrics we need: a gauge for the progress of PQ migration. Without that we are effectively guessing about the ratio of classical/PQ coins when making future soft fork decisions, which seems like shaky ground. Further, i'm not sure that your goal would even be accomplished... As you note here: > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines. A quantum attacker could simply neglect to attack outputs created after the "landmine" soft fork was activated, and be certain that they'll never step on one. If any new output could be a landmine, the attacker would just focus on old outputs, e.g. satoshi era coins, and still have plenty of profit. > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. This is confusing. How does the network distinguish an attacker from the real honest user? If the honest user is trying to rescue their coins, why do they have to endure this rigmarole in order to do it, rather than using a rescue protocol like commit/reveal? Why does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He hasn't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would spend a given UTXO. Why would landmine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, given that it was created beyond a landmine soft fork was deployed? Why does Carol's 30 BTC bid win over Bob's 40 BTC bid? I'm not sure i see the logic here. Could you clarify what you mean by "staking"? AFAICT nobody has any coins timelocked or staked in any enforceable way (except apparently for the legacy UTXO?) Secondary concern: The collateralization requirement makes it possible to create outputs you cannot spend without access to more bitcoins for collateral. Tractable but very awkward UX. regards, conduition On Tuesday, November 17th, 2026 at 10:26 AM, Cory Fields <foss@coryfields.com> wrote: > Hi Conduition, thanks for taking a look. > > Yes, the landmine would be purposeful bait. > > The reason it's interesting is because it makes it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe at any given time. This would have the effect of rendering any "freeze the coins that can't be safely spent" argument moot (or disingenuous), as the vulnerability of _any_ unspent output, Satoshi's included, could not be known until attempting to steal it. UTXO superposition would be an ironic defense against a quantum attacker :) > > I agree that incentivizing _not_ moving coins seems backwards at first glance, but another way of looking at it is that the coins are "moved" as soon as the landmine is planted, in that they're protected and safely spendable at that point. It's just that their safety is not observable to anyone else. Depending on how forking and migration go, that could be a feature or an anti-feature. > > I presented these ideas because, as far as I'm aware, there have been no other proposals for turning the tables on a quantum attacker in order to allow but disincentivize it from attacking. The question of "what on-chain transactions should we incentivize" is of course very closely related, but with these thought experiments I aimed to take a step back a bit and instead ask "can we co-exist with an active quantum attacker while maintaining Bitcoin's ethos?". Obviously I can't answer that question myself, but when attempt to reason through it, the most Bitcoiny solutions I could come up with involved financial punishments for theft and rewards for defending the chain against attacks. Landmines achieve both of those. > > It seems to me that if recovery schemes are on the table, it's worth considering whether we could take them a step further and use them as an actual offense/defense rather than just an escape hatch. The same collateral rules employed by landmines could be added to any recovery scheme in order to change the incentives. > > I haven't thought it through enough to advocate for or against. And I'm definitely not advocating for anything that could slow migration. Just sharing the idea that it *could* be done with wider audience :)On Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 11:00:09 AM UTC-5 conduition wrote: > > > Hi Cory, > > > > > > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. > > > > > > If alice was online and aware enough to take such proactive action prior to Q-day, why wouldn't she simply move her 1 BTC legacy output to an quantum-safe wallet? Unless you're saying she is leaving coins vulnerable intentionally to bait a future quantum attacker, which I'd argue is the wrong thing to incentivize. > > > > regards, > > conduition > > > > > > > > > > On Wednesday, November 4th, 2026 at 2:14 PM, Cory Fields <fo...@coryfields.com> wrote: > > > > > I've had fun discussing these rough ideas regarding post-quantum migration to a few people in the last week. Rather than describing mechanics of how to do any of the below via soft fork, which I do believe to be possible, I'm leaving those details to a future exercise. The purpose of this post is just to introduce the ideas as thought experiments. > > > > > > For the below, I'm assuming a future where: > > > - We have a new quantum-safe output type pre-qday > > > - Some new validation rules are activated post-qday (Something like Tripwire and/or manually) > > > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be fully collateralized in order to be spent (more on this later) > > > - Post qday, all legacy output spends must be have outputs that meet certain conditions (time-locks and alternate spend paths) > > > > > > Note that the last two requirements are similar to vault/covenant constructions, but in this case their behavior could be enforced implicitly by soft-fork rules. > > > > > > ## Quantum Landmines > > > > > > This is a commit/reveal scheme, similar to those which have been discussed here, but with the addition of a payout in the case of proven theft. > > > > > > Alice has 3 unspent outputs: 1btc in a legacy output type, 1btc in a quantum-safe output, and a trivial amount of btc in another quantum-safe output (the landmine). Let's say that her legacy output is p2pk, though any legacy output type would work. > > > > > > Pre-qday, when Alice funded her trivial quantum-safe output, she also embedded within it a proof-of-knowledge. For the sake of example, imagine this is a taproot-like tree. So in addition to its script-spend-path, it also contains a leaf which commits to a new quantum-safe pubkey and is signed by her legacy p2pk private key. The existence of this leaf is never revealed unless/until it is used as a proof. > > > > > > Post-qday, in order to spend her legacy p2pk coin, recall that the new rules require that it must be fully collateralized. So she creates a transaction consisting of both of her 1btc inputs and a 2btc quantum-safe output. The output has the following implicit spending conditions: > > > - If re-spent within (say) 30 days, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > > > - If a proof is provided, the output's pubkey must be the same as the one signed for in the above proof > > > - If re-spent after the time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. > > > > > > To see why this is useful, let's now consider the same scenario, except that a quantum attacker is attempting to steal her p2pk coin after finding her private key. > > > > > > The attacker creates a transaction consisting of their own quantum-safe 1btc coin (for collateral) as well as Alice's vulnerable 1btc as inputs, and a 2btc output with the same required spending conditions described above. Because they have no pre-qday proof-of-knowledge of Alice's key, the attacker would have to wait the 30 days before they can re-spend the output. However, Alice notices the transaction in the meantime and spends the in-limbo output to her committed-to key by including her landmine as an input and revealing the proof. In doing so, she moves her own coins while also taking the attacker's collateral. > > > > > > Unbeknownst to the attacker, Alice's trivial output, which looked just like any other quantum-safe output, actually contained a landmine. > > > > > > This scheme is especially interesting because it actually incentivizes Alice to bait a quantum attacker pre-qday in order to double her vulnerable coins later, and thus makes quantum attackers wary of stealing coins as they may be secretly guarded by mines. It also muddies the waters so that on qday, it's not possible to analyze how many coins are vulnerable to theft. > > > > > > ## Staked Auction > > > > > > The obvious problem with relying on landmines alone is that the associated private keys for many vulnerable outputs are believed to be lost, thus a quantum attacker could reasonably assume that they are not guarded by landmines. > > > > > > But what if we could devise a similar collateral/commit/reveal scheme to empower users who stake their coins pre-qday in order to thwart a quantum attacker post-qday and take their collateral? > > > > > > Let's add a new required spending condition, so there are now 3 ways to spend a legacy output: > > > - If re-spent before the initial landmine timeout, a proof of pre-qday knowledge of the private key is sufficient to spend > > > - If re-spent after the landmine timeout but before the auction timeout, a bid is sufficient to spend > > > - If re-spent after the auction time-out, no proof is required and it can be spent as usual. > > > > > > Bob suspects that an old legacy unspent output of 50btc has no associated landmine and thus a quantum attacker will try to steal it in the future. > > > > > > Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. > > > > > > Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. > > > > > > Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. > > > > > > Carol sees Bob's winning bid and repeats the same process, using her staked 50btc to reveal her secret bid of 30btc. The auction continues, but nobody outbids her and the auction times out. She can now claim the 30 coins as profit. > > > > > > The staking requirement limits how many vulnerable coins a future quantum attacker can bid on before qday. > > > > > > There are many ways this could be designed. Bob could get his coins back so that a bid carries no risk, or be slashed for a losing bid. Unused collateral could be burned, or given to Carol, or given to miners, or thrown into a pot for later use. Staking requirements could be 1:1 or x:y. Staked time (coin age) could be taken into consideration. Etc. > > > > > > Notice that in this design, as long as there is a landmine or a staked lower bid on the vulnerable coins, they are never successfully stolen by the quantum attacker. The vulnerable coins are burned, and it's the attacker's collateral that is claimed by the auction winner. The attacker only ever makes away with the stolen coins if no one outbids them. Thus they're incentivized to make a very conservative bid. > > > > > > ## Sats Auction > > > > > > When describing the above auction scheme to Neha Narula, she suggested that the well-understood Dollar Auction game [0] could be used as well. See the link for more details and intuition, but I'll summarize briefly how it could be used here. > > > > > > In this case, there's no need for pre-qday staking. The spending/timeout mechanics are similar to a Staked Auction. > > > > > > Every spend of legacy coins triggers an auction after the landmine timeout. The highest bid wins the coins minus the bid, and the second-highest bid loses its bid and collects nothing. The auction continues until there are no more bids. Participants may keep bidding more in order to prevent themselves from ending up as the second-highest bid and thus having to pay. As a result, it's possible that a quantum attacker trying to spend a vulnerable 50btc output ends up losing all their collateral. Bidders could even attach additional inputs to keep the auction going beyond the value of the vulnerable output. > > > > > > This is interesting because, as the Wikipedia article mentions, the logical conclusion is for the attacker not to play. Also, because there is no pre-qday commitment requirement, the original coin owner (outwardly indistinguishable from an attacker) would actually have a chance at partial recovery if they chose to start the auction themselves. > > > > > > Similar to auction A, there are lots of knobs and levers here: > > > - Collateral ratio > > > - Min/Max bids and intervals > > > - Where do the loser's coins go? > > > > > > ## Desired Auction Outcome > > > > > > Having thought about these for a week or so, it's clear that there are lots of interesting ways to dissuade a quantum attack via a vulnerable coin auction using incentives and game theory. However, it's unclear what the best design would be because it's not even clear to me what the most desirable outcome would be. > > > > > > - Attempt to prevent a quantum attacker from ever attempting to steal in the first place? > > > - Attempt to encourage staking via auctions, with quantum attackers sometimes winning to encourage the process? > > > - Attempt to redistribute the coins as randomly as possible? If so, an auction could be designed to work more like a lottery, where every unspent output is a lottery ticket or authorization to bid. > > > > > > To complicate things even further, the most desirable outcome may even change as time goes on after qday, as the vulnerable coin spender is increasingly likely to be an attacker as opposed to the original owner. > > > > > > [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dollar_auction > > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+...@googlegroups.com. > > > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/40a9f73d-481f-47e6-a64b-acfb2c7f4fa8n%40googlegroups.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/6e4b738d-95ce-49ed-bbc6-afb1b64f7bb2n%40googlegroups.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/3Si-X9YGMmYLUCsKqrf8g84uAsg2xdkZMDpHXcLgqC1_KTnCw1J8kylgHw8PyGNjMkT4tpxSfKwnVNxX8QbnzuSzFDkdGGe96a7q_GTLnWg%3D%40proton.me. [-- Attachment #1.1.2.1: Type: text/html, Size: 24040 bytes --] [-- Attachment #1.2: publickey - conduition@proton.me - 0x474891AD.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 649 bytes --] [-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 323 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions 2026-11-18 23:45 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List @ 2026-11-20 22:15 ` Cory Fields 0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread From: Cory Fields @ 2026-11-20 22:15 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List [-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 8641 bytes --] Attempting to use the Google Groups web interface to respond inline, hopefully this goes ok... On Wednesday, November 18, 2026 at 7:30:51 PM UTC-5 conduition wrote: It's a neat idea conceptually (your superposition joke elicited a hearty chuckle!), but I fear your stated goal of "make it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe" is contrary to one of the most important metrics we need: a gauge for the progress of PQ migration. Without that we are effectively guessing about the ratio of classical/PQ coins when making future soft fork decisions, which seems like shaky ground. It's not a goal, it's an observation. Deliberately making it impossible to reason about how many coins are quantum-safe (and how much of a threat a quantum computer actually poses) is possible. I agree that would likely not be a good thing. But it's worthy of being common knowledge. A quantum attacker could simply neglect to attack outputs created after the "landmine" soft fork was activated, and be certain that they'll never step on one. If any new output could be a landmine, the attacker would just focus on old outputs, e.g. satoshi era coins, and still have plenty of profit. To be clear, landmines are new utxos which contain hidden proofs of signing ability for _other_ utxos. After a landmine soft fork and pre-qday (so, say, 2 years from now), if I were Satoshi, I could create a landmine which embeds a proof that I can spend the coinbase output from block 1. Then post-qday, If a quantum attacker attempts to steal the ancient coins, I reveal the proof in my recent landmine. In doing so, I take the coins and the attacker's collateral for myself, 100btc total. It's likely true that Satoshi's coins will/can never be spent, but not 100%. As of now, if Satoshi is still around and capable of spending their coins, they have very good reason not to do so as it would change the economic assumptions held by many users. So even if they could, they likely wouldn't. But if they were to wait until after qday and activate a landmine, they could decimate the threat of future quantum attacks. Much like the tripwire idea, the existence of the threat, however unlikely, means it can't be ignored. Pre-qday, He creates a quantum-safe output of 50btc with a secret leaf, but in this case it commits to a the vulnerable output, a bid amount of 40btc, and a new pubkey. This unspent transaction represents a staked bid of 40btc in the event that a particular vulnerable output is ever spent. In order to keep bidding sane, the allowed depth of bid-leaves could be constrained. Post-qday, a quantum attacker finds the private key associated with the vulnerable 50btc unspent output and spends it, along with the required 50btc of their own as collateral, to an output which has the above spending conditions and is worth 95btc. This represents a bid of 45btc. Because no landmine exists, the initial timeout comes and goes. Now an auction begins and continues until a second time-out. During this auction period, Bob reveals his staked 50btc output with a 40btc bid, and uses it to take 40btc of the attacker's collateral. The original stolen coins are lost, the attacker loses some or all of their collateral, and the auction continues. If nobody outbids him, Bob takes the 40btc as profit. This is confusing. How does the network distinguish an attacker from the real honest user? If the honest user is trying to rescue their coins, why do they have to endure this rigmarole in order to do it, rather than using a rescue protocol like commit/reveal? A landmine _is_ a rescue protocol. It just has an additional incentive feature. Perhaps I should've separated the two ideas in my original mail. Other rescue schemes could use the collateral/timelock trick as well. I left this out of the original message for simplicity, but it'd be trivial to add an exception to the collateral/timeout rules if a pre-qday ownership proof (in this case, a landmine) is included as an input along with the vulnerable coin spend. So you'd either have to attach a proof _or_ collateral in order to spend a pre-qday utxo. In the absence of a proof, the clock starts for the original owner to grab the attacker's collateral. The same protocol could be used for other pre-qday signing ability reveals like bip32 seed knowledge, landmines aren't special here. Why does bob have any right to the coins involved in this transaction? He hasn't proven anything, other than the fact that he predicted someone would spend a given UTXO. This is exactly the kind of question I was trying to evoke with the auction thought experiments! At this point, Bob, the quantum attacker, and the original owner all have the same ability to spend the coin. So who should succeed? Assuming there's no rescue transaction possible, as far as the outside world is concerned, all three are equal. PQ conversations thus far have essentially boiled this down to 2 choices: freeze the coins (nobody gets the coins which can't be safely rescued), or leave them vulnerable. When leaving them vulnerable, the attacker will almost certainly take the coins with exposed pubkeys, as the original owner would've moved them if they could've and were aware of the quantum risk. I'm introducing a new possibility: when a pre-qday spend happens, there's a time window in which coins can be rescued with a proof of pre-qday knowledge. If that timeout expires, a fair auction begins. This has the benefit of avoiding a unilateral coin freeze while also not rewarding the attacker more than any other user. Potentially going further and punishing them for trying, leading to a "the only winning move is not to play" scenario for everyone involved. The tricky part then becomes defining the rules for the auction. Why would landmine rules apply to this old legacy UTXO at all, given that it was created beyond a landmine soft fork was deployed? Landmines could be planted on any legacy utxo any time after a landmine soft-fork and before qday. Why does Carol's 30 BTC bid win over Bob's 40 BTC bid? I'm not sure i see the logic here. There are many ways to conduct an auction, this is just an example. In this case, it's a silent auction where the highest bidder wins. But because you're bidding on Bitcoin with Bitcoin, given two users with the same stake, the winner is the person who's willing to take the _least_ amount of profit. Could you clarify what you mean by "staking"? AFAICT nobody has any coins timelocked or staked in any enforceable way (except apparently for the legacy UTXO?) In this scenario, Bob has created his "bid" pre-qday by creating a 50btc output which contains a hidden leaf which contains a bid amount and reference to a vulnerable output. Post-qday, only pre-qday bids are considered. If Bob spends his 50btc in the meantime via a different leaf, he loses his bid as well. So even though the coin was never timelocked, its age when revealed as a bid proves he had skin in the game. As another auction scenario, it could be that the winner is decided based solely on bid age. In yet another, a new output type could be added that could _only_ be spent as a quantum bid, effectively locking it up forever otherwise. That demonstrates a much bigger ante... If someone is willing to potentially burn 50 coins in order to take (say) 25btc of a Satoshi-era utxo, on a bet that qday comes years later and a steal is attempted, I'd say they deserve the win. The bid/stake/auction possibilities are endless :) Secondary concern: The collateralization requirement makes it possible to create outputs you cannot spend without access to more bitcoins for collateral. Tractable but very awkward UX. Thanks for pointing this out. See above about the exception for post-qday spends which reveal pre-qday ownership proofs in the same tx. Like other rescue schemes, no collateral is needed in that case. regards, conduition Thank you very much for the thoughtful response! Cory -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/ffd99327-f633-4e2e-bc54-cc1389ffebccn%40googlegroups.com. 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end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-21 21:55 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-11-04 21:05 [bitcoindev] Quantum Landmines and Vulnerable Coin Auctions Cory Fields 2026-11-17 15:51 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 2026-11-17 17:25 ` Cory Fields 2026-11-18 23:45 ` 'conduition' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List 2026-11-20 22:15 ` Cory Fields
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